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Ⅱ   Thesis abstract  
 
Human displacement occurs when people are motivated to leave their home country and when 
those who are eager to escape are given the opportunity to do so. In this regard, regime 
transition in the country of origin can be a key to understanding the phenomenon of forced 
migration: people’s motivations and opportunities for fleeing can be increased or limited by 
such a process. However, relatively few studies have systematically addressed how regime 
transition in the country of origin of forced migration affects the exodus of people, although 
studies on the causes of forced migration are extensive. This thesis aims to investigate how 
various forms of regime transition affect forced migration. The types of regime transition on 
which this study focuses are democratization, autocratization, and a radical replacement of the 
regime by a coup d’état. 
 
The first paper analyzes the impact of regime change through a coup d’état on the volume 
of refugee outflow generated. Much research points to the relevance of political instability and 
violent armed conflict in explaining refugee flows, yet we still know little about whether and 
how other forms of political instability such as coups d’état create incentives for forced 
migration. We, therefore, develop a theory to describe the influence of coups on individuals’ 
decisions to flee, highlighting the fact that coup events exacerbate individuals’ physical and 
economic insecurity and thus increase incentives to flee. We consider successful and failed 
coups and assess our claims using data for all countries between 1980 and 2015. Our most 
conservative estimates suggest that successful coups have a substantive effect on the number 
of refugees: forced migration from countries that have experienced a successful coup is 40 
percent larger than in countries that have not experienced a coup. We illustrate the theoretical 
8 
 
mechanisms by analyzing four coups in two counties: Uruguay in 1973 and 1976 and Egypt in 
2011 and 2013. 
 
The second paper determines whether regime shifts play a role in creating or constraining 
willingness and opportunities to flee and if they cause an increase in the number of people in 
the country of origin with the intention of seeking asylum elsewhere. Specifically, regime shifts 
refer to changes in political regimes: such regimes can vary qualitatively, as some regimes 
move toward democracy (democratization), whereas others shift along the spectrum in the 
opposite direction toward autocracy (autocratization). Using panel data covering the period 
from 2000 to 2016 across 118 countries, my results show that the number of asylum seekers 
tends to increase when a country experiences either sudden democratization or autocratization. 
Nevertheless, the level of increase is dependent on the political regime of the time. Specifically, 
for democratized countries, the increase in asylum seekers tends to be smaller if the countries 
experience a further democratic regime shift. Such a diminishing marginal effect is explained 
by the decrease in willingness to escape gradually outweighing the effects of greater 
opportunity to escape, which occurs in more democratic countries. In other words, as 
democratic countries become more democratic, the outward flow of the population becomes 
less prominent because people are less motivated to escape, even if the opportunity to escape 
is greater. On the other hand, during autocratization, the increase in asylum seekers is larger if 
the countries were more democratic (or less autocratic) prior to the regime shift. There is an 
increasingly marginal effect because in more democratic milieus, opportunities to escape still 
exist that accommodate the increase in willingness to escape as a result of autocratization. In 
other words, if an already autocratic country further autocratizes, the population outflow is 
mitigated, as the citizen’s opportunities to escape the country are marginal to start with and 




This study not only analyzes countries that have already experienced refugee outflows but 
also focuses on an area that has not experienced a mass outflow of forced migrants. The third 
paper examines different paths of regime development that the North Korean regime can follow, 
including 1) regime collapse, 2) status quo, and 3) democratic transition, and analyzes the 
possible impacts of each regime development path on forced migrations from North Korea. A 
statistical model is developed to examine the effects of the three regime variants on population 
outflow across autocratic milieus. The study employs a panel dataset covering 138 countries 
from 2000 to 2016. My findings show that the collapse of the regime and democratic transition 
in autocratic countries can increase the magnitude of the outflow of forced migrants, while the 
maintenance of the regime’s status quo has no significant impact on it. In other words, the 
findings imply, on the one hand, that if North Korea follows a path of regime collapse or 
democratic transition, the volume of forced migration generated may increase. On the other 
hand, if the current regime continues to maintain power in a manner resembling its current state, 
population outflow from North Korea will be deterred. The key conceptual framework of this 
study explains the relationship between a regime transition and population outflows, as well as 
distinguishing the motivation and opportunities for people to flee by controlling for the 
presence in a country of an autocratic military regime. In particular, the motivation and 
opportunities for North Koreans to flee may be increased or restricted depending on the path 








Ⅲ   Introductory remarks  
 
In 2019, it was estimated that there were over 70 million people worldwide who had been 
forcibly displaced. Alongside this increase in the volume of displaced populations, the areas 
affected by the outflow and inflow of displaced populations across borders have gradually 
expanded, and large-scale forced migration raises a variety of issues across socioeconomic, 
political, and security areas, becoming a global issue that cannot be overlooked. To understand 
and tackle the phenomenon of forced migration, a considerable literature has developed on the 
theme of the causes of human displacement.  
 
Some studies focus on economic motives by pointing out that poor economic conditions in 
the countries of origin of displacement are the leading cause of mass exoduses (Akokpari 1998; 
Breunig et al. 2012; Damm 2009; Neumayer 2005). The majority of studies of forced migration 
conclude that the occurrence of violence in general is a major determinant of displacement 
(Davenport et al., 2003; Melander and Ö berg, 2007; Moore and Shellman, 2004; Schmeidl, 
1997; Weiner, 1996). Since forced migration has tended to originate in areas in which violent 
conflicts exist, the approach that connects a rise in security threats due to generalized violence 
with increases in forced migration has gained wide support from scholars. Although it is true 
that conflict-induced displacement accounts for a high proportion of total human displacement, 
the possibility that human displacement that is not due to violent conflict is still occurring 
worldwide should not be overlooked. More importantly, given that human displacement is a 
complex phenomenon caused by a combination of various factors, further analysis of the non-
violent factors that cause displacement is necessary, as is an assessment of the structural 
conditions that enable people to leave or otherwise prevent them from doing so. While many 
studies pay attention to what drives people to leave their homes, some scholars are concerned 
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about what makes people unable to leave (Carling, 2002; de Haas, 2014). Forced migration 
becomes visible when people who are motivated to leave their homes are given the opportunity 
to leave. Therefore, in studying forced migration, it is necessary to analyze both what motivates 
people to escape and whether they are given the opportunity to flee.  
 
In this respect, the issue of regime transitions in the country of origin of displacement is 
worth visiting. Political instability caused by a transition in the ruling regime can either 
motivate or demotivate people to leave the country. Furthermore, to the extent that the regime 
of the country of origin of displacement is the driver that creates a structural environment that 
provides opportunities for people to escape or limits those opportunities, transitions in the 
regime can be key to explaining an increase in human displacement (Chiswick and Hatton 2003; 
Howard, 2010; Miller and Peters 2018). However, very few studies have systematically 
addressed how transitions in political regimes affect the volume of human displacement. The 
primary purpose of this thesis is to investigate how various forms of regime developments 
affect human displacement. This study presents three independent papers after a brief literature 
review of the research on forced migration. 
 
With reference to the fact that a regime transition can occur when the holder of the ruling 
power is replaced, the first paper pays attention to the impacts of coups on refugee outflows in 
autocratic countries. The term “coup d’état” refers to “illegal and overt attempts by the military 
or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting executive” (Powell and Thyne, 
2011, p. 252). A coup is the defining type of regime transition that leads to political instability, 
which in turn causes various political and security threats. Given that, in a coup, the 
replacement of the existing regime occurs through non-constitutional and largely coercive 
means, the analysis of its impact on forced migration has been underdeveloped in previous 
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studies (Bodea et al., 2016). We hypothesize that the intensified political and economic 
insecurity and uncertainty from the onset of a coup attempt are likely to increase people’s 
motivation to flee and to lead to a population outflow. In addition, we hypothesize that a 
successful coup attempt would create greater threats to people than a failed coup attempt, and 
thus an increase in forced migration is more likely to be observed when a coup attempt is 
successful than when it fails. The results of a statistical analysis based on cross-national 
samples from 1980 to 2015 show that the occurrence of a successful coup plays a crucial role 
in triggering refugee flows. The cases of coups in 1973 and 1976 in Uruguay and in 2011 and 
2013 in Egypt further provide a causal mechanism showing how political and economic 
instability was initiated and escalated by coups and further contributed to the increase in forced 
migration.  
 
In the second paper, my aim is to explain the growth in the volume of asylum seekers in 
connection with the transition in the political system of the country of origin. In the existing 
studies on forced migration, the type and maturity of the political system have been used as 
criteria to measure satisfaction with the regime, and these factors tend to be analyzed as 
influencing people’s motivation to leave the country. However, in terms of their impact on 
forced migration, the established political system and the transition in the regime need to be 
discussed separately. A regime transition toward democracy or autocracy may be closely linked 
to the increase or decrease in opportunities for people to leave the country, as it reflects the 
degree of change in the level of regime control over the country’s citizens. To test this theory, 
I set out two different directions in which the regime can move. A shift in regime can vary 
qualitatively, as some autocracies move toward democracy (democratization), whereas others 
shift even further along the spectrum toward absolutism (autocratization). Using time-series 
cross-sectional data, I evaluate how two phenomena, democratization and autocratization, 
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affect people’s motivation to flee and how they structurally limit people’s ability to escape to 
other countries. The results show, on the one hand, that a regime shift toward democracy can 
provide asylum seekers with greater opportunities to escape by easing state control of 
population outflow. On the other hand, autocratic regime transitions can also cause population 
outflows by increasing the motivation to flee. Furthermore, the impact of democratization on 
the volume of forced migration generated in an autocratic country is greater than in a 
democratic country, while the impact of autocratization on the volume of forced migration 
generated in a democratic country is greater than that in an autocratic country. These findings 
suggest that the effect of a transition in the regime on the motivation and opportunity of those 
who want to leave a state depends on the political system of the country at the time of the 
regime transition and that the extent of its influence on the volume of forced migration 
generated may vary. 
 
The first and second papers explain how the different types of regime transition can affect 
the growth of forced migration differently by using both large-n quantitative analysis and case 
studies. While the first and second papers attempt to identify the correlation between the regime 
transition and forced displacement by looking at past cases, the third paper focuses on an area 
in which political uncertainty exists, but that has not yet experienced mass exodus. It evaluates 
how the various forms of regime transition discussed in the first and second papers will affect 
the volume of forced migration generated in the future if they occur in North Korea. I set out 
the paths of regime development that the North Korean regime can follow in the future as 1) 
regime collapse, 2) status quo, and 3) democratic transition and analyzed the possible impacts 
of each regime transition on population outflow from North Korea. Consistently with the 
previous two papers, the key conceptual framework of the third article, which explains the 
relationship between regime transition and population outflows, is the motivation to escape and 
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the availability of opportunities for people to emigrate or flee. Regime transition in an 
extremely autocratic state such as North Korea can be interpreted as a change in the level of 
structural control exercised by the regime on its people. The motivation and opportunity for 
North Koreans to flee may be increased or reduced depending on the path the regime transition 
follows. The study employs a panel dataset covering 138 countries from 2000 to 2016. The 
findings suggest that regime collapse and democratic transition in autocratic countries can 
increase the magnitude of the outflow of forced migrants. The findings imply that sudden 
regime collapse in North Korea is likely to increase the volume of asylum seekers originating 
in North Korea by intensifying the political and security uncertainty and paralyzing 
governmental control over the people. An increase in the degree of people’s motivation and 
opportunity for fleeing is expected with the onset of regime collapse. On the one hand, if the 
North Korean regime maintains its current tight ruling system, population outflow from North 
Korea will be deterred because the regime’s firm control over its people will continue. On the 
other hand, a democratic transition in the North Korean regime could also increase the volume 
of population outflow. In such circumstances, people’s desire to enjoy a previously unknown 
life free from famine and political oppression is likely to manifest itself in the form of a mass 
exodus, which can provide people with greater opportunities to flee. A sudden regime collapse 
and a democratic transition may have something in common, in that both phenomena can lead 
to a weakening or loss of regime control over the people in that country. Thus, these types of 
regime transitions would potentially cause mass outflows from North Korea. The international 
community needs to prepare for a transition in the North Korean regime, which has the potential 






Ⅳ   Literature review  
 
In this section, an overview of the existing literature on forced migration is provided to identify 
under-explored research areas that have scope for further development. The overall structure 
of the review takes the form of six parts. The first part reviews existing studies of the causes of 
forced migration. In the second part, research gaps are identified, highlighting the importance 
of regime transition in analyzing forced migration. As the section pertaining to theory, the third 
part reviews some core studies that provided inspiration for establishing the theoretical 
framework. The linkages between regime transition and forced migration are mainly discussed 
in this part. The method of analysis used in the thesis is presented in the fourth part. In the fifth 
part, some of the key terms in the field of forced migration are presented and the groups of 
forced migrants, which are the subjects of this paper, are introduced. In the final part, the areas 
in which this paper can contribute to knowledge are presented. 
 
1 The causes of forced migration  
1.1 Socioeconomic insecurity and forced migration  
 
A worsened economic situation has long been recognized as an important cause closely related 
to the phenomenon of international migrant flows. Most migration theories view economic 
security as both a determinant of the outflow of immigrants and a key factor in attracting an 
influx of immigrants. Functionalist theories take the view that the desire to pursue a better 
economic life is a major factor in determining the migration of individuals (Borjas, 1989; Lee, 
1966; Todaro, 1969). Structural theories, however, stress that the economic situation is part of 
a structural environment that causes migration with specific and recognizable patterns. The 
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core argument that ties these theories together is that the flow of capital formed by development 
or investment leads to the creation, overflow, or shortage of jobs in a given area and that 
ultimately causes migration flows and forms a pattern of international migration (Castles and 
Kosack, 1973; Massey, 1998; Piore, 1979; Polanyi, 2001). A similar approach with an 
emphasis on economic factors can also be found in studies attempting to understand forced 
migration, and economic insecurity is often considered one of the leading causes of forced 
migration. Scholars such as Castles (2007) and Richmond (1995) point out that the legal and 
conceptual framework for distinguishing between genuine refugees from political persecution 
and bogus asylum seekers with a socioeconomic motivation is problematic; they do so by 
emphasizing that the migration of refugees, like most migrants, is caused by a combination of 
various factors. In a similar vein, Zimmermann (2011) points out that many refugees did not 
flee political violence itself but a situation in which their socioeconomic assets were collapsed 
by political violence, which threatened their survival. Economic marginalization and poverty 
and unstable employment conditions have been pointed out as major determinants of refugee 
outbreaks in a study by Lindstrøm (2005).  
 
Weiner (1996) points out in his paper, “Bad Neighbors, Bad Neighborhood: An Inquiry into 
the Causes of Refugee Flows,” that poor economic conditions in the country of origin of 
refugees can push people to leave. He reaffirms that widespread unemployment, along with the 
oppression that the authoritarian regime exerts on the people, has made Haiti the epicenter of 
mass refugees. He also argues that the massive outflow of population from Eastern European 
countries that emerged after the collapse of the Communist regime in 1989 could be seen as a 
migration by those looking to escape economic insecurity and seek better economic conditions. 
A similar claim is found in a study by Shellman and Stewart (2007), which shows that, based 
on an analysis of the pattern of migration from Haiti to the United States in the late 1990s, both 
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the political repression exercised by the despotic regime and economic hardship forced 
Haitians to move to the United States. Ogata (1995) asserts that poverty, economic aggravation, 
climate change, and demographic factors are the main issues driving people to find and move 
to a better environment. More importantly, he points out that these factors play a role in 
deepening political instability, which has a direct or indirect impact on refugee outflows. For 
this reason, he argues that it is problematic to distinguish between the factors that create general 
migrants and refugees. Based on an analysis of the influx of asylum seekers from countries in 
Asia and Africa to Europe, Vogler and Rotte (2000) argue that the wage gap in sending 
countries is positively correlated with the amount of population outflow. 
 
Akokpari (1998) claims that refugee flows from sub-Saharan African countries in the 1990s 
were driven by economic deterioration and famine. He explains that post-colonial African 
countries did not have efficient political and economic systems for economic reconstruction 
and that the prevailing political corruption and opaque and unfair economic environment 
deepened the fragility of those nations, resulting in mass refugee outflows. In a similar vein, 
Raleigh (2011) argues that poverty, along with conflict in the developing world, especially in 
Asia and Africa, is a significant factor pushing people away from their home countries. Many 
studies have found that food depletion and famine are closely linked to forced population 
movement (Dirks et al., 1980; Hugo, 1984; Maharatna, 2014). Chakraborty (2011) gives a 
historical example of extreme famine in South India at the end of the 19th century, leading to 
massive forced migration, showing that famine and insufficient cultivation are also strongly 
correlated with massive population displacement. 
 
While many studies attempt to analyze the socioeconomic insecurity of countries producing 
forced migration as a push factor, some scholars argue that better economic security in migrant 
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host countries is a pull factor that induces population migration. Hatton (2004), in his study, 
shows that relative incomes and a stable employment environment in the destination country 
have a significant impact on the volume of asylum seekers. Also, in his subsequent study (2009), 
he shows that 95% of asylum applications during the periods 1987–1991 and 2002–2006 were 
concentrated in industrialized countries. This trend reflects how poor economic conditions in 
the home country and a better economic environment in the destination country are factors 
driving the migration of asylum seekers. In their analysis, Breunig et al. (2012) show that the 
GDP of the refugee’s country of origin has no significant effect on population outflow, while 
the GDP of the receiving countries has a positive and significant effect on the volume of 
migration generated. Damm (2009) shows that economic factors such as a stable employment 
and welfare environment are a major consideration for refugees in choosing their first 
destination as well as their subsequent destination. In a study by Havinga and Böcker (1999), 
the existence of a labor market is considered a decisive factor for asylum seekers in determining 
their destination. Even if the host country takes restrictive legal measures against the formal 
employment of asylum seekers, if an informal labor market exists in the host country, it can be 
considered to represent an economic opportunity for asylum seekers and thus affects their 
destination decision. 
 
1.2 Conflict-induced forced migration  
 
It is evident that when people are exposed directly or indirectly to violent conflict, the most 
common option for unarmed citizens is to escape (Lischer, 2014). Political violence is 
considered one of the most significant factors that have forced people to move in the past, do 
so in the present, and will probably continue to do so in the future (Donato and Massey, 2016). 
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There are a large number of published studies that attempt to demonstrate the causal impact of 
political conflict on forced migration in both quantitative and qualitative studies. 
 
Schmeidl’s (1997) study is one of the most cited in the field of conflict-induced displacement. 
In her seminal work, the types of conflict which can increase forced migration are identified 
based on a cross-national analysis. According to that analysis, international warfare, civil 
warfare, and genocide/politicide can significantly affect forced migration. One well-known 
early study that is also often cited in the field of forced migration is that of Weiner (1996), who 
gives an overview of the major violent conflicts that have occurred since the Second World 
War, and of the global situation of refugees. He classifies four types of conflict as having 
caused an increase in the number of refugees. These were interstate wars, anti-colonial wars, 
non-ethnic conflicts, and civil conflicts. He also categorizes countries that are vulnerable to the 
outbreak of conflicts and refugee flows as “Bad Neighborhoods.” He argues that the presence 
of bad neighborhoods can hamper the security of an entire region.  
 
One of the most influential accounts of the determinants of forced migration comes from 
Davenport et al. (2003). In their study, based on a cross-national analysis of the period from 
1964 to 1989, civil war and genocide/politicide also show positive and robust statistical 
significance as predictors of increases in forced migration. Given the period covered by their 
analysis, it suggests that particular types of generalized violence such as civil war and 
genocide/politicide appear to have had a strong influence on forced migration in the periods 
both before and after the Cold War. What stands out in their findings is that while the degree 
of conflict accumulation has no significant effect on forced migration, the variety of conflicts 
is shown to increase the security threat and to lead to an increase in forced migration. Crawley 
et al. (2003) also identify violent conflict as the leading cause of forced migration. They list 
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eight driving determinants of the inflow of asylum seekers into Europe and point out that three 
of them are related to political violence in the origin countries. The intensified lack of security 
and the human rights violations caused by warfare and persecution are found to be the driving 
causes of the inflow of asylum seekers to Europe. In the same vein, they point out that well-
established democratic institutions and the rule of law in European countries are the significant 
pull factors attracting asylum seekers. It is because of the belief that a democratic political 
system and long-standing peace would provide shelter that asylum seekers fleeing persecution 
chose European countries. A significant analysis and discussion of the causes of forced 
migration are presented by Neumayer (2005). In his cross-national analysis, he finds that intra-
group warfare and dissident violence, such as civil war and ethnic war, can lead to population 
outflows, based on a statistical analysis of asylum seekers entering Europe from 1982 to 1999. 
This finding is contrary to that of Schmeidl (1997), who has suggested that the occurrence of 
genocide is strongly associated with forced migration.  
 
In Melander and Öberg’s study (2006), both the presence of intrastate violence (wars and 
minor armed conflicts) and the geographical scope of violence (ethnic and revolutionary 
fighting) have a statistically significant effect on and show a linear relationship with the 
outbreak of forced migration. Also, their analysis shows that existing accumulated refugee 
networks do not have the effect of inducing additional refugee outflows. On the other hand, 
based on the analysis of the pattern of forced migration to 28 European countries, Brück et al. 
(2018) argue that the existing network of those settled in Europe as a result of forced migration 
significantly induces subsequent refugee inflow. They report that escalating violence, not 
accumulated violence, significantly affects the increase in forced migration. Moore and 
Shellman’s series of analyses (2004; 2007) gives some reliable methods for calculating the 
geopolitical, political, economic, cultural, and historical factors in identifying the causes of 
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forced migration. Their main findings, that international and civil wars and genocide are the 
types of political violence that can cause displacement, support previous research linking 
generalized violence and forced migration. Notably, their study adopts a geographic approach 
to the impact of conflict on forced migration by arguing that the size of the geographic area 
that violence affects is proportional to the amount of forced migration. Schon (2015) also 
suggests, based on a case analysis on Somalia, that the expansion of the geopolitical scope of 
a conflict can increase the size of forced migration outflows. This result implies that more 
people are affected by the conflict due to the increased scope of the fighting. A similar result 
is also found in Melander and Öberg’s study (2007), a cross-national analysis covering 151 
countries from 1981 to 1999. Consistent with the literature, they find that armed conflict is an 
important determinant of forced migration. Also, they highlight that it is not the intensity of 
the armed conflict but the geopolitical range of the conflict’s effects that has a significant 
impact on forced displacement. 
 
Many previous studies use cross-national analysis to identify the determinants of forced 
migration at the macro-level. In contrast, another group of studies focuses on individual 
patterns of outmigration with the onset of political violence and analyzes the determining 
factors for the decision to flee at the micro-level. For example, Adhikari (2013) identifies 
various factors that can determine the individual decision to escape in a civilian conflict 
situation, based on a public opinion survey conducted in Nepal. Interestingly, his research 
draws fine distinctions between actual violence and the threat of violence and analyzes the 
influence of each on forced migration. He argues that both exposure to direct violence and the 
threat from indirect exposure can increase forced migration. Then, he highlights the finding 
that the incidence of displacement caused by direct violence is much higher than that caused 




Czaika and Kis-Katos (2009) analyze the push and pull factors of migration under a civil 
conflict that lasted from 1999 to 2002 in Aceh, Indonesia. According to their analysis, 
displacement tends to be prominent in areas where violent conflict is concentrated. In other 
words, the increase in security threats pushes individuals to flee. On the other hand, the 
presence of the police in the village appears to reduce displacement, indicating that the stable 
public safety provided by government authorities reduces the outflow of migration while 
increasing the inflow. Even in a conflict situation, rural–urban migration patterns appear to 
continue. Czaika and Kis-Katos (2009) interpret socioeconomic factors as being still important 
in selecting destinations for individuals, even under extreme circumstances. What is striking in 
the findings of this study is that the factors that cause internally displaced people to become 
displaced are not much different from the causes of people becoming refugees. Similar research 
was conducted by Lozano-Gracia et al. (2010) based on the case of Colombia. Their study 
statistically analyzes the impact of violence on the migration of displaced individuals between 
cities. The results show that the presence of violence in a city increases outmigration while 
suppressing population influx. Furthermore, the higher the degree of violence, the more people 
tend to migrate farther from the area where violence occurred. 
 
A household-level analysis of Colombia’s IDP migration patterns was also conducted by 
Engel and Ibáñez (2007). They provide some insightful findings through surveys of people 
displaced in 2000. As with the study by Lozano-Gracia et al. (2010), it was found that security 
considerations play an important role in the migration decision-making process. The presence 
of paramilitary and guerrilla groups in the region tends to increase the incidence of 
outmigration. Also, the finding that the presence of police can reduce displacement by reducing 
security threats to people is consistent with a study by Czaika and Kis-Katos (2009). On the 
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other hand, their findings show that a high level of satisfaction with basic needs, such as access 
to social services, education, and public utilities, reduces people’s willingness to move. Based 
on a survey conducted in Baghdad, Iraq, in 2015, Ozaltin et al. (2019) analyzed the factors 
leading Iraqis facing violent conflict to choose to flee. It is of note that only 60% of respondents 
who had been exposed to direct violence considered immigrating within the next three years. 
What is interesting about their findings is that many of the respondents who predicted that the 
conflict would end in the near future still wanted to move. They conclude that apart from 
violence, the existence of various demographic factors, such as respondents’ employment 
patterns, income levels, and education levels, appears to influence migration decisions.  
 
Cantor (2016) pays attention to the trend of increased forced migration in the countries 
comprising the Northern Triangle of Central America, where the homicide rate is exceptionally 
high. He argues that the impact of organized criminal violence on forced displacement is as 
significant as that of armed conflict at the national level. He identifies violence by various types 
of organized criminal groups, such as gangs, as a major cause of forced migration in these 
countries. While many studies pay attention to international and intrastate warfare, this study 
offers a fresh perspective on the importance of domestic-level violence on displacement in that 
some regions may experience forced displacement due to new security threats. Similarly, 
Ibáñez and Vélez (2008) also find that forced displacement from Colombia is greatly affected 
by violence against civilians by illegal armed groups. 
 
Refugee crises have been concentrated in particular regions of the world. Hence, many 
studies attempting to uncover the causes and effects of refugee crises include an area study 
(McColl, 1993). Several good examples are presented below. Osborne (1980) focuses on the 
refugee crises that occurred in the Indochinese region during the 1970s. His paper compares 
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the leading causes of mass flows of refugees that were generated in three different countries: 
Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. According to his paper, intensified ideological conflicts 
between democratic and communist regimes, inter-ethnic conflicts, and natural disasters are 
assumed as the root causes of the refugee crisis in Vietnam, while the causes of refugee crises 
in Cambodia and Laos were deeply associated with, respectively, the outbreak of the Second 
Indochina war and with Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia. He assumes that the local ideological 
conflicts in those countries were deeply affected by the international political environment, 
which was formed by the then-ongoing Sino-Soviet dispute. An interesting feature of his work 
is that it attempts to address how the refugee-hosting countries’ policies toward refugees were 
altered by the international politics of the region. Lui’s research (2007) attempts to analyze the 
causes of refugee crises in Asia and suggests that human rights abuses, armed conflicts, and 
political insecurity are the general causes of people becoming refugees in the region. However, 
the main focal point of the study is on identifying the reasons for the prolonged and settled 
situations of refugees in the host countries rather than on addressing the specific causes of the 
refugee crisis. The paper argues that refugees in Asia have been in a state of total neglect due 
to the lack of peacebuilding efforts and political will from both refugee-generating and 
receiving countries to improve the refugee situation. Monsutti and Balci (2014) analyze the 
mass exodus from Central Asia from a historical perspective. They show that the political, 
social, and ethnic tensions arising from the state-building process of independent republics that 
were formerly part of the Soviet Union have resulted in violence such as civil wars, riots, and 
genocide, which have driven the mass outflow. They also give the example of the mass stateless 
population that emerged with the collapse of the former Soviet Union and explain how 
involuntary displacement, although not directly induced by the conflict, can be caused by the 
collapse of the state and the emergence of new countries. While many studies focus on 
analyzing the immediate impact of warfare on forced migration, Kurtenbach et al. (2016) focus 
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on the trend of forced migration after the conclusion of civil war, by analyzing the cases of 
Nepal and El Salvador. They highlight the fact that forced migration tends not to cease 
immediately after the end of a war in a region. They point out that the ongoing outflow of 
forced migration after a war is due to the unstable peace established after the hostilities, the 
continued outbreak of domestic-level violence, the government’s oppression, and the low 
quality of the economy.  
 
Ibeanu (1990) views class struggle as the fundamental cause of the refugee crisis in Southern 
Africa. The study reports that the apartheid system that strengthened ethnic disharmony has 
continuously created various forms of violence, such as wars and coups d’état, and aggravated 
social divisions, resulting in serious famine, inequality, and a mass volume of displacement in 
the region. In his papers analyzing the determinants of forced migration in the region of Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA), Naudé (2009, 2010) highlights how violent conflict is the single most 
critical cause of forced migration. He predicts that conflict-induced outmigration is likely to 
decrease because violent conflicts in the region are diminishing compared to the past. However, 
he warns that environmental deterioration in this region could have further adverse impacts on 
the socioeconomic and security sectors and, consequently, lead to another wave of forced 
migration. Iqbal (2007) conducted a statistical analysis of the impacts of geopolitical influences 
on refugee flows during times of violent conflict, focusing on cases in post–Cold War era 
Africa. The results of this study demonstrate that the distance between a country that is 
experiencing conflict and a host country is negatively correlated with the volume of refugees 
generated, suggesting that geographical proximity plays a key role in forced migration. Also, 
the presence of violent conflict in a host country has a significant deterrent effect on forced 
migration. In this analysis, the size of the population, both in the country of origin and the host 
country, has positive correlations with refugee flows. By comparing the cases of Burundi, 
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Uganda, Rwanda, and Tanzania, Tom (2014) claims that common factors causing mass 
displacement found in countries in the Great Lakes Region of Africa are the prevalent poor 
governance and political conflicts that arise in the post-colonial period. Also, he points to 
Tanzania as an outlier in the region. He explains that the reason Tanzania has not experienced 
either a major-scale conflict or mass forced displacement is the political and economic stability 
that has been achieved through democratic political institutions. Purdeková (2017) identifies 
the fundamental causes of large-scale re-displacement of returned refugees and IDPs that have 
emerged in Burundi in 2015, based on interviews with Burundians from 2013 to 2015 across 
the region. She finds that the returned refugees and IDPs in Burundi decide to leave the country 
again not only when faced with direct harassment by the state, but also when witnessing that 
the home country does not have enough willingness and ability to protect them and that they 
are granted only partial rights as citizens. In other words, when the political promise presented 
by the state is broken, people express their distrust of the government through re-displacement 
as a “voice in exit”. 
 
2 Research gaps  
 
The field of forced migration studies is growing. After reviewing previous research, I find a 
number of unresolved questions remain about the causes and conditions that trigger forced 
migration. 
First, in analyzing trends and patterns of forced migration outbreaks, a great deal of previous 
research has focused on the push (motivation) factors that make people leave their homes. Up 
to now, however, little attention has been paid to the question of the conditions under which 
people can leave, and theoretical or empirical analysis on the issue is inconclusive. We witness 
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that there are areas that do not experience a population outflow despite the presence of the 
socioeconomic, political, economic, and environmental motivating factors that have been 
pointed out in past studies. Conversely, in the absence of these factors, some areas still 
experience a population outflow. This suggests that in order to understand the outbreak of 
forced migration, factors that cause people to leave, and factors that determine the conditions 
in which people can leave must be considered together.  
In light of this, the second thing that remains unclear in the previous studies is what factors 
create the structural conditions that determine whether people can or cannot leave. Despite the 
high degree of its importance, there remains a paucity of evidence on the influence of regime 
change in the state of origin on the occurrence of forced migration. In other words, exactly how 
regime change encourages people to flee or inhibits them from doing so is still not fully 
understood. Several studies have focused on the relationship between the types of regime and 
the patterns of migration. However, in most of these studies, regime transition has not been 
applied as a predictor of forced migration. Studies that do use regime transition as a predictor 
of forced migration in their statistical analysis still suffer from a lack of well-grounded 
theoretical considerations.  
 
3 The possible impact of regime transition on forced migration   
 
The majority of existing studies have the commonality that they acknowledge that political and 
economic insecurity and the presence of violence are driving forces of the outbreak of human 
displacement. Changes and transitions in a political regime, which can take various forms, can 
inevitably cause a profound political, economic, and security impact on society. In this respect, 
this paper raises the need to visit the possible effects of regime transition on forced migration. 
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This part briefly reviews the potential political, economic, and security implications of regime 
transition. 
Regime transition can proceed either toward democracy or toward autocracy. Many studies 
believe that a regime transition toward democracy can positively contribute to political stability 
because the introduction of a democratic institution serves to moderate internal and 
international disputes (e.g. Cervellati et al., 2011; Pastor and Sung, 1995; Cervellati and Sunde, 
2014). Also, many scholars agree that democratization prevents interstate aggression and 
contributes to regional and international peace (e.g. Hermann and Kegley, 1996; Kegley and 
Hermann, 1997; Maoz and Abdolali, 2016). On the other hand, there is also an opinion that 
regime transition toward democracy causes political and security instability (e.g. Cederman et 
al., 2010; Mansfield and Snyder, 1995; Powell, 1982). For example, Mansfield and Snyder's 
study (1995) shows that a newly democratizing state is more likely than a full democracy to 
engage in international war due to its institutional weakness. In their follow-up studies, they 
find that the vulnerability of democratizing states to engagement in international wars is more 
pronounced in transitional states proceeding from the autocratic regime to the partly democratic 
(anocratic) regime (Mansfield and Snyder, 2002). 
Scholars such as Cassani and Tomini (2018) viewed autocratization as a phenomenon in 
which individual political freedom and rights decrease and the autonomy and power of the 
regime increase. Besides, many previous studies argue that autocratization is conflict-prone 
(Francisco, 1995; Mansfield and Snyder, 1995; Muller and Weede, 1990). Enterline (1998) 
argues that autocratization is positively correlated with dispute initiation through his statistical 
analysis of 171 countries from 1816 to 1992. 
Several studies argue that countries that do not belong to full democracy or full autocracy are 
more susceptible to violent conflict when undergoing regime transition (e.g. Cederman et al., 
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2010; Petersen, 2002). Scholars such as Esty et al. (1998) and Rotberg (2004) also conclude 
that partial democracies are more vulnerable to state collapse than full democracies or 
autocracies. Zanger (2016) argues that autocratization can hamper political stability by pointing 
out that state repression without a developed political institution tends to cause violence. Some 
studies focus on the political and security implications of adverse regime change and conclude 
that adverse regime change, particularly regime change through a coup d'état, increases state-
sponsored violence (Barros, 2002; Finer, 1962.; Lachapelle, 2020). 
Research on the economic impact of regime transition has also accumulated considerably. 
There is an opinion that democratization is helpful in economic growth, productivity, and 
foreign investment attraction (e.g. Broz, 2002; Carbone et al., 2014; Hollyer et al., 2011; Rodrik 
and Wacziarg, 2005). This view is supported by quantitative analyses such as Rode and 
Gwartney's study (2012) which examines the impact of democratization on economic freedom. 
Based on cross-national analysis, the study shows that political transition toward democracy 
helps encourage economic liberalization. On the other hand, there is also a skeptical view of 
the positive economic effects of democratization (e.g. Haggard and Kaufman 1995). Steinberg 
et al. (2015) argue, based on a time-series cross-sectional analysis covering 178 countries from 
1973 to 2009, that autocratic states taking the form of monarchies are less vulnerable to 
currency crisis than democratic countries. Jong-A-Pin and De Haan (2010), in their statistical 
analysis using the Polity IV dataset, find that regime shift toward democracy decreases the 
likelihood of economic growth accelerations. It is widely viewed that adverse regime change 
also plays a role in slowing economic growth and deterring the inflow of foreign investment 
(Alesina et al., 1996; Barro, 1991). Gökçe (2017) focuses on the collapse of the regime and 
explains that the loss of the regime’s control over its entire territory leads to outbreaks of 




Studies on the economic, political, and security consequences that can be brought to society 
by the transition of a regime, a shift which can take various forms, have accumulated in a 
prolific manner. What is striking, however, is that relatively few studies have been conducted 
explaining the direct and indirect links between regime change/transition and forced migration, 
even though regime transition is precisely the type of phenomenon that can lead to political, 
economic, and security insecurity which can in turn initiate the outbreak of human 
displacement.  
 
Some existing studies analyze the relationship between regime type and forced migration. 
Martin-Shields (2017) finds state fragility to be the root cause of forced migration. He argues 
that the extent of human displacement caused by fragile security, an unstable political and 
economic situation, environmental changes, and development ultimately depends on whether 
state authorities have the ability to deal with these crises. He therefore argues that in nations 
with high state fragility, people are more likely to leave the country in search of a better life. 
This study deserves attention in that it analyzes various factors that cause forced migration 
through a conceptual framework called state fragility, measured by national authority, capacity, 
and legitimacy. In finding the causes of population displacement, Otunnu (2002) pays 
particular attention to the form of government. He points out that forced migration is 
concentrated in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, and notes that countries that 
produce forced migration are generally under a dictatorship, which hinders democratic 
pluralism and cuts off the route of peaceful regime change, which then increases socio-political 
conflict and tension, often leading to violence. Also, in order for the dictator to maintain power, 




Several studies attempting to identify the determinants of forced migration are concerned 
with the transition of the political regime of the countries where forced migration occurs. 
Howard (2012), for example, pays particular attention to the outbreak of forced migration in 
weak and fragile states. In his cross-sectional analysis, he finds that both failing and failed 
states significantly influence the increase in forced migration. Martin (2012) argues that the 
fragile peace and democratization process established in many countries during the post–Cold 
War period created a new wave of forced migration. A study by Rubin and Moore (2007) pays 
attention to the regime transition in the country of origin of forced migration. They include the 
regime transition variable in their analysis and find that a democratic regime transition is likely 
to trigger a forced migration. They suggest that there is a need for further research on these 
unexpected results. A study by Davenport et al. (2003) and Moore and Shellman (2007) also 
notes the effect of the democratic shift of the regime on the increase in forced migration. Their 
research also suggests that the transition to a democratic regime is positively correlated with 
forced migration. Neumayer (2005) finds that the collapse of the regime is positively correlated 
with an increase in the number of refugees. Lischer (2007) suggests that a collapsed state tends 
to be more vulnerable to forced migration. Melander and Ö berg (2007) also included in their 
analysis the variables representing the change in the regime of the country that produced forced 
migration. According to their study, regime transition significantly reduces forced migration, 
and regime collapse, on the contrary, increases forced migration. A study by Shellman and 
Stewart (2007) is notable in that it especially pays attention to the impact of the coup d’état in 
Haiti in 2004 on forced migration, which saw political uncertainty and threats created by 
adverse regime changes as motivating people to move. Larrabee (1992) also points out that the 
collapse of an autocratic regime and the resultant political liberalization could lead to the 




Although these studies have contributed to highlighting the role of regime types in analyzing 
forced migration, there is still a lack of a comprehensive theoretical explanation on the 
mechanism of how the transition of the regime, which unfolds in various forms, affects forced 
migration. This thesis not only empirically tests the effects of various types of regime 
transitions on forced migration but also explains how different types of regime transitions affect 
forced migration differently, both quantitatively and qualitatively. 
 
Another important reason why regime transition is important in the analysis of population 
outflows is that it not only motivates people to leave the country but also determines whether 
people’s opportunities to do so will increase or decrease. Previous studies, however, tended to 
focus on identifying the factors that motivate people to leave. This thesis assumes that 
population outflows occur when people are motivated to leave and opportunities to exit the 
country are also available to them. Some existing literature does shed light on the circumstances 
that make possible the realization of people’s desire to leave or that prohibit them from carrying 
out those aspirations. Some papers have seen those opportunities manifest as an individual’s 
capacity or ability to put that aspiration to move away into practice. In some studies, the 
opportunity to escape is approached as a structured external environment that limits people’s 
capability to put into action the desire to move. A study by Carling (2002) defines the condition 
of those who want to leave their country, but who cannot, as involuntary immobility. In his 
study, it is suggested that, in analyzing migration outflows, there is a need to discuss the 
aspiration to migrate and the ability to migrate separately. He points to a restrictive immigration 
policy as a major structural cause that limits people’s ability to migrate. Even if people can 
leave their home country, if they are not given the opportunity to settle in the destination 
country of their choice, it will cause involuntary immobility. Jónsson (2008) also focuses on 
the young men of the Soninke tribe in Mali who are eager to migrate but are in a situation of 
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involuntary immobility because they cannot leave for political reasons or due to other external 
circumstances. Lubkemann (2008) highlights a group of involuntarily immobilized people 
during the civil war that took place in Mozambique from 1977 to 1992. He argues that the most 
devastating effects brought about by the civil war have made it impossible for people in the 
area where the war took place to migrate for economic survival or to avoid ecological pressure. 
He adds that those who suffered most from the war are not the refugees or IDPs who have 
already left to avoid sociological threats but those who are forced to remain in place due to 
external pressure. He suggests that this involuntary immobilization is caused by complex 
factors, such as militarization and border closures exercised by the government and by rebels 
that mean that people are unable to move. Schon (2019) sees that with the onset of conflicts, 
those who are motivated to escape must be given opportunities to realize those intentions. In 
his study, this opportunity was considered to be defined by an individual’s financial ability and 
his or her possession of the social connections needed to overcome obstacles to being relocated 
to other countries. Although the theoretical approaches are somewhat different, these studies 
commonly pay attention to involuntary immobility, the condition experienced by those who 
are willing to leave but who are staying because they are not given the opportunity to do so. 
The existing studies suggest that it is necessary in studying population outflows to consider 
whether opportunities to leave voluntarily have been created to allow those who are motivated 
to escape to actually do so. In this thesis, the regime transition in the country of origin is viewed 
as a structural factor that either increases or decreases the people’s chances to leave the country.  
 
A study by Miller and Peters (2018) calls our attention to the subject of individual freedom 
of movement in analyzing human migration. They offer an explanatory theory for the 
association between the types of political regimes and the degree of individual freedom of 
movement. The study suggests that the maturity of democracy and the level of freedom of 
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movement are positively related. Their research provides new insight into the "opportunity" of 
people to leave, while many of the studies of forced migration have been linked to the 
motivating factors that cause forced migration. Scholars such as Niskanen (1997) and Mirilovic 
(2010) point out that countries under autocratic rule exercise stronger control over population 
outflows than democratic countries, suggesting that the opportunity for people to leave the 
country may be limited or increased depending on the type of regime. In other words, it can be 
viewed that a regime transition can be seen as a proxy measure for changes in the level of a 
regime’s border control and in overall border closure, where borders that were previously 
closed become open or vice versa (Larrbee, 1992).  
 
In sum, a political regime in the country of origin is an important subject that can directly 
influence the outflow of the population. It’s also significant in that a transition in the regime 
can create a structured environment that determines the motivation and opportunities of those 
who want to leave. In other words, the transition of the regime can create circumstances and 
conditions under which either people can leave or can't leave the country. The fundamental aim 
of this thesis is to provide a conceptual, theoretical framework that explains what drives people 
to make their decisions about leaving their home country and what structural conditions enable 
or limit people to realize those decisions to leave. To fill in the research gaps stated above, this 
thesis has been divided into three papers.  
 
The first paper’s aim is to determine whether a sudden change of regime by means of a coup 
d’état affects forced migration. The rapid replacement of the ruling leadership by a coup can 
be seen as a type of regime shift that can increase political, economic, and security uncertainty 
for the people. Although the outbreak of a coup can be expected to have a significant impact 
on the public, to date there has been very little detailed theoretical investigation of the impact 
35 
 
of coups d’état on the displacement of people, not only in the field of forced migration but also 
in political science. Also, there has been little quantitative analysis of this topic. In this paper, 
both qualitative and quantitative methods are used to identify a general association between 
the occurrence of a coup d’état and the generation of forced migration and to contribute, via 
case studies, to a deeper understanding of the mechanisms of coup-caused population outflows.  
 
Regime shifts refer to transitions in political regimes, which can vary qualitatively, as some 
regimes move toward democracy (democratization), whereas others shift along the spectrum 
toward autocracy (autocratization). The second paper attempts to identify whether the two 
types of regime transition, democratization and autocratization, play a role in the creation or 
limitation of people’s willingness and opportunity to flee and in the growth of asylum seekers. 
My attempt to draw up a theoretical framework that illustrates how regime transition can 
determine forced migration using quantitative analysis will generate fresh insight into the role 
of the regime of the country of displacement in analyzing the phenomenon of forced migration. 
 
The third paper analyzes the likelihood of a population outflow from North Korea following 
the various paths of transition along which the North Korean regime can travel. Up to now, far 
too little attention has been paid to the refugee flows from North Korea. Therefore, not 
surprisingly, there is a general paucity of empirical research focusing specifically on the effects 
on forced migration of the various forms of transition the North Korean regime can take. In the 
paper, the following paths the regime could take and their respective influence on forced 
migration will be addressed: 1. Regime collapse, 2. Status quo, and 3. Democratic transition. 
This paper attempts to demonstrate the general trend of whether the level of individuals’ 
motivation and opportunities to flee can be determined by the transition of the regime in an 
autocratic state based on statistical analysis, and it conducts a detailed analysis of the North 
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Korean case. The importance and originality of this paper are that it explores the issue of the 
outflow of forced migration from North Korea in connection with its possible regime transition 
paths by employing a mixed-methods approach. 
 
4 Methodology  
 
As for the statistical method underpinning the research, this thesis conducts a time-series, cross-
country analysis to identify general associations between the occurrence of forced migration 
and the transition of the regime of the country of origin. The subject of research in this thesis 
is the flow of asylum seekers and refugees in analyzing the impact of the regime transition on 
forced migration. In selecting the forced migration group to be analyzed and in establishing a 
method of analysis, the works of various scholars served as a cornerstone for my choices. These 
would include Schmeidl (1997), Davenport et al. (2003), Davenport and Armstrong (2004), 
Moore and Shellman (2007), Rubin and Moore (2007), Neumayer (2005), Melander and Ö berg 
(2007), Howard (2010), Adhikari (2013), Choi and Salehyan (2013), and Schon (2015, 2019). 
 
The number of generated refugees and asylum seekers from the country of origin are utilized 
as dependent variables in the papers presented in this thesis. Both variables are count data in 
that their variance highly exceeds their mean. Thus, in this thesis, negative binomial regression, 
which can be applied to over-dispersed count data, is applied (O’Hara and Kotze, 2010). In 
addition, a zero-inflated negative binomial model is additionally conducted in order to take 
account of excess zero in count data. A negative binomial regression model can overcome some 
of the weaknesses arising from applying OLS regression, which has been frequently used in 
cross-sectional analysis in the field of forced migration, for example, with respect to lack of 
capacity to model the dispersion and the loss of data caused by log conversion of count data 
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(Bruin, 2006). It is encouraging that newly introduced statistical estimates used across the 
papers in the thesis yield consistent results. 
 
This thesis proposes an alternative dependent variable in the quantitative analysis of forced 
migration. The refugee stock and refugee flow measures are widely utilized as dependent 
variables in the area of forced migration studies, identifying the causes of displacement using 
cross-sectional statistical analysis (e.g. Kurtenbach and Strasheim, 2016; Moore and Shellman, 
2007; Schmeidl, 1997). In this thesis, I raise numerous problems stemming from using a 
refugee flow measure that has been widely used in studies in analyzing the factors of increasing 
forced migration. Then, I propose an alternative proxy measure that can be used in place of the 
refugee flow measure to compensate for the emerging limitations of using that refugee flow 
measure. This study has a methodological contribution in that it produces results in line with 
the findings of the existing studies using alternative data. 
 
This paper conducts various case studies showing the relationship between the dynamics of 
the regime and forced migration. Existing quantitative studies in the area of forced migration 
have often aimed at revealing universal factors that induce out-migration. However, these 
studies have often failed to provide empirical and theoretical implications applicable to specific 
regions. This study, however, shows statistical findings which are accompanied by case studies 
to present a theoretical mechanism for how regime transitions in the different areas induce or 
deter forced migration.  
 
Also, this study focuses on the possibility of regime shift and population outflow in an area 
that previous studies have failed to pay attention to, the Northeast Asia region. Case studies on 
the outflow of displaced populations have tended to be carried out on particular areas of the 
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world where political violence is visibly concentrated and mass exoduses are active (e.g., 
countries in Africa, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and South America.). However, the region 
of Northeast Asia has attracted very little attention from the scholarly community in connection 
with forced migration. We have several reasons to observe this area carefully. The political and 
military tensions in Northeast Asia continue to persist around North Korea. The current North 
Korean regime could be gone under a transition that can develop in various forms. Persistent 
refugee outflows from Northeast Asia are currently detected, although they are not large-scale 
population outflows. We cannot exclude the possibility of a mass exodus from the region in 
the future, given the existence of various root causes that can lead to forced migration in the 
region and the possibility of regime transition, which can develop along a variety of pathways.  
 
The specific method used throughout the thesis will once again be presented in detail in each 
paper. 
 
5 Key terms in forced migration and research subjects  
 
 
The term “forced migration” is often used interchangeably with the term “displacement.” The 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) defines “forced migration (displacement)” as 
follows:  
 
The movement of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes 
or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of 
armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or 




According to the European Commission, a “forced migrant” refers to:  
 
A person subject to a migratory movement in which an element of coercion exists, including 
threats to life and livelihood, whether arising from natural or man-made causes (e.g., 
movements of refugees and internally displaced persons as well as people displaced by 
natural or environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters, famine or development 
projects). (European Commission, 2019)  
 
“Forced migrant” is the generic term for those who are forcibly displaced. Forced migrants 
come in various categories. Forcibly displaced people are categorized using the labels of 
refugees, asylum seekers, and internally displaced people (IDPs), depending on the geographic, 
legal, and political context they face.  
 
The definition of each group is as follows.  
 
“Refugee” refers to: 
 
Someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group, or political opinion. (UNHCR, 2019) 
 




Individuals who have sought international protection and whose claims for refugee status 
have not yet been determined, irrespective of when they may have been lodged. (UNHCR, 
2019) 
 
“Internally displaced persons” (IDPs) are:  
 
People or groups of individuals who have been forced to leave their homes or places of 
habitual residence, in particular as a result of, or in order to avoid the effects of armed 
conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights, or natural or man-
made disasters, and who have not crossed an international border. (UNHCR, 2019)  
 
There are similarities and differences between the groups of forced migrants listed above. 
Refugees, asylum seekers, and IDPs are similar in terms of the causes of occurrence. Many 
studies suggest that the group consisting of refugees and IDPs was generated from similar root 
causes, such as physical and political persecution and repression by the state, and 
coercive/violent behavior including civil and international wars (e.g. Melander and Ö berg, 
2007; Weiss, 1999). In other words, from a humanitarian point of view, it is not necessary to 
distinguish between different groups of displaced people in that they are all victimized by 
conflict and one-sided violence, regardless of the label attached to them. Also, they are 
comparable in that they all belong to the group of forced migrants uprooted from their homes, 
all of which need international protection to ensure basic human rights (Cohen and Deng, 2010; 
2012). 
 
Despite the fact that refugees, asylum seekers, and IDPs share considerable similarities in 
the causes of their occurrence and the circumstances they face, they reveal distinct differences 
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in several respects. The most crucial difference is their influence on neighboring and host 
countries. As reviewed earlier, the terms asylum seekers and refugees refer to a group of people 
who have left their home country to seek international protection to avoid persecution. In 
contrast, IDPs are those who are forced to leave and are relocated within the country of origin. 
Under the 1951 Refugee Convention, those who cross borders and attain refugee status in the 
host country are subject to the legal application of the fundamental principle of non-
refoulement that states that they cannot be forcibly returned to their country of origin. In other 
words, the subject of legal responsibility for refugees is shifted from the country of origin they 
left to the host country in which they later reside. On the other hand, IDPs are still under the 
legal protection of their home country. In this respect, the differences in international legal 
status between refugees (asylum seekers) and IDPs and with regard to the subject of who has 
legal responsibility for protecting each group of forced migrants create a distinction in the 
influence that the existence of each has on the host countries (Barutciski, 1998). 
 
The implications for host countries of the existence of refugees and IDPs is not limited to 
legal status. A mass inflow of refugees can have profound impacts not only on the country of 
origin but also on the host countries. It has been pointed out that mass flows of refugees can 
have adverse economic effects on the labor market and the public finances of the host countries 
(Constant and Zimmermann, 2013). It is believed that migration means not only an increase in 
population but also a change in volumes of economic and fiscal imports (Cully, 2012). Sudden 
population influxes from outside will affect the economies of the host countries in various ways. 
In other words, the host country has to endure the economic strain of providing refugees with 
financial support until they successfully put down roots in the host country or return to their 
country of origin. It is highly likely that the host countries, especially developing countries, 
could face an unfortunate situation in which their economies are severely damaged while the 
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volume of public spending is increased to satisfy the essential needs of refugees (Hugo, 1997). 
It has been argued that the job market in the host countries tends to become competitive due to 
the mass influx of refugees (Dadush and Niebuhr, 2016). In particular, the economic security 
of low-income groups, including women, the young, and the unskilled, is severely threatened. 
The heightened competition for jobs in the host countries due to the inflow of refugees can 
create social tensions between refugees and local people (Akokpari, 1998). Also, it is assumed 
that the quality of public services tends to be lowered due to increased demographic pressures 
(Damoc, 2016; Rother et al., 2016).  
 
From a political and security perspective, much of the available literature on forced 
migration highlights refugee outflows as a contributing factor to the spread of conflict in the 
region. An international population movement can affect security in international relations by 
increasing tensions and strains between sending and receiving countries, thereby inhibiting 
regional and international stability (Lohrmann 2000). Scholars such as Salehyan and Gleditsch 
(2006) and Whitaker (2003) conclude that countries experiencing a massive influx of refugees 
are more vulnerable to the outbreak of civil war. They point out that the influx of refugees can 
alter the local demographic and ethnic balance of host countries and intensify economic 
competition between refugees and local groups. All of this could trigger the outbreak of conflict. 
Based on a study of Kosovar refugees who entered Albania and Macedonia in 1999, Krcmaric 
(2014) illustrates that refugee inflows tend to cause armed conflict in host countries. The influx 
of refugees can upset the balance of power between mainstream ethnic groups in the host 
country, and this can lead to civil war. Zolberg et al. (1989) express concern about the dangers 
of the refugee community transforming into combatants. They argue that the areas where 
populations of refugees are concentrated are likely to be the primary source of combatant 
recruitment by armed groups. They refer to combatants submerged in the refugee community 
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as "refugee warriors," and illustrate the existence of armed refugee groups that reorganize in 
the host country, thus constituting a security risk that can lead to conflict. Likewise, Milner 
(2009) argues that the existence of armed rebel groups, called refugee spoilers or refugee 
warriors, and their potential for infiltrating refugee communities is likely to delay and to inhibit 
the peacebuilding process in host countries. Mills and Norton (2002) argue that the refugee-
hosting countries can be exposed to various security risks at all stages, from the time the refugee 
influx is first initiated until such time as the refugees settle down in a new place. The countries 
that absorb refugees inevitably take security risks in that they are unable to confirm the 
identities of the newcomers who are smuggled across the border region, as the majority of 
refugees are forced to leave their country and enter the host country via a non-official route to 
avoid immediate life-threatening situations. In their study, the presence of Rwandan refugee 
warriors in the refugee camps in Uganda in the 1990s is highlighted to show the possible 
security threat from accepting untraceable groups of people. They illustrate that the refugee 
communities provided a hideout for those militants, resulting in the continuous outbreak of 
armed conflicts at the border area between the two countries. A similar argument was made by 
Choi and Salehyan (2013), who suggest that a mass influx of refugees is positively related to 
the likelihood of terrorist attacks in the host countries, a phenomenon that is called the 
"neighborhood effect." This is because refugees have often been targeted for political revenge 
or punishment by their country of origin; therefore, the national security of the host countries 
becomes vulnerable (Bove and Böhmelt, 2019).  
 
There are also previous studies suggesting that the inflow of IDPs can also have similar 
results in host provinces. For example, in a study by Duncan (2005) that analyzes the 
consequences of the large influx of IDPs from North Maluku to North Sulawesi in Indonesia, 
he finds that the mass inflow of IDPs brings about negative economic impacts, such as a 
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decrease in wages and an increase in housing costs, and also increases the social tension 
between the IDP communities and the host communities. A study by Ferris (2007), which 
analyzed the influence of displaced populations within the country generated after the 2003 
invasion of Iraq, also suggests that internal displacement is a result of sectarian violence, but 
the large volume of inflow and outflow of IDPs within a country can cause another conflict by 
altering the existing sectarian geography. The influence of the occurrence of IDPs in the 
country of origin is inevitable. Nevertheless, the degree of impact of IDPs on foreign countries 
across their borders is not comparable to the level of impact of asylum seekers and refugees on 
the host countries. Unlike refugees or asylum seekers, access to host countries is not available 
for IDPs. Hence, from the standpoint of host countries, they do not need preparation for the 
influx of IDPs in the same way as for refugees and asylum seekers. 
 
To sum up, from a humanitarian point of view, it is clear that refugees, asylum seekers, and 
IDPs are indistinguishable in that they are all a type of forced migrants, those who are forcibly 
displaced and relocated. Also, they are alike in that they are subject to international protection. 
However, refugees, asylum seekers, and IDPs differ in the degree of their impact on foreign 
countries. Also, analyzing the movement of refugees and IDPs can be a very different task. 
Refugees, in selecting their relocation destination, choose to flee to a foreign nation, while 
IDPs are a group that chooses (or are forced to choose) their relocation destination within the 
country. In other words, IDPs are driven by the motivation/need to leave, while analyzing the 
movement of refugees and asylum seekers needs to also take into account people's 
opportunities to cross borders. On the theory side, this study focuses on identifying the 
mechanism of how people's motivation and opportunities to leave their home increase or 
decrease in the course of the regime transition. Given that the opportunity for people to cross 
borders can be directly linked to changes in the regime's level of control over borders and 
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population flow during the course of regime transition, in this thesis, it would be appropriate 
to focus on the explanation of the movement of forced migrant groups who cross borders. This 
thesis, from a policy perspective, aims to identify international security risk factors that are 
likely to inform contingency planning for human crises related to forced migration across 
borders. Therefore, this study exclusively selects refugees and asylum seekers among the 
various categories of forced migrants as subjects of the study. 
 
6 Expected contributions to knowledge   
 
This study highlights the role of regime change/transition taking various forms in the country 
of origin in the discussion of the causes of forced migration. Although the existing studies have 
been rich in discussions on specific factors that cause forced migration, the regime in the 
country of origin, which has a profound influence in generating those factors, has not gained 
much attention from academia. This study makes an essential contribution to the existing 
literature by providing an empirical and theoretical explanation of how different types of 
regime transition can affect the occurrence of forced migration differently. The understanding 
of the link between regime transitions and the outflow of forced migration proposed in this 
study enables the prediction and analysis of regions that have the potential for regime transition 
but that have not yet experienced a mass population outflow. Bridging the research discipline 
of regime transition and forced migration by providing a theoretical framework that people’s 
motivation and opportunity to leave the country will determine the outflow of forced migration 
is academically novel. It broadens the existing partial understanding of the influence of 
particular types of regimes on forced migration and provides a comprehensive theory that 
connects the two research disciplines. Taking it a step further, this study does not just identify 
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the quantitative impact of a regime transition on the outflow of the population but attempts to 
discuss the differences in the groups of displaced people produced by a qualitatively 
heterogeneous regime transition. This discussion could be a stepping stone for future studies 
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instability such as coups d’état create incentives for forced migration. We, therefore, develop 
a theory to describe the influence of coups on individuals’ decisions to flee, highlighting the 
fact that coup events exacerbate individuals’ physical and economic insecurity and thus 
increase incentives to flee. We consider successful and failed coups and assess our claims using 
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have not experienced a coup. We illustrate the theoretical mechanisms by analyzing four coups 



















Do coups d’état affect forced migration flows? This question commands great interest because  
coups are the most common type of irregular leader changes and the global number of refugees 
has reached a historical record, growing from 42.7 to 68.5 million between 2007 and 2017 
(UNHCR, 2017). The large increase of refugees has led many policy makers to consider forced 
migration as one of the most important problems in international and human security. Indeed, 
large waves of refugees are often seen as a cause of conflict and as a “new” security challenge 
in the post-Cold War period, fundamentally different from “old” security challenges in 
international security (see Adamson, 2006). These views are well founded, as refugee flows 
embody human suffering and can engender detrimental effects for peace and human rights: the 
risk of civil wars is higher in countries hosting refugees from neighboring countries, returning 
refugees can increase the risk of civil wars in post-conflict societies, and refugees face a higher 
risk of being victims of violence by state and non-state actors (Böhmelt et al., 2019; Choi and 
Salehyan, 2013; Lischer, 2008; Milton et al., 2013; Rüegger, 2019; Salehyan, 2007; Salehyan 
and Gleditsch, 2006; Schwartz, 2019; Wright and Moorthy, 2018).  
 
Leading explanations suggest that individuals’ decisions to abandon their countries are 
shaped by the threat of and the use of violence by state and non-state armed actors (Moore and 
Shellman, 2004; Weiner, 1996). Consistent with this, empirical studies show that the presence 
and nature of internal and interstate armed conflicts can create environments that lead to greater 
flows of forced migration (Adhikari, 2013; Cohen and Deng, 2010, 2012; Davenport et al.,  
2003; Melander and Ö berg, 2007; Moore and Shellman, 2004; Schmeidl, 1997; Schon, 2015). 
This literature identifies specific events of political instability that cause large refugee flows, 
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and in so doing it sheds light on risk factors that can inform contingency planning for human 
crises (see Rubin and Moore, 2007).  
 
Despite significant progress, most existing research is focused on episodes of internal and 
international armed conflict, without considering that other forms of political instability such 
as coups can also affect refugee flows. A few studies stress the role of coups, but do not 
elaborate on the mechanisms through which coups affect forced migration. Moreover, these 
studies only look at cases where forced migration followed a coup, with no comparisons to 
cases where coups did not bring large refugee flows, raising the perils of causal inference under 
selection on the dependent variable (Kyle and Scarcelli, 2009; Shellman and Stewart, 2007). 
The lack of systematic attention to coup-induced forced migration is puzzling because coups 
tend to create environments that entail the threat of or direct use of state violence against 
civilians (Derpanopoulos et al., 2016; Finer, 1962; Lachapelle, 2020), and thus are likely to 
motivate large flows of refugees. To take one high- profile example, the 1973 coup in Chile 
triggered thousands people to flee and escape from state coercive behavior under the military 
dictatorship. 
 
We build upon motive-based explanations and develop a theoretical framework where 
physical and economic insecurity shapes individuals’ decisions to leave their countries. We 
highlight that individuals flee in response to state-sponsored violence, or in anticipation to 
physical and economic insecurity that results from political instability, and then we propose 
mechanisms through which failed and successful coups affect individuals’ physical and 
economic insecurity. Failed coups have limited effects on large-scale repression and are less 
likely to threaten physical security of large segments from society. Failed coups, however, can 
increase uncertainty of economic agents and societal actors that raise economic insecurity and 
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hinder economic prospects. On the other hand, successful coups have significant effects on 
individuals’ physical and economic insecurity due to its effects on increasing repression and 
economic decline. Our theory predicts that refugee flow will be higher in countries that 
experience a failed coup attempt that in countries with no coup and forced migration will be 
higher in countries that experience a successful coup than in countries that experience a failed 
coup or no coup. 
 
We use a panel data set for all independent states between 1980 and 2015 to assess our theory. 
The empirical results point to a strong and positive relationship between successful coups and 
refugee flows, while we find limited evidence that failed coups influence forced migration. Our 
most conservative estimates suggest that forced displacement in countries that experience a 
successful coup is about 40 per cent larger than in countries with no coup. These findings hold 
after controlling for other relevant determinants of coups, country and year-fixed that account 
for unit heterogeneity. We illustrate the theoretical mechanisms analyzing four coups in two 
counties: Uruguay in 1973 and 1976, and Egypt in 2011 and 2013. The qualitative analysis 
reveals that thousands of people escaped in the first two years after each coup in Uruguay and 
Egypt. Moreover, the case studies show that the threat of or the use of repression and economic 
uncertainty in the post-coup period are the most important factors increasing the number of 
forced migrants.  
 
This study has important implications for the policy community and existing research on 
refugee flows and coups. First, our findings suggest that domestic political instability in the 
form of successful coups can help to understand patterns of forced migration. As such, 
successful coups can be an indirect source of political instability at the international level. Our 
results also have meaningful implications for identifying risk factors that are likely to inform 
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contingency planning for human crisis related to refugee flows (Dowty and Loescher, 1996). 
As Apodaca (1998, p.81) puts it, “in order to anticipate, assist, or prevent refugee flight, we 
need to identify and monitor those causes triggering events of flight”. This study contributes to 
this noble purpose by identify that irregular leader changes via coups trigger waves of forced 
migrants. Second, while many studies examine the determinants of military involvement in 
politics and coups (Bell and Sudduth, 2017; Bove et al., 2020; De Bruin, 2019; Finer, 1962; 
Kim, 2016; Powell, 2012; Roessler, 2011; Svolik, 2013), this literature falls short in exploring 
coup outcomes, beyond traditional attention to military spending (Leon, 2014), repression 
(Derpanopoulos et al., 2016; Lachapelle, 2020), and leaders or regime change (Aksoy et al., 
2015; Marinov and Goemans, 2014; Thyne and Powell, 2016). We contribute to this literature 
by showing a significant and large effect of successful coups on forced migration flows. 
 
2 Previous Research 
 
There is a wide consensus that violent armed conflict influences forced migration flows. 
Canonical accounts in political science and international relations aim to explain why people 
abandon their countries and underline that individuals’ decisions to flee are largely motivated 
by the threat of or the use of violence by state and non-state actors (Davenport et al., 2003; 
Schmeidl, 1997; Weiner, 1996). Moore and Shellman (2004, p.725) summarize such 
explanations: “people abandon their homes when they fear for their liberty, physical person, or 
lives.” More formally stated: “one will leave one’s home when the probability of being a victim 
of persecution becomes sufficiently high that the expected utility of leaving exceeds the 
expected utility of staying” (Ibid: pp.726-27). 
 
There are two general approaches about the relationship between violence and refugee flows.  
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One strand of the literature focuses on observed levels of state repression and highlights that 
systematic violations of human rights affect individuals’ decisions to flee their homes and 
increase the aggregate supply of forced migrants (Zolberg et al., 1989). In line with this, 
virtually all cross-country studies show that there is a strong positive effect of repression on 
different measures of forced migration (Apodaca, 1998; Davenport et al., 2003; Gibney et al., 
1996; Moore and Shellman, 2004; Schmeidl, 1997). 
 
An alternative approach identifies events of violence that affect refugee flows, instead of 
exploring observed levels of repression. Some argue that civil and international wars create 
environments that prompt forced migration. Considering different time periods and countries, 
every cross-country statistical study shows that the number of forced migrants is higher in 
states that experience a civil war that in states that do not1 (Davenport et al., 2003; Moore and 
Shellman, 2004). Qualitative studies yield similar conclusions about the effect of civil wars on 
forced displacement (Cohen and Deng, 2010; 2012). In turn, empirical research reaches 
different conclusions about the impact of international wars on forced migration: some find no 
relationship2  (Davenport et al., 2003; Melander and Ö berg, 2006); some find that forced 
migration increases in the presence of conflicts between states (Schmeidl, 1997); and some find 
that states disputing international wars in their territory produce larger forced migration (Moore 
and Shellman, 2004). 
 
Related studies stress events of mass killing like genocide and politicide (Harff, 2003; Harff 
and Gurr, 1988; Jonassohn, 1998; Rummel, 1997). The results of cross-country studies are 
                                                 
1 Melander and Ö berg (2007) find that the severity of civil wars does not influence the number of 
refugees and stress that the threat perceived by potential forced migrants tends to be related to the 
location of the conflict and the nature of the fighting area, and not with the intensity of violence. 




somewhat mixed, however. Some find no association between genocide/politicide and forced 
migration (Melander and Ö berg, 2006, 2007; Neumayer, 2005); some find that 
genocide/politicide increase refugee flows (Davenport et al., 2003; Moore and Shellman, 2004; 
Schmeidl, 1997); and others find the opposite (Rubin and Moore, 2007). Theoretical 
explanations regarding these differences are worth noting. Rubin and Moore (2007) argue that 
genocide/politicide and forced migration are contemporaneously correlated, but the former 
does not precede forced migration. Since genocide/politicide is likely to anticipate mass 
killings, annual data do not capture the effect of large-scale violence against civilians. Uzonyi 
(2014) claims that genocide targets specific groups, while politicide threatens larger groups and 
thus only politicide should affect forced migration. 
 
Several aspects seem important against this background. One the one hand, there is a 
consensus that the threat of or the use of violence by armed actors motivate people to flee their 
homes in search of refugee. This approach is indeed informative from a policy perspective 
since it helps to identify risk factors that can inform contingency planning for human crises. 
On the other hand, however, the existing literature has not analyzed systematically how coups 
affect forced migration. A handful of studies focus on specific countries where we see refugee 
flows following coups (Oucho, 1997; Kyle and Scarcelli, 2009; Shellman and Stewart, 2007), 
raising the perils of causal inference under selection on the dependent variable. Moreover, these 
studies tend to highlight single-country idiosyncrasies, without detailing the mechanisms 
through which coups affect forced migration. The remainder of this study contributes to this 






3 Theoretical Framework 
3.1 Motives of forced migration 
 
We develop a theory about the relationship between attempted coups and forced migration. 
Our argument builds upon existing theories of refugee flows, where individuals value their 
freedom, personal security, and economic opportunities, and they compare the expected costs 
and the expected benefits of leaving their countries, considering those parameters. These 
theories suggest that individuals are motivated to leave their countries in environments that 
decrease or threat individuals’ freedom, security, and income (e.g., Moore and Shellman, 2004; 
Davenport et al., 2003; Neumayer, 2005; Weiner, 1996). Following this perspective, we regard 
coup attempts as focal points of forced migrants flows, either because coup-born regimes are 
associated with a higher threat of or use of repression and individuals are forced to escape from 
state-sponsored repression, or because these regimes can create political instability that hinders 
a country’s economic performance and individuals’ well-being. 
 
Individuals value a set of tangible and intangible goods, and their decisions to leave their 
countries and search for shelter and better prospects in other countries are shaped by a number 
of factors affecting the presence and quality of those goods. Specifically, motives-based 
explanations of forced migration point to the relevance of freedom, individual security, and 
income or economic opportunities (e.g., wages, jobs). We summarize these motives briefly, 




A first set of motives stems from environments that hinder or threaten individuals’ freedom 
and physical security.3 The emphasis on freedom and physical security in many academic and 
journalistic accounts is intuitive and straightforward: the routine use of repression threatens 
liberty and physical security, creating incentives to leave and escape from violence. 
Importantly, individuals’ decisions to flee do not only depend on observed repression, but on 
individuals believes about future state coercive behavior and the perceived physical threat from 
violent sanctions (Davenport et al., 2003; Moore and Shellman, 2004). According to this view, 
individuals’ expectations on further state coercive behavior are key to understand 
contemporaneous decisions, as individuals decide to leave based on the perception that the risk 
of repression in the future is high. In short, the greater an individual’s sense of threat to her/his 
freedom and personal security, the higher the probability she/he will abandon the country. 
 
A second set of motives is associated with a substantive deterioration of individuals’ income 
and economic opportunities. Building on economic models of migration (see Massey et al., 
1993), many studies stress the impact of worsening economic opportunities and living 
standards, arguing that poverty, low supply of labor, and low or falling wages affect individuals’ 
decisions to leave (Moore and Shellman, 2004; Morrison and May, 1994; Neumayer, 2005; 
Schon, 2019). Put differently, observed and perceived economic insecurity can shape decisions 
to flee, which parallels the above explanation about the role of freedom and personal integrity: 
individuals sometimes are forced to leave their countries when they have experienced severe 
economic hardship, or when they perceive that economic opportunities and living conditions 
will be significantly low in the future.  
 
                                                 
3 Personal integrity rights are those concerned with individual survival and security, such as freedom 




3.2 Coup attempts and forced migration 
 
In their Archigos Dataset of Political Leaders, Goemans et al. (2009) highlight three manners 
through which political leaders obtain power, distinguishing between regular or 
institutionalized processes (i.e., elections), irregular actions in infringement of established rules 
(i.e., coups), or through direct intervention by other states. Two findings stand out from their 
analysis. First, while regular leadership transitions are the most common type of leader’s entry 
in modern history, irregular transitions –most notably coups– have played a prominent role too, 
particularly in middle- and low-income countries (see Goemans et al., 2009; Svolik, 2009, 
2013).Second, there is evidence that the manner political leaders entry has strong effects on 
different policies, including internal and international conflict, economic growth, and 
institutional reforms. Following the footsteps of Goemans et al. (2009), we highlight that the 
manner through which political leaders and ruling elites take power influences state coercive 
behavior and economic policy. 
 
We distinguish between events during and after attempted coups. Events during coup 
attempts take place when power is actively contested by coup plotters, whereas events after 
coup attempts occur after a failed attempt (i.e., failed coups), or after coup plotters obtain power 
(i.e., successful coups) (see De Bruin, 2019). This distinction is critical because repression 
greatly varies during and after attempted coups. Indeed, the threat of violence is intrinsic to all 
coup attempts; yet it is well established in the theoretical literature that coup plotters have 
incentives to avoid high levels of violence to keep cohesion and prevent the loss of legitimacy 
(e.g., Finer, 1962; Rouquié, 1987; Singh, 2014). As Finer (1962) puts it, “the whole point of a 
coup is to carry out the displacement of the supplantment [of the current regime] with the 
minimum bloodshed” (cited in De Bruin, 2019, p.154). Consistent with this claim, De Bruin 
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(2019) shows that nearly 55 per cent of all the attempted coups between 1950 and 2017 were 
bloodless.  
              
Despite a large proportion of coup attempts are bloodless, however, there is strong evidence 
that the threat of and the use of repression are a defining feature of coup-born regimes. Post-
coup environments unfold under conditions of uncertainty and struggle between regime and 
opposition actors, especially when coup plotters succeed in gaining power. Successful coups 
tend to bring significant changes in state institutions and relations between state and society, 
motivating opposition actors to organize politically and mobilize around demands against the 
new ruling coalition. Under these environments, coup-born regimes have incentives to repress 
opposition actors and other members from within society, either to thwart popular dissent or to 
signal resolve and prevent the opposition from mobilizing in the future. This contention is 
supported by qualitative and quantitative research on coups, which shows that state-sponsored 
violence increases substantively after successful coups (e.g. Barros, 2002; Derpanopoulos et 
al., 2016; Finer, 1962; Sudduth, 2017; Lachapelle, 2020; Licht and Allen, 2018; Stepan, 1971).   
    
While coup-born regimes use repression either to quash or prevent mass dissent and build a 
reputation of a strong and resolved regime, ruling elites after failed coups may also have 
incentives to repress (Curtice and Arnon, 2019). Importantly, however, political leaders who 
survive an attempted coup are more likely to use targeted repression to mitigate threats from 
actors within the ruling coalition and reduce the risk of a coup attempt in the future,4 which 
                                                 
4 Our case studies illustrate this logic. In Egypt, the Morsi regime failed to deter rival elites from 
attempting another coup, and as a result another coup removed President Mohamed Morsi from power. 
In Uruguay after the coup of 1973, the coup-born military regime systematically controlled the loyalty 
of alternative elites, most notably the police, and used repression against any group that did not express 




contrasts with the use of repression against non-elite opposition actors and broader members 
of society after successful coups. Recent empirical studies support this claim, showing that 
state-sponsored violence is significantly higher after successful coups, compared to the 
intensity of repression after failed coups (Lachapelle, 2020; Derpanopoulos et al., 2016). 
 
A second pathway through which coup attempts affect forced migration has to do with its 
effects on a country’s economic performance and individuals’ well-being. Coup-born regimes 
tend to be related to a decline in economic performance due to the negative impact of political 
instability on economic agents’ decisions about production and investment (Barro, 1991). 
Political instability stemmed from successful coups creates uncertainty about governments’ 
capacity to manage the economy and the type of economic policies that will be implemented 
in the future, preventing domestic and foreign economic agents to invest. To quote Alesina et 
al. (1996, p.189), “risk-averse economic agents may hesitate to take economic initiatives or 
may exit the economy, by investing abroad. Conversely, foreign investors prefer a stable 
political environment, with less policy uncertainty and less uncertainty about property rights”. 
A wealth of research in economics shows that successful coups cause lower rates of economic 
growth and investment, even after accounting for a potential endogenous relationship between 
coups and economic performance (Alesina et al., 1996; Barro, 1991; Blomberg, 1996; Fosu, 
2002; Easterly and Rebelo, 1993). In a similar manner, failed coup attempts can hinder the 
economy and economic prospects, since economic agents likewise may hesitate to invest or 
exit the economy amid political instability and observed attempts to replace political leaders 
through violent means, although we expect this effect to be lower compared to successful coups. 
Drawing on our theoretical approach, we claim that a real and perceived decline of economic 
performance and individuals’ opportunities after successful and failed coup attempts is likely 




3.3 Observable implications 
 
To summarize, individuals have incentives to leave their countries when they face significant 
threats to their physical and economic security. Our theory underlines that failed coup attempts 
influence targeted repression against elite members but have limited effects on broader 
repression against civilians. Accordingly, failed attempts are unlikely to threaten the physical 
security of large members from society. Failed coups, however, can have negative effects on a 
country’s economic performance, increasing economic insecurity. On the other hand, 
successful coup attempts have strong negative effects on both individuals’ physical and 
economic insecurity due to its effects on state coercive behavior and economic performance. 
The conceptual mechanisms linking coup attempts and refugee flows are complements and 
cannot be separated empirically. Therefore, we limit the empirical assessment on two main 
observable implications of the theory: (1) refugee flows will be higher in countries that 
experience a failed coup attempt that in countries with no coup; (2) refugee flows will be higher 
in countries that experience a successful coup than in countries that experience a failed coup 
or no coup. In the next section we evaluate these hypotheses quantitatively, and then provide 
examples of the theoretical mechanisms. 
 
4 Statistical Analysis 
 
In the empirical analysis we contrast the effect of successful and failed coups on forced 
migration flows, using a panel data set of all independent states annually between 1980 and 
2015. In the analysis we distinguish between nondemocratic and democratic regimes and 
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consider states as non-democracies if they have a Polity score below 6. Conversely, we identify 
democracies if a state has a score above 5 in the Polity scale. 
 
4.1 Data and measurement 
 
Our dependent variable is forced migration flows. We use data from the Population Data Unit 
of the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), in line with previous research (e.g., 
Davenport et al., 2003; Moore and Shellman, 2004; Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006). According 
to the 1951 United Nations (UN) Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, a refugee is 
an individual that owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country 
of his nationality and is unable, or owing to fear, unwilling to avail himself of the protection of 
that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside of his former habitual residence 
as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to return to it.5 The 
UNHCR reports annual data on the cumulative number of refugees or forced displaced people 
living in a state other than their own, regardless of when they entered. We operationalize forced 
migration flows by taking the first difference of the refugee stock and truncated the negative 
values at zero (see Moore and Shellman, 2004). 
 
The key independent variables are successful coups and failed coups, coded 1 if a state 
experiences an event and 0 otherwise, using the Coup D’etat Dataset (Powell and Thyne, 2011). 
Coup attempts are defined as “illegal and overt attempts by the military or other elites within 
the state apparatus to unseat the sitting head of government using unconstitutional means”. In 




contrast, successful coups are events where “perpetrators seize and hold power for at least 
seven days” (Powell and Thyne, 2011, p.252). Failed coups are therefore attempts in which 
coup plotters do not succeed in ousting incumbent political leaders and taking power. We see 
132 attempts between 1980 and 2015, although our sample includes 103 events due to missing 
values on the outcome (52 failed coups and 51 successful coups).6 
 
We include several controls that are plausible associated with refugee flows (see Davenport 
et al., 2003; Melander and Ö berg, 2006; Moore and Shellman, 2004; Schon, 2015; Schmeidl, 
1997): civil wars and international wars, human rights scores, regime durability, gross domestic 
product (GDP) per capita (logged), economic growth, population size (logged), land area 
(logged), refugees abroad, and direct contiguities (logged). There is evidence that civil and 
international wars increase the number of refugees (Moore and Shellman, 2004; Schon, 2015; 
Schmeidl, 1997). We thus include two dichotomous variables for civil and international wars 
from the Major Episodes of Political Violence Data Set.7 Specifically, we use a binary measure 
for civil wars coded 1 in all state-years in which there is a civil war and 0 otherwise. Similarly, 
we incorporate a binary indicator for international wars coded 1 in all-state years in which there 
is an international armed conflict and 0 otherwise. 
 
State repression and physical integrity rights violations tend to motivate people to abandon 
their countries (Davenport et al., 2003; Moore and Shellman, 2004). Thus, we control for state-
sponsored repression by including human rights protection scores from Fariss (2014).8 Higher 
                                                 
6 In sensitivity analyses we consider a shorter time frame (from 1990 to 2015), which reduces the 
number of missing values due to improvements on refugee flows data. This set of analysis accounts for 
90 per cent of the observed coup attempts between 1990 and 2015, and we obtain almost identical 
results. 
7 http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html 
8 These scores are based on a Bayesian measurement model that incorporates information from multiple 
sources, including measures of repression from the Political Terror Scale (PTS) (Wood and Gibney, 
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human rights protection scores indicate lower repression; thus, higher values on this item 
should be negatively associated with forced migration.  
 
Related research stresses the role of contingency and threat perceptions by arguing that 
uncertainty about a state’s structure may make individuals more likely to flee (Davenport et al., 
2003). Following Davenport et al. (2003), we operationalize uncertainty about a state’s future 
by controlling for regime durability, measured as the log of time in years a regime coalition 
has remained in power, based on data from the Polity IV project. 
 
Economic insecurity and poverty can influence individuals’ decisions to abandon their 
countries and raise the number of refugees. Accordingly, we include the natural log of gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita. We also include the growth rate of GDP since a country’s 
poor economic performance may also force individuals to flee their homeland in searching for 
better economic prospects in other states. These measures come from the World Bank 
Development Indicators. 
 
There is evidence that demographic factors also affect flows of forced migration. Melander 
and Ö berg (2006) claim that the costs and benefits of migration vary among individuals and 
highlight a selection effect in the segment of the population that remains behind in episodes of 
forced migration. We thus control for the number of refugees abroad (logged), based on annual 
data from the UNHCR. We also include population size (logged) using data from the World 
                                                 
2010) and the Physical Integrity Rights Index from Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) (Cingranelli and 
Richards, 2010), torture (from Hathaway, 2002; Conrad, Haglund and Moore, 2013), negative sanctions 
(from Judice and Taylor, 1988), government one-sided killings (adapted from Eck and Hultman, 2007), 
mass killing (Ulfelder and Valentino, 2008), genocide/politicide (Harff and Gurr, 1988; Rummel, 1995), 
and political executions (adapted from Judice and Taylor, 1988). 
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Development Indicators, as there is evidence that population size is related to a higher 
probability of forced migration (Moore and Shellman, 2004). 
 
Finally, there is also evidence that geography and physical infrastructure can 
facilitate/inhibit displacement (Adhikari, 2013; Uzonyi, 2014). We thus include a measure of 
land size (logged) from the World Development Indicators, as individuals are likely to 
experience higher costs to flee in larger countries. We also control for the total number of direct 
contiguities for each state at time t (land or sea), using Direct Contiguity Data from the COW 
Project (Douglas et al., 2002). 
 
4.2 Method and results 
 
We estimate negative binomial models because our dependent variable is a count one with a 
variance exceeding the mean, and thus it is over-dispersed. Our estimates include year-fixed 
effects and country-fixed effects to account for unit heterogeneity, since we are primarily 
interested in how refugee flows change in response to the onset of coup episodes (i.e. within-
country variation), as opposed to variation in refugee flows between treated and non-treated 
units (i.e. between-country variation). This strategy allows us to control for the potential 
omission of country-specific determinants of coups and forced migration, as well as for 
unobserved common trends. Our estimates are rather conservative since the use of year-fixed 
effects and country-fixed effects likely absorbs much of the effect of the independent variables. 
 
In Table 1, Models 1-2 present negative binomial estimates of forced migration in non-
democracies between 1980 and 2015, whereas Models 3-4 report results for a full sample of 
democratic and non-democratic regimes. In Model 1 we estimate a parsimonious specification 
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including only our key independent variables, i.e. successful and failed coups –no coup is the 
reference category. Model 2 replicates Model 1, adding the control variables listed above.9 The 
coefficient for successful coups in the two models are positively signed and statistically 
significant at the .10 level. In turn, the coefficient for failed coups is positively signed but it 
fails to reach statistical significance by conventional criteria. Models 3-4 show that the 
relationship between successful and failed coups and forced migration flows holds if we 
consider autocratic and democratic regimes. These results support our expectations that 
successful coups increase the number of forced migrants, although we do not find evidence 
that failed coups influence forced migration flows. Importantly, Models 1 and 3 suggest that 
the results for successful coups are not an artifact of model specification and the inclusion of 
control covariates. Moreover, the robustness of the results to the inclusion of other confounders, 
as well as year-fixed effects and country-fixed effects suggests that successful coups have an 











                                                 
9 Data availability on several controls reduces the number of observations in Models 2 and 4, compared 




Table 1: Negative binomial estimates of forced migration 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Successful coups 0.337+ 0.335+ 0.420* 0.498** 
 (1.83) (1.70) (2.41) (2.73) 
Failed coups 0.131 0.0788 0.0928 0.1000 
 (0.68) (0.39) (0.57) (0.59) 
Civil war  0.118***  0.121*** 
  (4.22)  (4.98) 
International war  0.0919*  0.158*** 
  (2.09)  (4.02) 
Human rights scores  -0.301***  -0.319*** 
  (-5.61)  (-10.64) 
Ln regime duration  0.0173  0.0751** 
  (0.60)  (3.26) 
Ln GDP per capita  0.0697*  0.0291 
  (2.10)  (1.28) 
Ln GDP growth  -0.0180***  -0.0137*** 
  (-4.01)  (-3.49) 
Ln refugees abroad  -0.135***  -0.164*** 
  (-11.25)  (-18.05) 
Ln population   0.00176  -0.0204 
  (0.05)  (-0.80) 
Ln land size  -1.486***  -0.650** 
  (-4.25)  (-2.65) 
Ln contiguities  0.233*  -0.0602 
  (2.07)  (-0.93) 
_cons -2.555*** 0.803 -2.571*** -0.198 
 (-10.72) (0.86) (-10.92) (-0.32) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2369 2063 4499 4183 
Years 1980-2015 1980-2015 1980-2015 1980-2015 
Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. 
Fixed effects not shown. + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
Table 2 reports the incidence rate ratios (IRRs) to show substantive quantities of interest. 
IRRs reflect the change in forced migrants given a one-unit increase in an independent variable, 
holding all other variables constant. The second and third columns display IRRs based on 
Models 2 and 4 from Table 2. The IRRs indicate that forced migration flows in autocracies that 
experience a successful coup are 40% (IRR = 1.40) larger that in countries with no coup, and 
this quantity is considerably larger (65%) if we consider the full sample of democratic and 
nondemocratic regimes (IRR = 1.65). The substantive effect of successful coups is worth noting 
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if we consider that the IRRs of this item is larger than the IRRs of the civil war binary variable 
(IRRs = 1.13), although it should be noted that the accumulated impact of civil wars on forced 
migration should be larger. 
Table 2: Incidence rate ratios 
 
IRRs in columns 2-3 based on Models 2 and 4 from Table 2, respectively. 
 “–” indicates that the variable’s coefficient is not significant in Table 2 
 
The results for the control variables are consistent with previous studies (e.g., Davenport et 
al., 2003; Melander and Ö berg, 2006; Moore and Shellman, 2004). We briefly discuss the 
results from Model 2, yet note that the coefficients of the control variables are almost the same 
in Model 4, when we consider autocracies and democracies.10 First, the positive and significant 
coefficients for civil wars and international wars suggest that the presence of armed conflicts 
increases forced migration flows. Second, the coefficient for the human rights protection scores 
corroborates previous findings indicating that state repression force people to flee. Third, the 
coefficient for GDP per capita (logged) suggests that, on average, refugee flows are larger in 
                                                 
10 The only difference between Models 2 and 4 in terms of statistical significance is that the coefficient 
for contiguities is positive and significant in Model 2, whereas it turns non-significant in Model 4. In 




wealthier autocracies. This is somewhat striking but it can be interpreted from the perspective 
of opportunity theories suggesting that wealthier actors have more resources and capacity to 
abandon their countries (see Schon, 2019). Fourth, we see that economic growth tends to be 
related to lower number of forced migrants, in line with other studies showing that worsening 
economic conditions increases displacement (e.g., Adhikari, 2013). Fifth, the estimates for land 
area and direct contiguities are consistent with previous studies showing that individuals in 
larger countries experience more difficulties to abandon their countries, whereas a higher 
number of direct contiguities facilitates forced migration. Finally, the coefficient estimates for 
regime durability and population size are statistically insignificant. 
 
4.2. 1 Regime dynamics after a coup  
 
Our analysis shows that an outbreak of a coup could trigger a population outflow. However, 
what we should not overlook is that not all coups are qualitatively homogenous, and not all 
coups lead the political regime to one unified development path. The regime dynamics during 
and in the post-coup period may differ from case to case. Hence, it is likely that the degree of 
impact of a coup on the outflow of refugees may also vary depending on the direction and 
extent of the regime dynamics during and after the coup.  
 
From a broad perspective, the path along which a successful coup leading the regime can be 
divided into three categories. One widely accepted argument is that the outbreak of the coup 
undermines the existing democracy and leads to autocratization (Onwumechili and Carle, 1998; 
Agbese and Kieh, 2004). As discussed earlier, coercive and violent repression functions to 
solidify the coup-born regime by suppressing the collective resistance of its opponents against 
the regime (Escribà-Folch, 2013; Muller, 1985). Particularly, military interventions foster the 
process of autocratization of the state in terms of impeding political participation and public 
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contestation because force is used to remove the existing elected government or the initiative 
of the civilian chief executive (Cassani and Tomini, 2019). Bermeo (2016) argues that the coup 
leads to autocratization. He pointed out that although many coup leaders justify their coups in 
the name of democracy and set out a plan for a return to democracy based on democratic 
elections, in practice, those elections tend to not be implemented or are manipulated in the post-
coup period, which in turn leads to the commencement of an autocratization process (ibid.). 
The violent 1973 coup in Chile, which through unprecedented repression reduced the scope of 
the people's political participation to a minimum level, can be regarded as an example of a coup 
that led to autocratization (Oxhorn, 1991). Thailand's coup in 2014, which suspended the 
Constitution of 2007 and suppressed the political freedom and rights of the people, can be 
represented as another case that led to autocratization after the coup outbreak (Cassani and 
Tomini, 2018).  
 
There is an opinion that the coup can open a path for democratization. For example, the 
studies of Thyne and Powell (2016) and Collier (2008) take the view that a coup outbreak 
especially in nondemocracies, could be a starting point for democratization. Based on a cross-
country analysis of all authoritarian states from 1950 to 2008, Thyne and Powell (2016) show 
that a junta regime is expected to meet two requirements for the survival of said regime after 
the coup, which are economic prosperity and legitimacy of the regime, the latter of which 
entails international support. The most effective way to meet these requirements would be to 
introduce a democratic system. In many cases, therefore, coups in undemocratic countries tend 
to lead to democratization (pp. 195-198). Also, their analysis suggests that if authoritarian 
leaders have long been in power, it’s more likely that the outbreak of the coup will be the 
starting point for democratization. Hoyle (2019) analyzes the factors that lead military leaders 
in coups to accept to the transition to civilian rule. In his study, public support for democracy, 
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a strong civil society, strong opposition parties, and a weak solidarity between military officers 
are pointed out as major factors in getting the military to accept civilian rule.  
 
On the other hand, some views that the influence of the coup on regime transition can be 
insignificant in that a coup is often just the typical means of replacing the chief executive in 
nondemocratic countries. For example, Geddes (2003) views that in certain types of autocracy, 
such as the collegial military regime, coups tend to function as a method of replacing leaders 
while maintaining the rules of the regime. A statistical analysis from Kim and Kroeger (2018) 
on authoritarian regimes from 1952 to 2009 also shows that most junta regimes tend to 
experience reshuffling coups rather than regime-altering coups.  
 
Our paper conducts further analysis to identify how the regime dynamics elicited by coups 
as discussed above affect refugee outflows. To this end, we create a variable called the 
Coup_Regime in our analysis capturing the coup regime paths. For this variable, if there is no 
change in the polity2 index of the year in which the coup takes place compared to the previous 
year's polity2 index, then the coup is coded 1 and classified as a coup that maintains the status 
quo. On the other hand, the variable is classified as a successful coup that leads to 
democratization and is coded 2 if there is an increase in the polity2 index of the year in which 
the coup occurs compared to the previous year. If there is a decrease in the polity2 index of the 
year in which the coup takes place compared to the polity2 index of the previous year, it is 
classified as a coup that leads to autocratization and coded 3. In addition, another variable 
(Coup_Regime Paths 1) is created to capture the impact of the coup on the regime dynamics in 
the year following the coup (i.e. post-coup period). If the polity2 index remains the same in the 
following year compared to the year in which the coup occurs, it is classified as a coup that 
leads to status quo and coded 1. If there is an increase in the polity2 index in the following year 
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compared to the year in which the coup occurs, it is categorized as a coup that induces 
democratization and coded 2. If there is a decrease in the polity2 index in the following year 
compared to the year in which the coup occurs, it is classified as a coup that leads to 
autocratization and coded 3.  
 
In our data based on successful coup cases from 1980 to 2015, in about 40% of successful 
coup cases, the regime becomes more autocratic in the year of the coup compared to the year 
before the coup. In 26% of all successful coup cases, the government becomes more democratic 
in the year of the coup compared to the previous year. In the rest of the cases, which account 
for 36% of all successful coups, the regime does not experience a major change in the year of 
the coup compared to the previous year. On the other hand, cases in which the regime becomes 
more autocratic in the year following the year in which the coup takes place accounted for 5.4% 
of all successful cases. In 24% of successful coups, the regime becomes democratic in the year 
following the coup compared to the year in which the coup took place. Among the successful 
coups, 71% of cases do not cause a change in the regime in the year after the coup took place.  
 
Our analyses presented in Table 3 show the regime dynamics during and after a coup and its 
impact on the population outflow (Model 1 and Model 2, respectively). The results in Model 1 
in Table 3 show that a coup that leads to autocratization has a statistically significant positive 
effect on the refugee outflows. In other words, if the polity2 score of the year in which the coup 
takes place falls compared to the previous year, meaning that the regime becomes more 
autocratic in the year the coup occurred compared to the previous year, the outflow of refugees 
increases. On the other hand, a coup that leads to democratization or to status quo appears to 
be positively associated with the increase in refugees in the year of the coup. In other words, 
when the polity2 score of the year in which the coup takes place is unchanged or increases 
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compared to the previous year, it is found to be positively associated with the increase in 
refugees, although statistical significance is not detected. These results may represent that the 
intensified political instability and violent repression associated with the onset of the coup 
could play a role in pushing people to leave the country during the coup outbreak.  
 
The results of Model 2 in Table 3 show the dynamics of the regime and its impact on 
outmigration in the year following the coup (the post-coup period). The results are slightly 
different from Model 1. The coup cases in which the regime becomes more democratic in the 
year following the coup compared to the year in which the coup occurs appear to be statistically 
significant and positively correlated with the increase in refugees. This aftermath effect takes 
place may be because those who have experienced a period of time under the coup 
government’s reign have a higher tendency to leave the country during a period of loosened 
control as the regime becomes democratic in the year following the coup. The effects are 
unlikely to take place promptly following the change. For the situation of the coup cases that 
do not bring about much change in the regime in the year following the coup compared to the 
year in which the coup occurs, these appear to be positively correlated with the increase in 
refugees, but the statistical significance is marginal. Lastly, if the regime becomes more 
autocratic in the year following the coup than it was in the year in which the coup took place, 
its effect on the outflow of the population becomes less significant. These results can be 
explained by the consequences of the autocratic regime's further tightening of its control over 
its people, namely, a reduction in the chances of people's escape from the country, leading to a 






Table 3. Negative Binomial Estimates of Refugee Outflows 
 




Regime dynamics after successful coups   
Status quo  0.655 0.408+ 
 (0.451) (0.226) 
Democratization  0.093 0.832* 
 (0.412) (0.323) 
Autocratization  0.649** 0.079 
 (0.222) (0.714) 
Control variables    
Civil war 0.125*** 0.122*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) 
International war 0.107** 0.158*** 
 (0.037) (0.039) 
Human rights scores -0.320*** -0.320*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) 
Ln regime duration 0.090*** 0.075** 
 (0.023) (0.023) 
Ln GDP per capita 0.023 0.029 
 (0.023) (0.023) 
GDP growth  -0.011** -0.014*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Ln refugees abroad -0.168*** -0.164*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) 
Ln population -0.021 -0.020 
 (0.026) (0.026) 
Ln land size -0.650** -0.652** 
 (0.245) (0.246) 
Ln contiguities -0.045 -0.062 
 (0.065) (0.065) 
Constant -0.186 -0.188 
 (0.625) (0.625) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 4238 4183 
Years 1980-2015 1980-2015 
Note: Status quo is a dummy variable that denotes unity where the Coup_regime = 1, and zero otherwise; 
Democratization is a dummy variable that denotes unity where Coup_regime = 2, and zero otherwise; and 
Autocratization is a dummy variable that denotes unity where Coup_regime = 3, and zero otherwise.  
Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. 






4.3 Additional analyses 
 
We further explore the relationship between coups and forced migration flows by conducting 
three additional sets of analyses. 
 
It is well established that anocracies tend to experience more conflict and instability due to 
their institutional inconsistencies (Gates et al., 2006). We run additional models including a 
binary variable for anocracy –from the Polity IV project– to assure that our main findings not 
only reflect institutional inconsistencies and broader process of political instability. The 
coefficient for successful coups remains positive and statistically significant after controlling 
for inconsistent regimes or anocracies. 
 
In a second set of analyses we ensure that potential influential observations do not drive our 
main results. There is evidence that civil wars and international wars often influence leaders’ 
tenure and trigger coups (Bell and Sudduth, 2017; Chiozza and Goemans, 2003). Thus, to 
assure that our results do not purely reflect the presence of episodes of internal- and interstate- 
armed conflicts, we run additional estimates excluding country-year observations with civil or 
international wars. These estimates do not alter the substance of our main findings. 
 
The third set of analyses shows that our results are robust to using zero-inflated negative 
binomial models (ZINB). We estimate a zero-inflated negative binomial model that allows us 
to differentiate meaningful zeros from others, which we interpret as the difference between 
states at risk of facing refugee flows and those with negligible risk. The first stage estimates 
the probability that a zero in the second stage is the outcome of a different data generating 
process than that assumed by the model. This helps distinguish between states that are at risk 
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of experiencing refugee outflows but have not experienced these in that year compared to those 
which have a negligible risk of forced displacement. The second stage estimates the effect of 
the explanatory variables on forced migration outflows after the excess zeros have been 
controlled for in the first stage. Consistent with our results in Table 1, we see in Table 4 that 
successful coups raise the number for forced migrants (see Models 1.1 and 2.1). The coefficient 
for failed coups in the ZINB estimates is also positive and statistically significant at the p > 
0.05 level in Model 1.1; yet it loses its statistical significance when we consider the full sample 
of autocracies and democracies (see Model 2.1). Finally, we find no evidence that neither 
successful coups nor failed coups reduce the probability that a state produces zero forced 
migrants at a given year. 





5 Case Studies 
 
The statistical analysis provides systematic support for the effect of successful coups on forced 
migration flows. We now turn to qualitative evidence by analyzing four coups in two 
autocracies: Uruguay in 1973 and 1976, and Egypt in 2011 and 2013. In these cases, we observe 
a substantive increase in the number of forced migrants soon after each coup, and most relevant 
confounders were either absent or played a limited role.11 These cases vary, however, in the 
levels of repression and economic conditions after the coups. Given the time frame of the 
statistical analysis, the coups in Uruguay are out of sample whereas the coups in Egypt fall 
within our sample. While these cases do not in themselves represent a definitive test, they help 




Uruguay experienced two military coups in the 1970s, first in 1973 and then in 1976. Under 
military pressure, President Juan Maria Bordaberry created the National Security Council 
(COSENA) in February 1973, an advisory board including the commanders of three branches 
of the military, an additional officer, the Ministers of Defense, Interior, Economy, Foreign 
Affairs, and the head of the executive. The armed forces took power over many of the powers 
of government, but Bordaberry remained president. Despite Bordaberry stayed in office, 
                                                 
11 None of these countries experienced an open armed conflict before the coups. In Uruguay, the left-
wing Tupamaro rebel movement ceased its operations in 1972, a year before the first coup. The coups 
in Egypt took place during predominantly nonviolent mass protests, yet in absence of civil war. The 
latter coup provoked some non-state violence between supporters and opponents of the ousted president 
Muhamed Morsi. The government took some anti-terror measures against supporters of Morsi, but this 




however, the Junta hold effective power. The coup was formally accomplished on June, when 
the two houses of the congress were dissolved, and appointed Council of State was established 
(Kaufman, 1979). To quote Rouquié (1987, p.250), “the power of the military was thus 
institutionalized” after the coup.  
 
Left political parties and the National Workers Convention mobilized and went to a general 
strike, while the police and the U.S. Chief safety advisor in Uruguay stressed that the new 
regime faced violent contention strategies, including riots, violent demonstrations and armed 
attacks against the military and the police.12 Given the military nature of the regime and its 
lack of popular legitimacy, it is not surprising that the government resorted to repressive tactics 
to appease dissent and impose order after seizing power. The government targeted left-wing 
opposition groups, including labor unions, students and independent media outlets that 
supported democratic institutions (Kaufman, 1993). To quote Rouquié (1987, p.252), “the 
militarization of the state was accompanied by the destruction of representative organizations. 
The parties of the left that were opposed to the coup d’état were proscribed, their leaders 
arrested, and their press forbidden”. 
 
Torture, disappearances, and extra-judicial killings occurred, but illegal imprisonment was 
the main repressive strategy after the 1973 coup (Rico, 2013; Busquets and Delbono, 2016; 
Kaufman, 1993). Some estimates suggest that at least 6,000 people were illegally imprisoned 
because of their political views, and many of them suffered from torture at hands of the police 
and the military (Echegoyen, 1975; Bendfeldt-Zachrisson, 1988). Moreover, political struggle 
between government and opposition actors contributed to increase the fear of violence 
escalation and the intensification of repression by the military. 
                                                 




Systematic repression after the coup triggered a wave of forced migrants. Although forced 
displacement had increased before 1973, the largest exodus of forced migrants took place right 
after the military took power, reaching its peak when nearly 65,000 people abandoned the 
country in 1974 (Pellegrlno, 1996). The 1981 census indicates that nearly 170,000 Uruguayans 
left the country between 1963 and 1975, yet almost 106,000 (62 per cent) fled in 1974 and 
1975 (Ibid.). Country experts explaining these trends highlight that many people who were 
targets of post-coup repression or felt threatened by state coercive behavior left the country to 
neighboring countries. In particular, the coup forced thousands of political activists and 
members of the traditional parties to flee to Argentina to avoid political prosecution and 
repression (Markarian, 2006).  
 
Other scholars also argue that economic worsening and perceived economic insecurity due 
to the coup played a role in the population exodus (Sznajder and Roniger, 2007). Over 30,000 
civil servants lost their jobs almost immediately after the coup, increasing uncertainty about 
their economic prospects (Mallinder, 2009). Moreover, changes in economic policy by the 
military regime very soon provoked a significant decline in real wages, forcing many semi-
skilled workers to leave the country (Skaar et al., 2015). Both increasing unemployment and 
reduction in real wages have been pointed out as key triggers of forced displacement in the 
post-coup period in Uruguay (Pellegrino and Vigorito, 2005). 
 
In 1976, internal divisions within the ruling elite as a result of policy differences ended in 
another coup. The military forced Bordaberry to resign, however, the structure of the regime 
remained intact (Kaufman, 1979). The coup provided momentum in the military’s attempt to 
consolidate their power, as the armed forces were formally in full control of executive power 
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and decision-making.13 The armed forces thus became more powerful and resolved to use 
harsher sanctions against the opposition. Unsurprisingly, the 1976 coup generated the 
perception that the military regime deepened and signaled the intensification of repression, 
despite the coup itself was bloodless. 
 
Political persecution continued after the coup and repression reached its peak. Kaufman 
(1993, p.29) describes how “Uruguayan citizens were classified in three categories, A, B, and 
C, according to their degree of dangerousness ... By 1976, Uruguay had the highest per capita 
level of political prisoners in the world: “one in every five hundred citizens was confined to 
prison; at the same time, it was claimed that one in every fifty Uruguayans had been 
interrogated and one in every five was living abroad”. Repression after 1976 not only targeted 
opposition actors, but also people who had fled before to neighboring countries14 (Rico, 2013). 
On the other hand, the 1976 coup was associated with a strong economic decline, and economic 
policies of the military government tended to benefit members of the upper class dedicated to 
the financial export sector, with high costs for the middle and working classes (Rouquié, 1987). 
As a result, 133,000 Uruguayans left the country between 1976 and 1981, although a large 




Egypt experienced two coups d’état in the last decade, in 2011 and 2013. The Arab Spring hit 
                                                 
13https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/1983/01/states-of-emergency-thematic-report-1983-eng.pdf 
14 At least 20 refugees who fled to Buenos Aires, including a Uruguayan senator, Zelmar Michelini, 
and his daughter, were kidnapped or shot. This type of operations outside the country were facilitated 
by the Operacion Condor, a network of South American military regimes which cooperated in hunting 




Egypt when the masses mobilized against the Hosni Mubarak regime in 25 January 2011. The 
armed forces did not support mass mobilization during the first two weeks after the protest 
onset, although they “never actually fired on the people”; “nor did the army prevent 
demonstrators from filling Cairo’s Tahrir Square” (Barany, 2011, p.28). The turning point 
came when state security agents and loyalists of Mubarak resorted to repression against 
protesters, provoking backlash and increasing popular discontent. The military elite concluded 
that the government response was ineffective and hurt their legitimacy, deciding to back 
protests and seized power. On February 10, Mubarak resigned and the Supreme Council of the 
Armed Forces (SCAF) took control of executive power.  
 
Three days later Mohamed Hussein Tantawi –head of the junta– announced the suspension 
of the constitution and the legislative assembly and vowed that the military would govern for 
six months, until new elections were held. Even though the armed forces signaled their 
commitment of organizing democratic elections, a wave of refugees followed the 2011 coup. 
Figure 1 reports changes in the number of forced migrants from Egypt between 2005 and 2015, 
and it clearly illustrates how the refugee stock was very stable from 2005 to 2010 and then 
increased sharply after the coup. Country specialists suggest that the increase in forced 
migration immediately after the coup on February can be explained by the uncertainty about 
the economic situation in Egypt, as well as increasing violence against Christians by non-state 
armed actors belonging to Islamist groups (Dunne and Hamzawy, 2019; Tabaar, 2013). 
However, as we detail below, the refugee outflow in 2012 was related to Morsi’s election and 
the subsequent rise of Islamist violence. 
 
The transitional period ended when Mohamed Morsi –candidate of the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP)– was elected president in June 2012, being the 
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first democratically elected president in Egypt.15 Importantly, the armed forces assured their 
power under the newly elected Islamist government. As Bou Nassif (2017, p.162) describes, 
“the Brothers were not going to dismantle the Egyptian military’s economic empire, nor pursue 
any officer for corruption or human rights abuse. The officers were to remain above the state 
under the Brothers, just like they were under Mubarak.” In exchange, “the Brothers hoped that 
the military elite would remain henceforth politically neutral.”  
 
 
Figure 1: Trends in forced migration and coups in Egypt, 2005-2015 
 
Morsi and his coalition shifted their campaign position, moving “from a commitment to 
participation not domination to a strategy of controlling the legislature and the presidency” 
(Tabaar, 2013, p.727). Morsi’s election did not solve political struggle about the post-Mubarak 
era, and the new government started to try to concentrate power soon. In November 2012, 
President Morsi issued a temporary constitutional declaration that allowed him to make 





presidential decrees without judicial oversight and review 16  The new legislation was 
accompanied by the use of repression against opposition actors, falling foreign currency 
reserves and raising poverty and unemployment, which motivated widespread popular 
discontent and ultimately a new mass uprising in June 2013, in Tahrir Square (Housden, 2013). 
On July 1, the armed forces urged Morsi to solve the crisis and restore political stability, but 
his rejection to this ultimatum motivated the military –led by General Abdulfatah al Sisi– to 
take power on July 3 2013 (Tabaar, 2013). In the words of General al Sisi, the military 
intervened to “end the state of conflict and division” and to “ensure the construction of a strong 
and coherent Egyptian society which does not exclude any of its members”.17 
 
In contrast to the 2011 coup, the military quickly consolidated its power by means of ruthless 
repression (Letourneau, 2019). By framing the actions of their opponents as a threat or as 
behavior harmful to society, the regime legitimated repression against opposition groups 
(Hamzawy, 2017). Through the enactment of new laws such as the protest law and anti-terror 
legislation, the military successfully removed the legal obstacle to repress opposition groups, 
particularly students and the Muslim Brotherhood. Estimates suggest that, in the six months 
after the coup between July 2013 and January 2014, 3,143 Egyptians were killed, and of these 
2,528 were killed in anti-government demonstrations (Dunne and Williamson, 2014). In 
addition, other 41,000 people were detained, charged, or sentenced by the government between 
July 2013 and April 2014 (Human Rights Watch, 2015).  
 
Perhaps the hallmark of post-coup repression is the Rab’a massacre in August 14, when the 
military forces brutally repressed a protest at Rabaa al-Adawiya Square in El Cairo. Around 
                                                 





85,000 protestors gathered at the sit-in at Rabaa al-Adawiya Square (Human Rights Watch, 
2014), and the army claimed that pro-Morsi sit-in protests undermined state stability and 
terrorized citizens by creating clashes between pro-government and anti-government groups 
(Fahim and Gladstone, 2013). The military deployed bulldozers, ground troops and snipers, 
and state armed actors fired indiscriminately against demonstrators. At least 817 were killed 
during the Rab’a massacre, and some witnesses reported that more than 800 protesters were 
detained and tortured by the police 18  (Human Rights Watch, 2014). Moreover, after the 
massacre the targets of repression were no longer limited to Islamists but expanded to various 
categories of liberal and ideological activists who oppose military rule, including young 
activists, writers, artists, and journalists (O’Dowd, 2013). 
 
State repression and prosecution against the opposition provoked a large wave of forced 
migrants soon after the 2013 coup (Hamzawy, 2017). Figure 1 portrays the significant increase 
refugees after the coup, in 2013 and 2014, and qualitative accounts underline that this trend 
was closely related to increasing repression under the rule of Abdulfatah al Sisi (Hamzawy, 
2017; Dunne and Hamzawy, 2019). Members of the Muslim Brotherhood fled to Asia, Europe 
and North America (De Bel-Air, 2016; Dunne and Hamzawy, 2019). In particular, given their 
geographic proximity, Turkey and Qatar turned an important destination for many members of 
the Muslim Brotherhood escaping from government’s persecution. 19  The increase in the 
number of Egyptians seeking asylum in the United States is also noticeable. In 2011, 1,028 
                                                 
18 The Rab’a massacre has described as “one of the world’s largest killings of demonstrators in a 





Egyptians were granted an asylum title and these figures increased to 3,407, in 2013, 
accounting for 13.5 per cent of asylum applications accepted in the United States.20 
 
6 Discussion  
 
The issue of endogeneity 
 
Our statistical analysis and case studies suggest that the outbreak of coups d'état can be seen as 
a risk factor that can influence refugee outflows. Our findings are highly encouraging in terms 
of contributing to providing a systemic explanation for the potential impact of coups on forced 
migration. Nevertheless, we should not overlook a potential statistical issue, i.e. endogeneity. 
 
Countries experiencing coups are generally in a state of political, economic, and security 
instability, and many of these countries experience mass refugee outflows simultaneously. Our 
database contains samples of coups (both successful and failed coups) between 1980 and 2015 
in 155 countries. Most of our samples indicate that the outbreak of the coup initiates or boosts 
the increase in refugee outflows. However, about 25% of our samples, especially cases in 
African countries, show that a series of coups and refugee outflows occur simultaneously for a 
long period of time, and several cases show that there was already an increase in refugees 
before the coup.21 Figure 1 reveals the trend of coups and the increase in refugee outflows in 
Sudan, Burundi, and Uganda. These figures illustrate that there was a continuing outflow of 




21 We identified if there was an increase of more than 500 refugees during the three years 
prior to the coup. 
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refugees before a coup, and the coup was boosting that outmigration, and that outflow was 
again followed by another coup. The trend found in three different countries in Africa suggests 
that in some regions, we cannot easily determine the directional causality between the outbreak 
of a coup and refugee outflows. 
 
Figure 1. Coups and Refugees from 1980 to 2015 in Sudan, Burundi and Uganda 
 
 
                                    (UNHCR, 2019)  
 
Therefore, although the argument that a coup could have a direct impact on the refugee 
outflows is highly convincing and largely applicable to many regions in the world, we still have 
to consider the possibility that the increase in refugee flows could reversely affect the outbreak 
of the coup (i.e. reversal causality). That is, at this point, we cannot completely rule out the 
possibility of endogeneity between the occurrence of a coup and the increase in refugees. In 
other words, the coup_regime paths variables (i.e. status quo, democratization, and 
103 
 
autocratization) may not be exogenous variables as required to achieve robust, consistent and 
unbiased estimators (Ketokivi and McIntosh, 2017). The sources of endogeneity for the current 
study is the simultaneity. As explained above, the outbreak of the coup and refugees may 
“simultaneously affect/cause each other” (Ullah et al., 2018, pp.71). Particularly, existing 
studies have suggested that an increase in refugees may affect the regime dynamics of the 
country of origin. Representatively, Betts and Jones (2016) point out that a diaspora group of 
refugees mobilized abroad can exert a significant influence that can lead to a change in the 
political landscape of the country of origin. Besides, a group of scholars believe that mass 
refugee outflows can undermine the legitimacy of the ruling regime, as it can heighten the 
political insecurity not just within the country of origin and but also in host countries. (e.g. 
Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006; Lischer, 2007; Whitaker, 2003; Adamson, 2006). For example, 
Krcmaric (2014) analyses the inflow and outflow of refugees from a country and finds that 
these can have a profound impact on the power dynamics among political ruling elites because 
it alters the demographic balance, specifically the distribution of ethnic groups. Greene (1990), 
in his book “Comparative Revolutionary Movements: Search for Theory and Justice,” provides 
concise descriptions of accelerators of revolutionary movements. Military defeat, economic 
crisis, government violence, reform and political change, elite fragmentation, and the 
demonstration effect are considered to be accelerators. Given that coups tend to occur when 
the political and economic instability of the country increases and the durability of the ruling 
regime is weakened, we cannot rule out the possibility that an increase in refugees can create 
an environment that increases the likelihood of a coup. 
 
From the perspective of statistical analysis, this suggests that the possibility that the error 
terms of our dependent variable (refugee flow) in the main models can be correlated with our 
independent variable (coup d’état) cannot be excluded entirely. The existing literature has 
104 
 
recommended the two-stage least squares (2SLS) as an effective statistical technique that takes 
into account the reverse causality (or simultaneity) of the dependent variable and the 
independent variables (Maydeu-Olivares et al., 2019). To implement this analyses, 
instrumental variables, which are correlated with a potentially endogenous variable but is not 
directly associated with the dependent variable, are required to uncover the unobserved 
potential influence of the independent variable on the dependent variable (Tyvimaa et al., 2019). 
However, as discussed above, studies on the effect of coups on forced migration have not 
sufficiently accumulated. Similarly, analyses which review the impact of refugee outflows on 
the political regime of the country of origin, more specifically on the power dynamics among 
political elite groups, are also scarce in the extant literature. It means appropriate instrumental 
variables have not been determined or suggested. The choice of instrumental variables is 
critical which can tremendously impact the robustness of the whole analysis. Hence, it is 
challenging to choose a variable that can meet the requirements of being an instrumental 
variable and is available to collect. Hence, the feasibility of its collection at this stage is also in 
doubt. Therefore, applying two-stage least squares (2SLS) in the thesis is also challenging at 
this stage. We hope that this study, which uncovers the possible effects of a coup on refugee 
outflows, can be the basis for future studies that attempt to identify the existence of 




Forced migration has become one the most important challenges for global governance and 
human rights over the last decades. Even though much research examines how political 
instability affects refugee flows, coups d’état have received very little attention in the existing 
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literature. This study has examined theoretically and empirically the effect of coups on refugee 
flows. We argued that coups are focal points that trigger refugee flows, largely because post-
coup repression motivates people to escape from the threat of or the use of state violence and 
because coups signal future policies that raise perceived threats to personal and economic 
security. 
 
This study provides quantitative and qualitative evidence for a positive relationship between 
successful coups and forced migration flows. Our statistical analysis shows that successful 
coups have a positive and significant effect on forced migration flows. The estimated 
magnitude of this effect is large: forced migration in countries that experience a successful 
coup is between 40 and 65 percent larger than in countries with no coups. These results are 
robust to the inclusion of a battery of controls, the use of fixed-effects and country-fixed effects 
that account for unit heterogeneity, and different model specifications. 
 
The case studies complement the statistical analysis and offer nuanced insight into how 
coups function as focal points and are followed by large refugee outflows. The analysis 
corroborates that people react quickly to episodes of political instability and coups increase 
forced migration in their immediate aftermath. In the four episodes we see that thousands of 
people escaped in the first two years after each coup in Uruguay and Egypt. In addition, the 
case studies yield support for our theoretical mechanisms, revealing that the threat of or the use 
of repression and economic uncertainty in the post-coup period are crucial factors to understand 
the link between military takeovers and forced migration, although repression seems to play 




The 1973 coup in Uruguay and the 2013 coup in Egypt were followed by systematic abuses 
of civil rights and open repression against opposition actors and broader segments of society, 
motivating thousands of people to flee. Regardless of variation in the intensity and types of 
repression–repression in the 2013 coup in Egypt tended to be more brutal compared to the 1973 
coup in Uruguay, where repression took the form of political imprisonment–, post-coup 
repression was the main trigger of forced migration in the two countries. Notwithstanding the 
prominent role of repression, however, we also see that the two coups in Uruguay affected 
economic conditions and people’s views about future economic opportunities, motivating 
many to flee to neighboring countries. 
 
Like in Uruguay, the 2011 coup in Egypt highlights the relevance of economic motives of 
forced migration after coups. However, it is important to note that the 2011 coup also created 
a window of opportunity for non-state armed actors to resort to sectarian violence that forced 
many Christians to escape from Islamist violence. This highlights another mechanism in action, 
where coups are associated with violence by non-state armed actors that threaten specific 
groups and ultimately forced them to leave to avoid the risk of repression. Whereas we found 
in our cases systematic evidence that repression and economic worsening after the coup played 
a prominent role in motivating forced displacement and these experiences mirror those from 
many other countries, further research could expand on how systematic is that coups are related 
to non-state armed violence induced forced migration and under what conditions this is most 
likely to occur. 
 
Taken together, the quantitative and qualitative evidence points to the relevance of coups in 
explaining refugee flows, beyond episodes of armed conflict that have received the most 
attention in previous research. This makes us better able to identify the contexts in which 
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countries experience a high risk of generating large number of forced migrants. As such, this 
study has relevant policy implications, showing how important it can be for international actors 
to realize the overall benefits on human rights and regional political stability that can be 
achieved if they develop contingency planning in those contexts where coup onsets are more 
likely. This goal is certainly possible considering recent advances in the forecasting of coups22 
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Coups d’état and Refugee Flows 
Overview 
This supplementary appendix to “Coups d’état and Refugee Flows” reports additional analyses 
discussed in the main manuscript, but not reported. In particular, we present empirical estimates 
considering a shorter time period, controlling for other confounders (i.e. anocracies), and 
excluding potential influential observations. 
 
1 Estimates for the period 1990-2015 
Our main explanatory variables in the analyses are successful coups and failed coups from the 
Coup d’états Dataset (Powell and Thyne, 2011). Coup attempts are “illegal and overt attempts 
by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting head of government 
using unconstitutional means”. Successful coups are events where “perpetrators seize and hold 
power for at least seven days” (Powell and Thyne, 2011, p.252). We see 132 attempts between 
1980 and 2015, although our analysis includes 103 events due to missing values on the outcome 
(52 failed coups and 51 successful coups). We consider here a shorter time period (1990 to 
2015), which reduces the number of missing values due to improvements on refugee flows data. 
This analysis now accounts for 90 per cent of the observed coup attempts between 1990 and 
2015. Following this approach, empirical estimates reported in Table 1 replicate Models 2 and 
4 reported in Table 2 in the manuscript, considering the period between 1990 and 2015. 
Consistent with the results reported in the manuscript, we see that successful coups positively 





Table 1: Negative binomial estimates of forced migration, post-Cold War period 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Successful coups 0.352+ 0.469* 
 (0.213) (0.198) 
Failed coups 0.006 0.017 
 (0.226) (0.185) 
Civil war 0.116*** 0.124*** 
 (0.035) (0.030) 
International war 0.218* 0.298*** 
 (0.091) (0.067) 
Human rights scores -0.357*** -0.350*** 
 (0.060) (0.032) 
Ln regime duration 0.020 0.077** 
 (0.032) (0.025) 
Ln GDP per capita 0.081* 0.013 
 (0.036) (0.024) 
GDP growth -0.017*** -0.011** 
 (0.005) (0.004) 
Ln refugees abroad -0.184*** -0.202*** 
 (0.014) (0.010) 
Ln population 0.053 -0.005 
 (0.043) (0.027) 
Ln land size -1.307*** -0.647* 
 (0.377) (0.254) 
Ln contiguities 0.138 -0.036 
 (0.121) (0.067) 
Constant 0.098 0.011 
 (0.953) (0.554) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 1708 3746 
Years 1990-2015 1990-2015 
Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. 


















2 Controlling for anocracies 
We know that anocracies tend to experience more conflict and instability due to their inherent 
institutional inconsistencies (e.g., Gates et al., 2006). From this perspective, it is certainly 
plausible to argue that the main results may reflect such institutional inconsistencies and 
broader process of political instability. We estimate additional models including a binary 
variable for anocracy, based on data from the Polity IV project. The results in Table 2 are 
consistent with those reported in the manuscript: the coefficient for successful coups is 
positively signed and statistically significant in Models 1 and 2, while the coefficient for failed 
coups is positive but does not reach statistical significance at conventional levels. Finally, we 


















Table 2: Negative Binomial estimates of forced migration, controlling for anocracies 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Successful coups 0.337+ 0.498** 
 (0.195) (0.183) 
Failed coups 0.093 0.099 
 (0.202) (0.169) 
Civil war 0.111*** 0.121*** 
 (0.028) (0.024) 
International war 0.091* 0.158*** 
 (0.043) (0.039) 
Human rights scores -0.330*** -0.319*** 
 (0.053) (0.030) 
Ln regime duration 0.009 0.076** 
 (0.032) (0.024) 
Ln GDP per capita 0.051 0.030 
 (0.033) (0.023) 
GDP growth -0.019*** -0.014*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Ln refugees abroad -0.129*** -0.164*** 
 (0.012) (0.009) 
Ln population 0.012 -0.020 
 (0.037) (0.026) 
Ln land size -1.335*** -0.652** 
 (0.335) (0.246) 
Ln contiguities 0.199+ -0.060 
 (0.109) (0.065) 
Anocracy -0.075 0.008 
 (0.084) (0.058) 
Constant 0.446 -0.206 
 (0.907) (0.627) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 2080 4183 
Year 1980-2015 1980-2015 
Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. 
















3 Excluding influential observations 
We also ensure that potential influential observations do not drive our estimates about the 
impact of coups on forced migration flows. Some studies have shown that civil wars and 
international wars influence leaders’ tenure and trigger coups (e.g., Bell and Sudduth, 2017; 
Chiozza and Goemans, 2003). In order to assure that our empirical estimates do not reflect the 
presence of ongoing episodes of internal- and interstate- armed conflicts, we run additional 
estimates excluding countryyear observations with civil or international wars. Respectively, 
Models 1-2 in Table 3 replicate Models 2 and 4 in Table 2 in the manuscript, excluding country-
year observations with civil wars. In Table 4, we follow the same approach but exclude 
observations either with civil or international wars. The estimates reported in Tables 3 and 4 
do not alter the main results, indicating that there are not significant differences when exclude 





























Table 3: Negative binomial estimates of forced migration, excluding civil war observations 
 
 (Model 1) (Model 2) 
Successful coups  0.567** 0.695*** 
 (0.214) (0.194) 
Failed coups -0.017 0.066 
 (0.243) (0.192) 
International war 0.173*** 0.225*** 
 (0.052) (0.044) 
Human rights scores -0.280*** -0.318*** 
 (0.056) (0.031) 
Ln regime duration -0.002 0.082*** 
 (0.031) (0.024) 
Ln GDP per capita 0.053 -0.013 
 (0.037) (0.024) 
GDP growth -0.007 -0.004 
 (0.006) (0.005) 
Ln refugees abroad -0.146*** -0.173*** 
 (0.014) (0.010) 
Ln population 0.025 -0.008 
 (0.041) (0.026) 
Ln land size -1.154** -0.670** 
 (0.364) (0.251) 
Ln contiguities 0.172 -0.041 
 (0.124) (0.068) 
Constant 0.020 -0.073 
 (1.010) (0.659) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 1831 3922 
Years 1980-2015 1980-2015 
Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. 



















Table 4: Negative binomial estimates of forced migration, excluding civil war and 
international war observations 
 
 (Model 1) (Model 2) 
Successful coups  0.561** 0.695*** 
 (0.214) (0.195) 
Failed coups 0.106 0.117 
 (0.250) (0.195) 
Human rights scores -0.291*** -0.325*** 
 (0.057) (0.031) 
Ln regime duration -0.005 0.074** 
 (0.031) (0.024) 
Ln GDP per capita 0.061 -0.008 
 (0.038) (0.025) 
GDP growth  -0.009 -0.001 
 (0.006) (0.005) 
Ln refugees abroad -0.145*** -0.174*** 
 (0.014) (0.010) 
Ln population 0.028 -0.013 
 (0.041) (0.026) 
Ln land size -1.163** -0.706** 
 (0.364) (0.252) 
Ln contiguities 0.161 -0.030 
 (0.123) (0.068) 
Constant -0.005 0.119 
 (1.023) (0.677) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 1803 3880 
Year 1980-2015 1980-2015 
Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. 
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Despite the extensive research on the causes and consequences of forced migration, only a 
limited number of studies has systematically addressed how changes in political regimes affect 
the growth in the numbers of asylum seekers. Thus far, the focus of the extant literature tends 
to be exclusively on the motives that have caused individuals to leave their countries, while the 
opportunity to escape remains insufficiently investigated. Given the important roles of both 
willingness to escape and opportunity to escape, this study aims to examine potential 
circumstances in which these two conditions are created or limited. Overall, this study 
determines whether regime shift plays a role in the creation or limitation of willingness and 
opportunity to flee and an increase in people in the country of origin with the intention to seek 
asylum elsewhere. Specifically, “regime shifts” refers to changes in political regimes: such 
regimes can vary qualitatively, as some regimes move toward democracy (democratization), 
whereas others shift along the spectrum in the opposite direction toward autocracy 
(autocratization). Using panel data covering the period from 2000 to 2016 across 118 countries, 
our results show that the number of asylum seekers tends to increase when a country 
experiences either sudden democratization or autocratization. It is common sense that 
democracies produce less forced migration than autocracies and that autocratization increases 
refugee flows. What this paper offers by also focusing on the opportunity aspect of forced 
migration is the observation that democratization is also capable of increasing the numbers of 
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forced migrants, especially if the starting point of democratization is very autocratic. The level 
of increase is dependent on the current political regime. For democratized countries, the 
increase in asylum seekers tends to be smaller if the countries experience a further 
democratizing regime shift. Such a diminishing marginal effect is explained as the decrease in 
willingness to escape gradually outweighing the effects of higher opportunity to escape, which 
occurs in more democratic countries. In other words, as democratic countries become more 
democratic, the outward flow of the population becomes less prominent because people are 
less motivated to escape, even if the opportunity to escape is greater. While democratization 
may reduce the motive to leave, it may not change the fact that migrants from countries that 
are still very autocratic are forced to leave. On the other hand, during autocratization, the 
increase in asylum seekers is larger if the countries are more democratic (or less autocratic). 
There is an increasing marginal effect because in more democratic milieus, opportunities to 
escape still exist that accommodate the increase in willingness to escape as a result of 
autocratization. In other words, if an already autocratic country further autocratizes, population 
outflow is mitigated as the citizen’s opportunities to escape the country are diminished, even if 

















1 Introduction  
 
In 2019, there were more than 70 million people who had lost their homes in various parts of 
the world; 30 percent of them were estimated to be refugees, and still, dozens of people 
continue to be displaced every minute (UNHCR, 2019). Unlike other forms of migration, the 
causes and consequences of the ongoing refugee phenomenon seem to be more closely linked 
to international security. Large-scale involuntary migration was classified as the most likely 
and most serious risk threatening the world, and its influences were evaluated as the fourth 
greatest risk in 2016 (World Economic Forum, 2016). It is clear that mass refugee exoduses 
have become an item on the global agenda that cannot be overlooked, and a systemic 
understanding of the fundamental sources of the phenomenon is essential for sustaining peace 
in the future. The modern experience of a large-scale population exodus is driven by very 
complicated reasons, and any form of immigration cannot be independent of the changes in the 
political regimes of the origin countries. A nation-state is an entity whose regime exhibits 
exclusive control over a geographic area and border access (Chiswick and Hatton, 2003; 
Joppke 1998). Thus, changes in the regime may, in some way, affect the outflow of refugees 
abroad. However, very few attempts have been made to understand the effects of such changes 
on population outflows.  
 
Some historical evidence revealed a relationship between sudden regime changes and 
refugee outflows. For example, many Eastern European countries, such as Hungary, Albania, 
Bulgaria, and Romania, simultaneously experienced massive population outflows and 
democratic political transitions during the period of the fall of communism. The demolition of 
communism, including the collapse of the Soviet Union, triggered a wave of radical democratic 
political change that broke away from the communist rule (Strayer, 2001). This phenomenon 
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might imply that mitigated border control, caused by a sudden political transformation, can 
have created an environment suitable for mass population outflows. However, the outflow of 
asylum seekers has not been sufficiently examined within the context of internal changes in the 
regime of the country of origin. A general election which was held in 2002 in Kenya ended the 
40 year-long dominance of the Kenya African National Union, and a democratic regime was 
established. Ironically, the number of asylum applications filed from Kenya reached 10,923 
cases in the same year (Anderson, 2003; Ndegwa, 2003; UNHCR, 2018). This is ten times 
higher than the previous year’s asylum applications of 969 cases. It is important to note that 
there was no significant state-sponsored generalized violence in Kenya at this time, although 
there was some communal violence, and the number of asylum seekers surged despite the 
establishment of a democratic regime. This may suggest that democratic change in a non-
democratic regime can be seen as a crucial change to the structural environment that creates 
people’s opportunities to escape. North Korea, for example, has maintained a full autocracy 
over the past decades. Despite the evident factors motivating people to escape, such as 
economic poverty, violation of human rights, and political oppression, the volume of asylum 
seekers generated from North Korea has consistently remained at a low level. This case also 
suggests that state control can serve as a key to deter population outflows by limiting people’s 
opportunities to escape.  
 
Conversely, cases in which rapid autocratization has resulted in increased forced migration 
are also found in many countries. Mali, which maintained a democratic political system based 
on multi-party elections for 20 years from 1992, experienced rapid democratic backsliding due 
to a coup initiated by rebels in 2012 (Arieff and Johnson, 2012). This transition led to broader 
political and security instability, which in turn increased threats to those nations’ populations 
and intensified their motivation to escape (Thurston and Lebovich, 2013). Burundi’s case in 
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2015 also clearly shows how a regression of democracy can induce population outflows. Pierre 
Nkuruniziza, who had served as President of Burundi since 2005, announced his commitment 
to running in his third presidential election in 2015. His announcement faced strong criticism 
due to its unconstitutionality, resulting in massive protests by opponents. In addition, military 
personnel who resisted President Nkurunziza staged a coup in May 2015, although it ended in 
failure (Amnesty International, 2015). The opposition rally, which took place before and after 
the presidential election in July 2015, was mostly suppressed by government forces, and 
universities and several radio stations were also closed by the government (Jobbins and 
Ahitungiye, 2015; Mross, 2015; Schlein, 2015). During this period, political instability caused 
by the autocratic shift of the ruling regime generated hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers 
and refugees in a short period of time. Mauritania also experienced a sharp regime shift toward 
autocracy in 2008. Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi, who was elected Mauritania’s president in the 
2007 democratic election, was overthrown by a coup led by military personnel, including 
General Abdel Aziz, which put Mauritania under the control of the High Council of State 
(United States Department of State, 2009). Although the military coup was relatively less 
violent, the number of asylum seekers from Mauritania continued to increase over the 
subsequent few years due to damaged democratic values and increased political instability. As 
can be seen in history, the shift in the political system of the country of origin plays a very 
important part in understanding the causes of the occurrence of forced migration and the 
structural environments that affect increases and decreases in forced migration. Nevertheless, 
transitions and changes in the regime of the country of origin on forced migration remain 
overlooked in the literature.  
 
The majority of previous studies have tended to pay particular attention to generalized 
violence in discussing the determinants of refugee outflows. While it is difficult to criticize the 
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widely accepted argument and the perceived “orthodox viewpoint” that “the occurrence of 
violence causes diaspora,” this “conflict-induced” approach has revealed certain limitations in 
explaining the non-violent determinants of displacement. In particular, this approach precludes 
discussion of the government’s role in the refugee phenomenon amid the growth of forced 
migration. In analyzing forced migration, there is a consensus among social scientists (e.g., 
Carling, 2002; de Haas, 2014; Schon, 2019) that a willingness to leave the country does not 
always create a population outflow and that a population outflow can occur only if the 
opportunity or capability to realize that will to leave exists. In other words, the willingness and 
opportunity to leave have a combined influence on the outflow of population. In this regard, 
this study examines the impact of regime changes on the increase in the number of asylum 
seekers. By analyzing the contrasting phenomena of democratization and autocratization, the 
relevance of sudden regime change can be highlighted and explained through its effects on the 
opportunity and willingness to escape. 
 
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a literature review on the determinants 
of forced migration. Section 3 outlines the argument that regime shifts in different directions 
can result in different consequences for refugee outflows; also, in section 3, a discussion will 
follow about how regime changes can limit or create motivations and opportunities for people 
to escape. Section 4 outlines the structure of the analysis and describes both the methodology 
and the data. The main findings are presented in section 4. Then, I will conclude with a 
discussion of the contributions of this study.  
  
2 Previous research  




In discussing the determinants of refugee outflows, economic factors have been central to the 
debate. Breunig et al. (2012) argue that economic aspects are the most important consideration 
in determining migration for both economic immigrants and refugees while denying the 
relevance of political motivation in the matter. Their justification is based on the observation 
that the final destination for a significant number of refugees is often not a democratic country. 
They argue that the migration of refugees can also be analyzed in line with the phenomenon of 
general migration and that it is likely to arise from economic motivation. When identifying the 
determinants of the influx of refugees into Western Europe, Neumayer (2005) specifically 
focuses on economic factors that influence refugee flows. He underlines the premise that 
refugees entering Europe do so for economic purposes by showing that economic factors such 
as GDP per capita, average annual growth rate, and economic discrimination influence refugee 
inflows. Akokpari (1998) also claims that economic deterioration and famine, along with civil 
war, were a major cause of the increase in refugees in Africa in the 1990s. Similarly, Damm 
(2009) argues that refugees decide to flee in an attempt to ensure their own economic welfare 
by pointing out that refugees generally escape to areas with low levels of unemployment. 
Adhikari (2013) analyzes how people’s motivations to flee vary depending on their level of 
income and assets owned. He explains that people who are guaranteed stable employment 
hesitate to flee even in the face of threats, suggesting that economic security is a decisive factor 
in determining migration.  
 
In addition to economic factors, many previous studies of conflict-induced displacement 
tend to emphasize political and security threats in analyzing the occurrence of refugees. For 
example, the analytical model proposed by Schmeidl (1997) points out that the occurrence of 
violence (civil war and genocide/politicide) is a major cause of increases in the number of 
refugees. Moore and Shellman (2004) conclude that physical threats arising from government 
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violence are the most crucial determinant of forced migration. They list the specific physical 
threats that create fear, forcing people to abandon their homes. In their study, government terror, 
genocide, and dissident violence are shown to be positively associated with a higher volume of 
forced migrations. Adhikari (2013) also argues that the presence of physical threats is 
positively correlated with the probability of displacement. Similarly, Davenport et al. (2003) 
show that the presence of physical threats such as genocide and civil war affects forced 
migrations, while economic and demographic threats appear not to be closely linked with the 
volume of forced migrations. Melander and Ö berg (2007) provide a new perspective on 
migration research by analyzing the relationship between violence and immigration from a 
geographical point of view, arguing that the outflow of forced migration is increased mainly 
by the geographic extent of violence, the low level of democracy, and the accumulated number 
of forced migrants. Their empirical findings suggest that it is the geographic extent of violence 
rather than its intensity that is significantly associated with the occurrence of refugees. 
 
  Weiner (1996) pays attention to the outbreak of violence in neighboring countries by 
categorizing countries that are vulnerable to the outbreak of conflicts and refugee flows as “Bad 
Neighborhoods.” Weiner argues that the presence of Bad Neighborhoods affects not only the 
internal security of the country of origin but also the security of neighboring countries and 
international society, suggesting that conflicts often spill across borders for various reasons and 
refugee flows frequently cause the outbreak of other conflicts in neighboring countries. 
Weiner’s argument is supported by Iqbal (2007), who shows that the distance between a 
country that is experiencing conflict and a host country is negatively correlated with the volume 
of generated refugees, suggesting that geographical proximity plays a key role in forced 
migration. Contrary to prevailing claims, Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006) conclude that an 
outbreak of refugees increases the possibility of civil war in neighboring countries. The 
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theoretical basis underpinning their argument is that the influx of refugees from neighboring 
countries implies the possibility of an influx of people directly involved in the civil war; thus, 
it can be viewed as a geographic expansion of civil war. Based on the results obtained after 
conducting a case study in Somalia using a Bayesian change-point model, Schon (2015) argues 
that structural changes in conflicts, particularly changes in the geographic scope of the conflict 
and in the balance of power, would heighten the intensity of fear and force people to flee.   
 
A number of authors have considered the effect of the availability of information about 
upcoming persecution on individuals’ decisions to flee abroad. For example, Schon (2015) 
argues that groups of people who are aware of information about upcoming punishment tend 
to run away to avoid it. In a similar context, information on destination countries has also been 
frequently discussed. Moore and Shellman (2004) argue that the size of the refugee community 
at asylum destinations affects the refugee outflow from the country of origin. The existence of 
a network composed of accumulated refugees outside the country of origin could be a factor 
that affects subsequent asylum seekers by reducing the risks incurred in the process of fleeing 
and settling into the destination country. 
 
Although the amount of research on the determinants of refugee outflows over the past 
several decades has grown considerably, the existing studies have tended to emphasize the 
economic and security aspects that cause increases in the number of refugees. As a result, the 
impact of changes in political systems on the outflow of refugees has received relatively little 
attention. However, the importance of the politics of the country of origin of refugees should 
not be overlooked. Betts (2014) points out the limits of the analytical approaches in existing 
refugee studies, arguing that many of the social science studies on forced migration have been 
based on a “bottom-up” approach that largely emphasizes the migrant experience as the 
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research focus. However, a “top-down” level approach is also necessary, as decisions made by 
the state or other political actors have a profound impact on refugees. Although there have been 
attempts to include the impact of regime transition on refugees in the analysis, there has been 
insufficient explanation of the different impacts of democratization on refugees compared to 
the phenomenon of autocratization. 
 
3 Regime transition and population flows  
3.1 Attitudes toward entry and exit  
 
The key premise of this study is that transitions in the regime, either toward democracy or 
autocracy, will affect the motivation and opportunity of people to flee, ultimately determining 
the scope of the outflow of asylum seekers. Hence, the theoretical discussion explaining the 
link between regime types and population outflow is material.  
 
The type of political system and the level of state control over the entry and exit of the 
population are deeply related. Therefore, changes in regimes are likely to influence asylum 
outflows. In general, existing studies have discussed the relationship between regime types and 
immigration policies across democratic and autocratic countries. According to the extant 
literature, democracies and non-democracies respond differently to the entry and exit of the 
population. Regarding entry, a common argument that can be found in many studies is that 
democracies tend to have relatively more restrictive policies on the influx of a foreign 
population than autocratic states. For example, Breunig et al. (2012) argue that the more rigid 
immigration policies typically found in a democracy but lacking in an autocracy are caused by 
the existence in the former of periodic elections. Because national leaders in democratic 
regimes are not free from the public’s preferences, democratic countries tend to have restrictive 
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immigration policies that satisfy their own citizens’ needs and interests. Niskanen (1997) 
explains that immigration is limited in democratic states because the goal of the democratic 
state is to maximize the income of the median voter, and the inflow of low-income immigrants 
can lead to an increase in tax rates and a decrease in the income of the average constituent. On 
the other hand, it has been argued that the leaders of autocratic countries have more autonomy 
in decision making because they feel less pressure to consider the public’s preferences than do 
the leaders of democratic countries, and so they tend to show a flexible attitude toward the 
entry of migrants. Mirilovic (2010) explains two reasons why an autocratic regime takes a more 
open stance on the entry of immigrants than a democratic one. First, the inflow of immigrants 
lowers wages, and, as an employer, an autocratic state based on a centrally controlled economic 
system reaps the benefits. Second, the increase in immigrants indicates an increase in the 
number of people who can pay taxes, which contributes to the national capital.  
 
The emigration policy of the country of origin is also an important factor in determining the 
size and composition of international migration flows (Massey, 1999). Niskanen (1997) claims 
that in modern society, countries that restrict emigration are all characterized as autocratic 
countries. Miller and Peter state that “control over the movement of citizens has long been 
central to autocratic power,” and they argue that one of the ways this power manifests itself is 
through the strong control over emigration that autocratic regimes exert (Miller and Peters, 
2018, p. 403). The reason for a restrictive emigration policy is that the ongoing population 
drain into democratic countries is considered a threat to the survival of the autocratic regime 
(ibid.). Hirschman (1978) argues that a large population outflow from an autocratic country 
could be the starting point of the collapse of the regime. As Mirilovic’s study (2015) shows, 
the propensity of autocratic states to take a tough stance on allowing their citizens to hold dual 
citizenship, an attitude meant to prevent the spread of democracy in their home countries, 
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proves this claim. It has been recognized that historical events such as the opening of China, 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the end of the Cold War are phenomena that initiated a 
new era, breaking the artificial restrictions on migration in non-democratic countries (Frejka 
1997; Roberts 1997).  
 
In democracies, the opposite tendency is observed. It has been argued that democratic 
countries lean toward exercising a weaker control over the outflow of the population than non-
democratic states because they follow the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and pursue 
the protection of the international norms and human rights agreements adopted by democratic 
nations (Breunig et al., 2012; Miller and Peters, 2018). In a study conducted by Miller and 
Peters (2018), the level of democracy is found to be proportional to freedom to emigrate, 
suggesting that a transition to democracy can increase the level of freedom to emigrate. 
Larrabee (1992) also views political liberalization as having the capacity to trigger population 
outflows. Given that democratization refers to a transition of the political system toward 
democracy and autocratization to a transition toward autocracy, these changes can lead to a 
change of control over entry into and exit out of the country. Consequently, changes in the 
level of control over immigration are likely to have structural impacts on the volume of asylum 
seekers (ibid.).  
 
Together, existing studies indicate that democratic countries tend to take a generous stance 
on emigration but are disposed to taking a hard stance on the influx of a foreign population. On 
the other hand, non-democratic countries tend to exert tough control over the outflow of the 
populace, while they take a generous stance on the influx of a foreign population. Based on the 
discussion of the types of regimes and their corresponding immigration policies, this study 
anticipates that a regime change can be interpreted in terms of changes in the level of state 
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control over population outflows, which in turn creates and limits opportunities for people to 
escape. In the following section, possible impacts of two different forms of regime transition 
on asylum outflows will be addressed.  
 
3.2 The impacts of democratization on asylum flows   
 
In many studies of conflict, political democracy has been regarded as inherent to the 
resolution of conflicts based on the expectation that negotiations and mediation through 
democratic institutions can alleviate domestic and international disputes. There has been a 
belief that democracy prevents the government from exercising violent oppression against 
individuals, instead preserving the value of human rights and promoting peace (e.g., Davenport, 
1995; Dixon, 1994; Goldstein, 1978; Inglehart et al., 2008; Kinsella and David, 2008; Rummel, 
1995, 2002). A group of scholars, among them Sunde and Cervelliati (2014), argue that 
democratization contributes to political stability by reducing internal civil conflicts. Przeworski 
defines democracy as “a particular system of processing and terminating intergroup conflicts” 
(1986, p. 56). He believes that democracy forms an institutional framework in which conflicts 
among diverse groups within society can be reconciled peacefully in a particular way. 
Cervellati et al. (2011) also suggest that peaceful democratization can enhance the quality of a 
political system by allowing political and economic liberties to mature. The impacts of 
democratization on society are not limited to the political and security sphere and can be 
extended to the economic sphere. Pastor and Sung (1995) point out that the necessity for the 
rule of law and transparency of government agencies that can be settled via democratization 
can reduce political instability and uncertainty, thereby attracting capital investment and laying 
the foundation for economic growth. Carbone et al. (2014) argue that democratization can 
increase productivity and growth, as the introduction of democratic institutions and 
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competition allows the public to replace leaders who have previously hampered economic 
growth, by showing that democratization served as a catalyst for economic development in the 
majority of the sub-Saharan African countries that experienced democratization between 1995 
and 2004. Similarly, Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005) argue that the introduction of democracy in 
areas with poor political and economic stability does not negatively affect economic growth, 
but rather activates the economy. Given the positive effects of democratization on political and 
economic stability, it can be predicted that democratization will create a structural environment 
that reduces the willingness of the people to escape. In a similar vein, many studies of forced 
migration have found that the existence of a mature democracy is inversely related to numbers 
of refugees, suggesting that a well-established democracy can lower people’s desire to leave 
the country (e.g., Moore and Shellman, 2007). In Neumayer’s model (2005), the opposite 
tendency is found in an autocratic regime, suggesting that the motivation to flee increases for 
those living under that type of system.  
 
The maturity of the democratic system can contribute to political stability and lower levels 
of forced migration. However, the impacts of an established, mature democracy and of the 
democratization process need to be considered separately. Davenport and Armstrong (2004) 
argue that democracy and state oppression are not always in a nonlinear relationship. Their 
research shows that only when democracy reaches a certain threshold does state oppression 
weaken, and human rights improve. In other words, democratization in non-democratic 
countries, which can be a lengthy process, does not necessarily mean that the level of 
oppression felt by the people has decreased. Furthermore, it has been argued that the process 
of democratization in non-democratic countries can create a variety of political, economic, and 
security uncertainties. Democratization and peacebuilding are expected to be mutually 
inclusive. In reality, however, it has been pointed out that the process of democratization is 
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often conflict-ridden. In particular, Jarstad and Sisk (2008) argue that democratization as a 
post-war transition can hamper peace, and peace processes can also hamper democratization; 
furthermore, failure to address the dilemma of the coexistence of democratization and peace 
settlements can result in violence and a return to authoritarianism (ibid.).  
 
Cederman et al. (2010) hold the view that democratization does not guarantee political 
stability but can rather cause confusion and violence unless a country reaches a high level of 
democracy. It has been pointed out that the democratization of autocratic states hardly ever 
results in complete democracy, while a number of regimes experiencing democratization 
remain as anocracies that simultaneously embody the characteristics of both democracy and 
dictatorship. In a regime with a low level of democracy, elected governments find it hard to 
obtain full legitimacy and credibility, often resulting in political instability. This viewpoint is 
supported by Gleditsch and Ward (2000), who argue that although generally, a high-level 
democracy is unlikely to engage in wars, an unstable anocracy, which has both autocratic and 
democratic features, can be vulnerable to violence on a level similar to an autocratic regime. 
Similar arguments have been raised by Mansfield and Snyder (1995), who contend that the 
process of democratization can cause political instability and often leads to civil wars. Powell 
(1982) also highlights the political risks of democratization by pointing out that in the process 
of introducing democracy into non-democratic countries, political systems that have not yet 
been fully institutionalized tend to be eroded by extremist political groups, which can damage 
the legitimacy of elected regimes and cause political confusion. Perotti and Alesina (1996) 
posit that democratization is likely to deepen the income gap between social classes and can 
thus hinder social stability. In view of all that has been mentioned so far about the potential 
negative influence of democratization on the economy and society, one may suppose that while 
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a mature democracy can lower the motivation of the people to migrate, as consistently found 
in the literature, the same conclusion cannot be drawn for the process of democratization. 
 
As discussed in the previous section, democratic regimes tend to exercise limited or loosened 
control over the individual’s decision to move abroad compared to autocratic regimes. Hence, 
in an autocracy, a regime shift toward democracy can be interpreted in terms of a weakening 
of state control over the ability of that nation’s people to flee abroad (Miller and Peters, 2014). 
At the same time, it is suggested that the democratization process takes time to reach the 
desirable threshold (mature democracy) or complete-democratic stage (Cederman et al., 2010). 
Hence, although the introduction of a democratic political system can partially guarantee the 
rights of the people, public confidence in a democratic government created in a short period of 
time may not be sufficient to transcend the grievances people have accumulated over a long 
period of time due to the suppression exercised by the formerly autocratic regime. The 
perception alone that the state’s control over emigration has been newly mitigated by 
democratization can act as a catalyst for asylum seekers to realize their long-held desire to 
escape. Therefore, the possible reduction in motivation to escape during this democratization 
transition may be trivial comparing to the increased opportunities to escape for the oppressed 
people. Given the impact of a regime shift toward democracy on the opportunities as well as 
the motivation of people to escape, it is expected that sudden democratization can increase the 
number of asylum seekers, particularly in non-democratic countries. As a result, the following 
hypothesis will be tested: 
 





Nevertheless, what remains unclear at this stage is whether the effects of democratization on 
the outflow of asylum seekers change according to the countries’ current political regime. As 
previously discussed, democratization, particularly in non-democratic countries, may lead to 
higher levels of opportunity to escape while the willingness to escape can either decrease to a 
lesser extent compared to the increased opportunity to escape or remain constant. However, if 
the countries are currently close to the mature stage of democracy where the motivation to 
escape has been lowered, compared to non-democratic countries, and the opportunity for leave 
has also vividly existed, further democratization may not influence or even lower the outflow 
of asylum seekers. In other words, it is expected that the impacts of democratization tend to be 
weaker in more democratized countries and stronger in more autocratized countries. 
Consequently, the following hypothesis will be tested:   
 
Hypothesis 2. The political regime significantly negatively moderates the positive association 
between democratization and the outflow of asylum seekers. 
 
3. 3 The impacts of autocratization on asylum flows   
 
It is expected that an autocratic regime can influence, from various perspectives, the people’s 
motivations to flee that regime. First, there has been a view that autocracies tend to exert intense 
repression compared to democratic regimes (Davenport, 1999; Poe et al., 1999). Scholars such 
as Escribà-Folch (2013) explain that repression is prominent in autocracies because restrictions 
on civil liberties actually help the autocratic regime. As the regime’s oppression against 
individual civil rights intensifies, people living in an autocracy may be more willing to leave 
the country. In this regard, the process of autocratization can be interpreted as a situation in 
which the range of political participation and rights formerly exercised by the people is limited 
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or reduced, while the autonomy and control of the ruling regime are apt to expand (Cassani and 
Tomini, 2018; O’Donnell, 1998). Gurr (1970) points out that autocratic regimes tend to be 
vulnerable to a higher level of political instability than democratic countries, and the main 
reason for this instability is the constant suppression of the people; this increases public 
discontent against the regime and often provokes political resistance in violent forms. 
 
Second, the vulnerability to violent conflict inherent in autocracy also can increase people’s 
motivation to flee. Mansfield and Snyder (1995) argue that autocratization is a form of political 
transition that is conflict-prone, especially from a long-term perspective. Both the 
democratizing and autocratizing processes expose institutional deficiencies, making conflicts 
more likely (ibid.). Similarly, many studies conclude that countries that are experiencing 
regime transitions, identified as intermediate states, are more vulnerable to civil wars than fully 
democratic or autocratic countries (Francisco, 1995; Muller and Weede, 1990). The closure or 
reduction of individual political autonomy can trigger political violence by those citizens who 
have been deemed opponents of the regime. Violence may also be exercised by the existing 
regime as a tool of resistance to the opposition (Cederman et al. 2010; Petersen 2002). Political 
and security threats that are created in the process of autocratization can increase the level of 
threats to the population and motivate people to escape. 
 
Similar to democratization, the impacts of autocratization on forced migration should be 
approached from both directions: motivation and opportunities for people to flee. While 
autocratization can increase people’s motivation to escape, it can also limit their chances of 
doing so successfully (lower opportunity for escape). Autocratization can be defined as a 
regime shift toward autocracy. Cassani and Tomini define autocratization “as a process of 
regime change toward autocracy that makes politics increasingly exclusive and monopolistic, 
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and political power increasingly repressive and arbitrary.” (2018, p. 6). Applying their 
definition of autocratization, the enhanced control of the regime over the people can be 
understood as a structural factor limiting any opportunities to flee. Again, autocratic regimes 
tend to take a more restrictive attitude toward demographic outflow than democracies (Miller 
and Peters, 2018; Mirilovic, 2015). It is likely that if the level of oppression a government 
previously exercised against its people is suddenly increased due to a regime shift, it might lead 
to the phenomenon of “involuntary stay” in which people are forced to remain in their home 
country even if they want to flee. In other words, when a regime is experiencing autocratization, 
that can indicate that the level of the state’s repression over its people is suddenly boosted with 
stronger means, and its control over population movement across borders is also strengthened. 
Autocratization is likely to cause physical or political threats to the inhabitants and increase 
their motivation to escape. However, the control of the state over its inhabitants is strengthened 
in proportion to the level of oppression felt by the people. Increased state control is likely to 
create greater risks for people leaving their home countries. Hence, I anticipate that the 
structural influence of autocratization, which restricts people’s opportunities to escape, will 
suppress the phenomenon of population outflows.  
 
Putting the above discussion together, I anticipate that increased political instability and 
compromised human rights not only increase people’s dissatisfaction with the regime but also 
increase their motivation to leave home, resulting in the generation of more asylum seekers. 
However, the volume of the outflow of forced migration will depend on the existing national 
political system, as the existing political system can determine the opportunity for people to 
leave. It is likely that the stronger the autocratic regime, the tighter the government’s control 
over its people. Hence, the impact of autocratization on the volume of asylum seekers tends to 




Hypothesis 3. Autocratization is significantly positively associated with the outflow of asylum 
seekers. 
 
Hypothesis 4. The political regime significantly positively moderates the positive association 
between autocratization and the outflow of asylum seekers. 
 
4 Statistical analysis  
 
4.1 Data  
Dependent variable  
 
The volume of forced migration has been estimated in various ways in previous studies. 
Typically, refugee stock has been widely used in the literature as a proxy for refugee flows 
(Moore and Shellman, 2007; Schmeidl, 1997; Weiner, 1996). Another measure that uses 
differences between refugee outflows and inflows, including internally displaced persons 
(IPDs), has also been often utilized (Davenport et al., 2003; Uzonyi, 2014). Regarding the 
former, refugee stock data may still be deemed a reliable measurement in studies of the causes 
of forced migration. Nonetheless, the measure is exposed to some limitations. First, the term 
“refugee” refers to persons who are eligible for international legal protection. In other words, 
obtaining refugee status means that the asylum application has been accepted by the host 
country. Thus, this granted refugee status is determined entirely by the host countries. Hence, 




Second, a flow measure using the refugee stock data takes the change in value from the 
total number of refugees in the previous year. If the change in value from the previous year is 
negative, it is generally converted to zero. The problem is that changes in the total refugee 
population are likely not to reflect the number of people who actually attempted to gain asylum 
in a given year. Changes in the total population of refugees can occur for various reasons. For 
instance, a decrease in the refugee population can occur if the number of refugees who have 
acquired the nationality of the host country increases. Alternatively, refugees residing in host 
countries for long periods of time may no longer be included in the refugee population; this 
also causes a decrease in refugee stock. More importantly, a model using refugee stock is 
unlikely to capture the number of people who actually spilled over the borders each year, and 
it is difficult to analyze the impact of determinants on refugees. For example, the refugee stock 
in Afghanistan in 2000 was 985,645. However, in the same year, 291,283 Afghans applied for 
asylum. The 700,000 Afghans counted in models using refugee stock are not those who applied 
for asylum in the same year and are likely to be people already living in host countries. 
Therefore, these individuals are irrelevant to the determinants included in the analysis. In 
addition, the model using refugee stock counts the number of Afghan refugees in 2002 as zero 
because the population of refugees compared to the previous year is negative. However, 31,781 
Afghans applied for asylum in 2002. Again, one can conclude that there was no refugee stock 
in Guatemala from 2000 to 2005 by using this method. However, the average number of asylum 
seekers from Guatemala during this period was 3,150. 
 
Considering these drawbacks of the refugee stock proxy, the current research employs the 
asylum applications during a year as the main proxy of refugee flow. This measure is suggested 
as an appropriate parameter for identifying whether changes in the regime have led people to 
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leave the country (Neumayer, 2005). The variable of asylum applications made during the year 
is obtained from the UNHCR (2018) covering the period from 2000 to 2016.  
 
Main independent variables  
 
In order to capture the impact of changes in the political regime on asylum seekers, a revised 
combined polity score (Polity2) is used as baseline data in the analysis. This variable was 
collected from the Center for Systemic Peace (Marshall et al., 2017). Each country’s Polity2 
index is rated on a scale of -10 to 10, with -10 representing the highest level of Autocracy and 
10 representing the highest level of Democracy. Since the study focuses on the state of 
democratization and autocratization of a country as the key independent variables, two dummy 
variables, namely demo and auto, respectively, were created based on the changes in the 
country’s polity scores over time. Specifically, a country experiencing democratization 
(autocratization) is captured when its polity score increases (decreases) by at least 3 points 
against the previous year’s figure. This indicates a significant transition of the regime, which 
breaks the durability of the existing regime in that country (Marshall et al., 2017). Although 
the methodological application is somewhat different, in a study by Fearon and Laitin (2003), 
the extension of the change in the Polity2 index with a rise or fall of three points is seen as the 
standard for defining regime transition. Cederman et al. (2010) also view a shift of three points 
in the Polity index as an appropriate standard to indicate a visible regime transition. Therefore, 
the democratization variable denotes unity when there is a minimum increase of 3 points in 
the Polity2 index and zero otherwise. Conversely, the autocratization variable denotes unity 




In addition to democratization and autocratization, the study also employs two interaction 
terms to distinguish the effects of changes in willingness to escape and opportunity to escape 
(see Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 4). First, an interaction term between democratization and 
Polity2 (Demo_polity2) is constructed to capture any conditional relationship between the two 
factors in determining the outflow of asylum seekers. The variable aims to examine whether 
the influence of the democratization process of a country on the outflow of asylum seekers is 
dependent on the current political regime of that country. In the same way, an interaction term 
between autocratization and Polity2 (Auto_polity2) is constructed to examine if the effects of 
autocratization on the outflow of asylum seekers are moderated/influenced by the countries’ 
political regime (i.e. levels of democracy/autocracy) in the year where the autocratization 
process takes place. This moderating effect of political regime represents the opportunity to 
flee for asylum seekers. 
 
Assessing the people’s opportunity and motivation to flee  
 
Using the Polity2 index as a proxy measure to assess the impact of democratization and 
autocratization on the outflow of asylum seekers is suitable for this research, which is aimed at 
measuring the increase or decrease in willingness and opportunities of people to leave the 
country in the context of regime transition. The maturity of democracy in the Polity2 index is 
measured based on three criteria: first, the competitiveness of political participation, second, 
the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and third, the constraints on the 
chief executive. The three components are aggregated and scored on a 0-10 scale (Marshall et 
al., 2017). This indicator represents the existence of institutions and procedures that allow 
citizens to express their preferences for policy and political leaders effectively. It also captures 
the presence of institutionalized constraints that may limit the arbitrary exercise of powers 
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imposed by senior officials. In other words, the level of political freedom and the rights enjoyed 
by citizens to express their preferences, as well as the extent to which the arbitrary use of power 
by chief executives can be inferred from the index. 
 
On the other hand, the operational index score that composes autocracy is basically based 
on the same criteria as the one for democracy, and the openness and competitiveness of 
executive recruitment elements are additionally considered. This index assesses to what extent 
a country's political system allows the political freedom and political participation of its citizens, 
and also shows whether the selection of political leaders is left to the people or to those within 
a small number of political elite groups. In addition, this index takes into account the degree of 
legislative and institutionalized constraints on the use of power by political leadership groups. 
The four components are summed, and each country's autocracy is scored on a scale of 0-10. 
Polity2 is a unified index created by combining the democracy index and the autocracy index, 
and the score is calculated on a scale from -10 to 10 (Ibid.).  
 
From a broader perspective, two factors can be inferred through this index. 1. Are there 
democratic institutions and procedures that protect the rights of the people and reflect their 
preferences? 2. Can the political system limit the abuse of power by those who run the country? 
Hence, democratization can be seen as the process in which the scope of individual political 
freedom and rights is expanded, and the arbitrary use of state power against its citizens becomes 
strictly constrained. On the other hand, autocratization can be seen as the process by which the 
level of individual rights and freedoms is reduced, and the arbitrary exercise of state power 
against a country’s own citizens becomes permissible, with few institutional constraints. 
Therefore, the indicator of Polity2 can be used in this study, which focuses on the impact of 
regime shift on the opportunity and willingness of those seeking to leave the country. It is 
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logical to anticipate that in the process of autocratization, in which the expansion of state power 
is unrestricted, the chances of people leaving the state are likely to be limited. On the other 
hand, the motivation to leave the country in this process is expected to increase, because 
individual political freedoms and rights become limited. In the process of democratization, in 
which individual political freedom and rights are expanded, and the arbitrary use of state power 
becomes limited, the chances of people leaving the state are increased, while the people's 
motivation to leave the country is likely to decrease (Rubin and Moore, 2007). 
 
However, since the decision of asylum seekers to leave the country is made at the individual 
level, there is a practical limitation in thoroughly verifying the increase or decrease of the 
individual's motivation to leave the country through the aggregate empirical analysis presented 
in this study. Nevertheless, many previous studies have demonstrated that the maturity of 
democracy is in a nonlinear relationship with the degree of refugee outflow (Moore and 
Shellman, 2007). It is also generally argued that the presence of an autocratic political system 
functions as a push factor that generates refugee outflows (Martin-Shields, 2017; Otunnu, 
2002). In other words, the out-migration of asylum seekers/refugees can be analyzed as the 
reaction of people to anticipation of the negative consequences that regime transition in the 
country of origin can cause, consequences such as government repression, human rights 
violations, and violent behavior, which increase people’s willingness to flee (Moore and 
Shellman, 2006).  
 
Also, numerous qualitative studies based on interviews and case studies conclude that the 
desire of people to leave a country can increase or decrease depending on the type of political 
system of the country of origin. For example, Ozaltin et al. (2019), in their research examining, 
from a historical perspective, the causes of Iraqis’ decisions to flee, argue that between the 
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1960s and 1970s, the authoritarian nature of the Iraqi government was a major factor in 
increasing motivation to leave the country. In a study analyzing the causes of asylum seekers 
entering Canada from South American countries in the 1980s, Simmons (1993) also draws a 
similar conclusion. He analyzes that the prevailing autocratic rule, coupled with political 
turmoil and economic insecurity, was the primary determinant that motivated asylum seekers 
to flee to Canada from Chile and El Salvador. Based on the findings of both quantitative and 
qualitative existing studies, the reasoning that the democratization process can create an 
environment in which the willingness to leave the country can be reduced, and that the 
autocratization process can create an environment in which the willingness to leave the country 




The first evident controlling factor is “democracy.” Democracy has been considered an 
important condition in determining life satisfaction (Dorn et al., 2008; Owen et al., 2008). It 
has been argued that the maturity of democracy in the country of origin of asylum seekers plays 
a decisive role in the outbreak of forced migration (Levitsky and Way, 2005; Moore and 
Shellman, 2007). It reflects the notion that individual human rights are well protected under a 
democratic political system (Inglehart et al., 2008; Neumayer, 2005). The origin Polity2 score 
is controlled for to capture the general associations between the maturity of a political system 
and the outbreak of forced migration. If the influence of the regime change on asylum seekers 
can be analyzed as a factor of structural constraint, the maturity of the political system itself 
can be classified into the motivation category that determines the degree of life satisfaction of 




Furthermore, to see if violations of the physical integrity rights of individuals by the 
government lead to an increase in the number of asylum seekers, the variable for physical 
integrity rights that is part of the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset is utilized 
(Cingranelli et al., 2014). This variable is coded on a scale of 0 to 8, where 8 indicates that the 
government fully protects physical integrity rights, and 0 indicates that the government wholly 
violates these rights. The types of state repression counted in this data are torture, extrajudicial 
killing, political imprisonment, and disappearance. 
 
A high level of democracy and stable national wealth in the potential destination country of 
asylum are seen as factors inducing population inflows, reflecting the expectation that 
democratic institutions and legal systems can guarantee physical integrity rights (Moore and 
Shellman, 2004). Previous studies also argue that the neighboring countries of refugee-
producing countries tend to be tentative destination countries for asylum seekers compared to 
distant countries (Moore and Shellman, 2007). It is also predicted that the presence of 
democratic countries located in geographical proximity could play a role in inducing 
population outflows from the country of origin of asylum seekers (Uzonyi, 2014). A variable 
“Democratic neighbors in the region” is included in the analysis to determine whether the 
distribution of democracy in potential destinations in the region affects the outflow of asylum 
seekers.1 
 
The outbreak of violence has been considered the most immediate threat to people because 
it can cause them direct physical harm. The presence of any form of generalized violence would 
                                                 
1 This paper accounts for this possibility by controlling for the proportion of democratic regimes in a 
region. The regions are: Asia; Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union; Western Europe; North 
America; the Caribbean; Central and South America; the Middle East and North Africa; Sub-Saharan 
Africa; and Australia and Oceania. 
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be a severe threat to citizens, increasing the number of asylum seekers (Deal, 2013; Zolberg, 
1989). The degree to which it affects the people may vary according to the types and intensity 
of the violence. To clarify if the volume of asylum seekers differs depending on the types and 
intensity of violence, various types of violence are included in the analysis. These include (1) 
Genocide and Politicide, (2) Civil war, and (3) Ethnic war (Davenport et al., 2003; Schmeidl, 
1997; Weiner, 1996), which are measured using dummy variables to capture their presence. 
Specifically, with the occurrence of genocide and politicide, civil war and ethnic war, their 
corresponding variables are coded as “1,” otherwise zero. These data have been obtained from 
the Center for Systemic Peace (Marshall, 2017). 
 
It is believed that conflicts that exist in one country can bring about a domino effect in 
neighboring countries (Weiner, 1996). Therefore, it is likely that the presence of conflicts in 
one country would increase the security threats felt by the people of neighboring countries 
because it would affect the entire region where the country is located, and ultimately this would 
affect population outflows. Hence, another controlling factor is included in the model to capture 
the number of bordering states with violence (societal and major episodes of political violence). 
This original data is also part of the Armed Conflict and Intervention (ACI) data set provided 
by the Center for Systemic Peace (Marshall, 2017). 
 
The role of economic security in migrant flows has received extra attention due to the fact 
that economic activities are crucial to one’s living standards and survival (Brettell and 
Hollifield, 2008, p. 20). A great deal of the previous research focused on economic security as 
a primary driver of refugee flows, as the economic situation is also a significant factor in 
determining the life satisfaction of individuals (Ager and Strang, 2008; Di Tella et al., 2001; 
Hagen-Zanker, 2008; Lendorfer et al., 2016). People seek to maximize their benefits and 
159 
 
minimize their risks in a given set of circumstances. The labels applied to migrants vary from 
economic migrants to asylum seekers, depending on their legal status and their motivations 
(Zetter, 2007). However, it can be argued that asylum seekers also evaluate possible options 
by analyzing the internal and external environments in order to maximize benefits and 
minimize risks when they decide to leave their country (Breunig et al., 2012). Therefore, two 
key economic indicators, i.e., logged GDP per capita and the unemployment rate, are employed 
to capture the impact of the economic situation on the increase in the number of asylum seekers. 
The original data can be obtained from the World Bank (2018). Food insecurity has been 
pointed out as a driving cause of displacement (Neumayer, 2005). The threat of survival from 
hunger is likely to force people to choose to move abroad. Hence, a variable for the net per 
capita food production is taken into account to capture the effect of food shortages on 
displacement. The data are provided by FAO (2018). I anticipate that a high level of food 
production reflects the fact that fewer people suffer from hunger. Therefore, it is likely that the 
variable is inversely proportional to the amount of outflow of asylum seekers. 
 
A great number of previous studies have used the indicator of the total population in order 
to control for demographic influence on the volume of refugees. Because population density 
and population pressure are generally proportional and have been considered as chronic factors 
that increase the number of refugees from a long-term perspective (Davenport et al., 2003; 
Iqbal, 2007; Schmeidl, 1997), a variable for the total population, which comes from the World 
Bank (2018), is used as a demographic controlling factor. Also, the age proportion of a 
country’s population is likely to be related to the amount of population outflow. In the context 
of regime transition, the economic, political, and social motivations and capabilities for moving 
abroad can vary by age group. For example, in Neumayer’s study (2005), it is expected that 
people in the working-age group, from 16 to 64, are more likely to move abroad. Besides, given 
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that the cross-border routes available to asylum seekers are often physically demanding and 
risky, the journey of escape is likely to be limited to specific age groups. Thus, the study 
predicts that the higher the proportion of the aged population, the smaller the outflow of the 
population abroad. To test this, a variable for population aged 65 and over (% of the total 
population) collected from the World Bank (2018) is included. Some previous studies pay 
attention to the role of geographic conditions on the growth of forced migration. To control for 
the potential impact of geographic conditions on displacement, a variable for land size, which 
is provided by the World Bank (2018), is included in the analysis. Also, a variable for the 
number of borders (land/sea) is included to take into account the effects of borders serving as 
potential escape routes available to forced migrants. The original data comes from the Center 




The key dependent variable in this study is measured as the total number of asylum applications 
per year, which exhibits a variance that highly exceeds its mean (σ2 = 5.51e+08 > µ = 5271.28). 
In other words, the dependent data is over-dispersed. Therefore, the study chooses the negative 
binomial regression, clustered by country, as the baseline estimation model. This method is 
suggested as a more robust analysis for over-dispersion data compared to Poisson regression 
models (Choi and Salehyan, 2013; Hadi et al., 1995). To essentially correct the over-dispersion, 
the negative binominal estimation model includes a dispersion parameter to tackle the 
unobserved heterogeneity across observations (Hilbe, 2011). The estimation model can be 




The total number of asylum applicationsi,t= αi,t + ß1Demoi,t + ß2Autoi,t + ß3Polity2i,t + 
ß4Demo_Polity2i,t + ß5Auto_Polity2i,t + ß6-18Controllingi,t + i.year + ε 
 
The subscript (i,t) denotes the variables’ values for each country i at a given year t. The 
model controls for the year and country fixed effects which aim to take into account unobserved 
factors influencing trends in asylum applications at the national level. ß1 and ß2 capture the 
overall impacts of democratization and autocratization on the number of applications for 
asylum. According to Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 3, the values of ß1 and ß2 should be positive, 
indicating that countries experiencing democratization and autocratization tend to be associated 
with more asylum applications. However, it is also expected in Hypotheses 2 and 4 that those 
influences are dependent on the countries’ current political regime. In other words, the political 
regime (Polity2) is a potential moderating factor of the democratization and autocratization 
effects on the number of asylum seekers. More specifically, the marginal increase in the amount 
in asylum applications as a result of democratization is expected to decrease as the countries 
are more democratic, i.e., negative ß4. This coefficient also represents the reduction in 
willingness to escape. On the other hand, the marginal increase in asylum applications as a 
result of autocratization is expected to increase as the countries become more democratic. In 
particular, the coefficient ß5 is expected to be positive to a statistically significant degree, 




The statistical results of the negative binomial regression are presented in Table 1 with three 
different model classifications. Model 1 is the base model, ruling out the generalized violence 
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variables (Genocide & Politicide, Civil war, and Ethnic war). Model 2 adds the Genocide & 
Politicide variable to Model 1, and Model 3 takes all types of generalized violence into account.  
 
Overall, the empirical results are consistent across all model specifications and are in line 
with the expectations stated in the four hypotheses. In particular, the coefficient ß1 is positive 
to a statistically significant degree at a 0.1% critical level across the three model specifications. 
This implies that sudden democratization is likely to increase the outflow of asylum seekers. 
Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is supported. These results suggest that the degree of state control over 
the oppressed people is loosened due to the democratization, and these structural political 
changes can consequently create greater opportunities for people to escape. These results 
corroborate the ideas of Davenport et al. (2003). They found that the shift toward democracy 
is positively correlated with the volume of forced migration. This might suggest that 
democratization can be interpreted as a gradual relaxation of the policy on emigration, which 
had previously been very restrictive, giving greater opportunities for refugees to escape 
(Larrabee, 1992; Rubin and Moore, 2007; Zolberg, 1989). This finding is also in line with 
previous results that show that the maturity of democracy is proportional to displacement 
(Moore and Shellman, 2007). 
 
However, it is expected that such increased numbers of asylum seekers are found to be 
dependent on the level of democracy in the country where democratization is taking place. As 
shown in Table 1, the coefficient of the interaction term Demo_Polity2 (democratization * 
Polity2) is significantly negative at a 95% confidence level across all model specifications. 
This indicates that the country’s political regime significantly moderates the influence of 
democratization on asylum seekers. Specifically, in the event of democratization, the increased 
level of asylum seekers from a more democratic country is lower than that from a less 
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democratic country. This is because when a country is more democratic, the decreased 
willingness to escape gradually overtakes the increased opportunity for escape. On the other 
hand, for a country that is highly autocratic but in the process of democratization, oppressed 
individuals will take advantage of the higher levels of opportunity to escape away from the 
country, thus fulfilling their long-term willingness to escape. Overall, given the coefficient 
magnitudes of ß1 and ß4, it is also revealed that the outflow of asylum seekers tends to 
constantly increase in democratized countries regardless of their political regimes; however, 
the increase is lower in more democratic and higher in more autocratic countries. Accordingly, 
Hypothesis 2 is supported.   
 
Regarding autocratization, the coefficient ß2 of the Auto variable is significantly positive at 
the marginal level in Models 1 and 2. This suggests that autocratization tends to increase the 
number of asylum seekers, as the political and security threats created in the process of 
autocratization can motivate people to flee (H3). Although the statistical significance level of 
autocratization is marginal, signaling a relatively weak effect of autocratization per se on 
population outflows, such a positive effect becomes significantly stronger to an at least 5% 
critical level if the country is more democratic, providing more pessimistic individuals with 
higher levels of opportunity to escape. This is shown through the significantly positive ß3 
coefficients of the interaction terms between autocratization and political regime 
(Auto_Polity2). To be more detailed, taking the model with the weakest effect of 
autocratization, i.e., Model 3 with ß2 = 0.262, when considering the moderating effect of 
Auto_polity2 with ß5 = 0.105, the net autocratization effect becomes higher, which is likely to 
be statistically significant at 5%. Therefore, the results generally suggest that the effect of 
autocratization is not evident without taking into account the country’s political regime at that 
time. Specifically, in the process of autocratization, if the country is more democratic, more-
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eager-to-leave people are provided with higher levels of opportunity to escape; hence, greater 
population outflows are recorded. Conversely, if the country is more autocratic, those more-
eager-to-leave people are provided with lower levels of opportunity to escape; hence, the effect 
of autocratization on refugee flow in this case is not obvious. These results suggest when 
people’s motivation to leave countries has been increased by the onset of autocratization, it 
tends to be more readily converted into action in environments with low risks from crossing 
borders. As expected, both Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4 are supported. 
 
Table 2 shows the result for our main independent variables in Column 1 in Table 1 by 
converting the results to the incidence rate ratio (IRR), i.e., the degree of change in the 
incidence rate of asylum seekers for every unit change in each independent variable, assuming 
that other variables are equal. An IRR with 1 indicates no change. If the value of an IRR is 
greater than 1, it represents the expected increase in the incidence of the dependent variable 
caused by a one-unit increase in the independent variable. Conversely, an IRR value between 
0 and 1 indicates the degree of the incidence rate of the dependent variable that decreases with 
a one-unit increase in the independent variable. The democratic transition of a regime leads to 
an increase of roughly 68.8% in the incidence of asylum seekers compared to non-
democratized countries. However, this increasing rate is reduced by 5.5% for every one-unit 
increase in the political regime of the country at that time. In other words, in a country with 
one Polity2 score higher, the influence of democratization on the incidence of asylum seekers 
falls by 5.5%. In the case of autocratization, the occurrence appears to increase the incidence 
of asylum seekers by 33.4%. Nevertheless, such increasing levels surge by 10.4% when the 
value of Polity2 is increased by one unit. Therefore, the result implies that more democratic 





Interpretation regarding the effects of controlling variables will be subsequently discussed. 
In order to capture the effects of the outbreak of violence on the increase in refugees, the three 
types of violence included in this study are genocide and politicide, civil war, ethnic war. In 
the case of genocide and politicide, its occurrence increases the incidence of asylum seekers in 
all model specifications to a statistically significant degree. This finding reflects that of Lischer 
(2007), who also found that the occurrence of genocide and politicide is the best predictor of 
changes in the number of asylum seekers. A positive association is found between the 
occurrence of civil war and the number of asylum seekers. This finding is also supported by 
previous studies (Lischer, 2007; Moore and Shellman, 2007). In the case of ethnic war, it is 
found to be in a positive relationship with the dependent variable, but statistical significance is 
not shown. The variable of the number of bordering states with conflict is positive and strongly 
significant at the 0.1% level in all models. Again, the results of this study do not conflict much 
with those of previous studies in so far as they again confirm that generalized violence is still 
the dominant driver of forced migration. The results of the study support the argument that not 
only internal violence but also conflict in neighboring countries will destabilize the security of 
the country of origin of asylum seekers and increase their numbers. This suggests that the 
occurrence of violence, which may affect civilian security, is not confined to the border and 
can be directly related to the outflow of asylum seekers.  
  
In general, all of our control variables show expected signs which are consistent with the 
extant literature. As expected, a negative association is found between physical integrity rights 
and the number of asylum seekers. This result is consistent with earlier research by Rubin and 
Moore (2007), who find that human rights violations are a risk factor for forced migration. Our 
findings also suggest that population outflows tend to be low in areas where the government 
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protects the individual’s physical integrity rights well. The result is significant at the 0.1% level 
in all models. In all models, the Polity2 variable has a significant negative effect on the number 
of asylum seekers at a 5% level, suggesting that the higher the level of existing democracy in 
a country, the lower the incidence of asylum seekers. This result indicates that the existence of 
a mature political system will reduce the number of people trying to flee because the inhabitants 
are less motivated to move to another country (Moore and Shellman, 2007). The size of the 
countries’ territories is negatively related to the number of asylum seekers: the larger the 
territory, the smaller the outflow of population. The number of borders is also proportional to 
the number of asylum seekers. This result suggests that neighboring countries can be regarded 
as potential destinations of asylum to which asylum seekers can escape in case of emergency. 
The results table shows that the higher the proportion of democracy in the region, the higher 
the outflow of asylum seekers. This implies that people tend to move to areas where their safety 
can be protected in choosing their destinations. 
 
The variable of the population is positively related to the number of asylum seekers. It has 
been suggested that population pressure has no significant influence on forced migration 
(Schmeidl, 1997). This does not appear to be the case in our analysis, which mainly focuses 
on the number of asylum seekers. The study predicts that population outflows will be relatively 
small in countries with a high percentage of the aged population, and the prediction is 
supported by the results. The result is negative and significant at the 0.1% level. As shown in 
Table 1, food shortages are also a major cause of increased population outflows. Interestingly, 
in all models, the variable of GDP per capita is statistically significant, showing a positive 
correlation to the number of asylum seekers, while the unemployment rate is inversely 
proportional to the number of asylum seekers. The findings suggest that an individual’s 
economic capacity may be a necessary condition for leaving the country. A similar finding can 
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be found in a study by Schon (2019), which suggests that people with economic resources have 
more opportunities to leave the country than those who do not. Similarly, Van Hear (2006) 
claims that the level of financial assets and social class determine an individual’s ability to 
escape when facing violence to avoid physical threats. On the other hand, it is likely that a high 
level of unemployment, which undermines the economic security of individuals, can boost 
population outflows. The results also imply that if a country experiences an economic 






















Table 1. Negative binomial regression results 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Dependent variable Number of asylum applications 
Demo* 0.523*** 0.523*** 0.507*** 
 (3.98) (3.97) (3.89) 
Auto* 0.288+ 0.283+ 0.262 
 (1.70) (1.67) (1.53) 
Polity2 -0.0155* -0.0166* -0.0163* 
 (-2.19) (-2.33) (-2.31) 
Demo_polity2 -0.0567* -0.0561* -0.0551* 
 (-2.15) (-2.12) (-2.09) 
Auto_polity2 0.0993** 0.0999** 0.105** 
 (2.68) (2.68) (2.85) 
GDP per capita+ 0.225*** 0.236*** 0.234*** 
 (6.05) (6.31) (6.26) 
Unemployment+ 0.101* 0.0934* 0.0963* 
 (2.35) (2.19) (2.23) 
Population+ 0.289*** 0.298*** 0.281*** 
 (6.36) (6.55) (6.11) 
Population aged 65 and above  
(% of total population) 
-0.0630*** -0.0643*** -0.0659*** 
 (-5.56) (-5.65) (-5.79) 
Physical integrity rights -0.0866*** -0.0837*** -0.0748*** 
 (-5.49) (-5.31) (-4.64) 
Food security -0.00634*** -0.00586*** -0.00542*** 
 (-4.37) (-4.04) (-3.73) 
Democratic neighbors in the region  0.0123*** 0.0119*** 0.0121*** 
 (7.50) (7.28) (7.34) 
Number of borders (land/sea) + 0.197* 0.183+ 0.210* 
 (2.04) (1.89) (2.17) 
Number of bordering states with 
violence  
0.119*** 0.0932** 0.102*** 
 (4.03) (3.13) (3.41) 
Land size+ -0.176*** -0.178*** -0.166*** 
 (-4.82) (-4.88) (-4.53) 
Genocide & politicide*  0.790** 0.629* 
  (3.19) (2.49) 
Civil war*   0.324** 
   (2.73) 
Ethnic war*    0.106 
   (1.24) 
_cons -3.099*** -3.270*** -3.285*** 
 (-4.79) (-5.03) (-5.06) 
Number of observations 1395 1395 1395 
Number of states 118 118 118 
t statistics in parentheses  + p < .1  * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 




Table 2. The corresponding change in the incidence of asylum seekers 
 
Variable % Increase 
Democratization 68.8 
Autocratization 33.4 
Democratization x polity2 -5.5 
Autocratization x polity2 10.4 
 
 
4.4 Additional Analysis  
-Controlling gradual regime transition  
 
In the main analysis, the key measure of democratization and autocratization indicates a 
sudden transition in the regime. Specifically, the democratization (autocratization) variables 
take unity value when there is a minimum increase (decrease) of 3 points in the Polity2 index 
against the previous year’s figure and zero otherwise. This method is intended to capture the 
trend of population outflows when a significant regime shift that breaks the regime’s durability 
has occurred rapidly within a short period of time. The regime transition, however, may 
sometimes progress gradually overtime. As a robustness test, the study employs an alternative 
measure of democratization and autocratization, capturing gradual regime transition to test for 
its effects on the population outflow. The measure is constructed based on the criteria set by 
the Polity IV project (Marshall et al., 2017, p. 30), i.e., the variables of democratization 
(Demo2) and autocratization (Auto2) are coded 1 if there is a 3-point increase and decrease, 
respectively, in the Polity2 index, with each continuous, sequential change within three years 
or less, and zero otherwise. According to the results given in Table 3, the findings are generally 
consistent with those reported in the Table 2, suggesting that employing the alternative 
measures of democratization and autocratization does not alter our main results. Nevertheless, 
the Auto2 variable lost its marginal statistical significance, suggesting that gradual 
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autocratization has a less significant impact compared to sudden autocratization. However, the 
interaction terms between autocratization and Polity2 (Auto2_Polity2) show its significant and 
positive effect on the number of asylum seekers generated. Therefore, the positive effect of 
autocratization is likely to be significant in the event of democratic countries, as individuals 
are exposed to higher chances to flee the countries given their increasing willingness to escape 






















Table 3. Negative binomial regression results, including gradual regime transition 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Dependent variable  Number of asylum applications 
Demo2* 0.523*** 0.522*** 0.504*** 
 (4.26) (4.25) (4.12) 
Auto2* 0.253 0.245 0.239 
 (1.59) (1.54) (1.50) 
Polity2  -0.0158* -0.0169* -0.0165* 
 (-2.22) (-2.35) (-2.32) 
Demo2_polity2 -0.0614* -0.0611* -0.0598* 
 (-2.53) (-2.52) (-2.47) 
Auto2_polity2 0.0920* 0.0920* 0.101** 
 (2.56) (2.55) (2.83) 
GDP per capita+ 0.224*** 0.235*** 0.233*** 
 (6.02) (6.28) (6.23) 
Unemployment+ 0.101* 0.0936* 0.0964* 
 (2.36) (2.19) (2.24) 
Population+ 0.290*** 0.299*** 0.283*** 
 (6.38) (6.56) (6.12) 
Population aged 65 and above (% 
of total population) 
-0.0632*** -0.0646*** -0.0660*** 
 (-5.57) (-5.67) (-5.80) 
Physical integrity rights -0.0850*** -0.0823*** -0.0735*** 
 (-5.43) (-5.25) (-4.59) 
Food security -0.00649*** -0.00602*** -0.00556*** 
 (-4.48) (-4.15) (-3.83) 
    
Democratic neighbors in the region 0.0125*** 0.0121*** 0.0122*** 
 (7.58) (7.36) (7.41) 
Number of borders+ 0.205* 0.191* 0.217* 
 (2.12) (1.99) (2.24) 
Number of bordering states with 
violence  
0.119*** 0.0935** 0.102*** 
 (4.04) (3.14) (3.42) 
Land size+ -0.176*** -0.177*** -0.166*** 
 (-4.82) (-4.87) (-4.52) 
Genocide & politicide*  0.785** 0.620* 
  (3.15) (2.46) 
Civil war*   0.329** 
   (2.77) 
Ethnic war*   0.104 
   (1.21) 
_cons -3.125*** -3.294*** -3.312*** 
 (-4.82) (-5.05) (-5.09) 
Number of observations 1395 1395 1395 
Number of states 118 118 118 
t statistics in parentheses  + p < .1  * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 






Controlling for anocracy and democracy 
The model specifications in Table 4 replicate the baseline model of the main analysis with the 
exclusion of observations representing an autocratic regime. The results are reported in Table 
1, and generally remained consistent with the main findings. In particular, democratization 
imposes a significant positive effect on the number of asylum seekers at a 1% critical level. 
Compared to the full sample, the significance level of the effect is reduced once autocratic 
regimes are excluded. This reveals that the impact of democratization on forced migration 
appears to be more pronounced in areas under autocratic rule. Hence, the exclusion of 
autocratic regime observations lowers its statistical significance. Regarding the effects of 
autocratization, the significance level increases from a marginal level (main findings) to 5%. 
This result is in line with our claim that autocratization, which emerges in a political 
environment where opportunities to leave are available to people, will have a more significant 
impact on population outflows. Intriguingly, the Polity2 variable maintains a negative effect 
on the asylum seekers generated but becomes statistically insignificant once the autocratic 
regimes are excluded. This result probably suggests that in areas not under extreme autocratic 




















Table 4. Negative binomial regression results, excluding the autocratic regime 
observations 
 
 Model 1 





















Physical integrity rights -0.100*** 
 (-5.84) 
Food security -0.0101*** 
 (-5.48) 
Democratic neighbors in the region  0.0126*** 
 (6.80) 
Number of borders (land/sea) 0.200* 
 (1.98) 
Number of bordering states with violence 0.126*** 
 (3.48) 




Number of observations 1199 
Number of states  107 
t statistics in parentheses  + p < .1  * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 











5 Discussion  
 
Types of democratization and autocratization and their impacts on the outflow 
of asylum seekers. 
 
Our findings show that a regime transition can induce population outflow regardless of the 
direction of the transition. Although our findings are meaningful in that they uncover the 
general association between regime transition and forced migration, there is one important 
thing to consider. A regime transition, even one which proceeds in the same direction, can be 
divided into various types of transformation depending on the extent of the change which takes 
place. As discussed in the previous sections, regime transitions may each have different starting 
or ending points in terms of the maturity of the existing political systems. Also, the range of 
regime transition varies depending on how radically the regime transforms. Therefore, each 
type of regime transition within the same spectrum can still have different consequences for 
the outflow of population. This section discusses in more detail the impact on population 
outflow of various types of regime shifts within the spectrums of democratization and 
autocratization. 
 
As explained earlier, the Polity2 index, which is the basis of our dataset, is constructed based 
on, first, the components of the competitiveness of political participation, second, the openness 
and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and third, the constraints on the chief executive. 
Depending on the summed score, the regime is categorized into autocracies (-10 to -6), 




With regard to democratization, democratic regime transitions from anocracies to anocracies 
are the most common types of democratization in our dataset, and these account for 58% of all 
democratization cases. Anocracies include both partial democracies and weak autocracies. In 
this spectrum of democratization, the transition from weak autocracies to partial democracies 
accounts for 67% of instances. It can be found that 52% of these cases have led to an increase 
in the outflow of asylum seekers. On the other hand, the transition from weak autocracies to 
weak autocracies accounts for 10% of this type of democratization. All cases of transition from 
weak autocracies to weak autocracies are accompanied by an increase in asylum seekers. The 
transition from partial democracies to partial democracies accounted for 23% of cases, and 71% 
of these led to a rise in asylum seekers. What is remarkable is that within the spectrum of 
democratization from anocracies to anocracies, the transition from weak autocracies to weak 
autocracies is most likely to lead to an increase in population outflows.   
 
Another path of democratization found in our dataset is the regime transition from anocracies 
to mature democracies, which accounts for 30% of all democratization cases. More specifically, 
73% of the democratization in this spectrum is from partial democracies to full democracies. 
On the other hand, the transition from weak autocracies to mature democracies accounts for 
27%. Fifty percent of the transition cases from partial democracies to mature democracies were 
accompanied by an increase in asylum seekers compared to the previous year, whereas 75% of 
the transitions from weak autocracies to mature democracies were accompanied by an increase 
in asylum seekers compared to the number of these asylum seekers in the previous year. These 
findings indicate that within the spectrum of democratization from anocracies to democracies, 
the larger the range of regime transition made, the greater the probability that population 
outflows will be affected and that these will become larger. In other words, it can be said that 
a sudden and radical regime shift is likely to induce a greater likelihood of an increase in 
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population outflows. Also, what we can infer from this trend is that the existence of a 
democratic political system, even if it is incoherent and flawed, can offset the impact of 
democratic regime transition on population outflows. In our dataset, a regime transition from 
full autocracies to weak autocracies accounted for 7% of cases, and 75% of this type of 
democratization led to an increase in the outflow of asylum seekers. On the other hand, a regime 
transition from mature democracies to mature democracies accounted for 3% of the total cases. 
In comparison, the transition from full autocracies to full democracies accounted for 2%, and 
no apparent increase in refugees is found in these cases. One more thing we need to consider 
is whether democratization is accompanied by violence. Our data set shows that 25% of 
democratization cases proceeded violently. In instances of democratization accompanied by 
violence, the extent of the increase in refugee outflow tends to go up. This trend illustrates that 
if a regime transition from full dictatorship to electoral autocracy or flawed democracy goes 
violent, it is highly likely to lead to a massive increase in forced migration. 
 
As for the autocratization cases, the transition from partial democracies to partial 
democracies or weak autocracies accounts for 44% of the autocratization in our data set. All 
cases in this spectrum are found to be accompanied by an increase in asylum seekers. Four 
percent of autocratic regime transitions are from partial democracies to full autocracies. Forty 
percent of autocratization takes place from mature democracies to partial democracies or weak 
autocracies. Interestingly, 75% of the transitions from full democracies to partial democracies 
lead to an increase in population outflow, whereas 50% of the transitions from full democracies 
to weak autocracies were accompanied by an increase in population outflow. However, in our 
dataset, the effect that radical regime transition from partial democracies to full autocracies has 
on population outflow was not clearly detected. In our data, only 4% of cases show a regime 
shift from weak autocracies to full autocracies, and 8% of autocratization is a regime transition 
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from mature democracies to full autocracies. A common trend found in both types of 
autocratization is that although a rise in the population outflow is detected, the degree of the 
increase remains at a low level. This could be interpreted as the limited availability of 
opportunities to escape the country playing a role in deterring the population outflows, as 
discussed earlier. Another striking finding is in the case of the violent regime transition from 
weak autocracies to full autocracies; the increase in population outflow tends to be relatively 
small. In contrast, a regime transition from partial democracies to weak autocracies which is 
accompanied by violence tends to induce a greater outflow of population. 
 
In this paper, it has not been sufficiently discussed whether the asylum seekers generated by 
democratization and autocratization are qualitatively identical or heterogeneous.  
 
It can be challenging to clearly articulate the qualitative differences between groups of 
asylum seekers that are in different political and security environments. This is because the 
level of the perceived threat and the level of forcedness/voluntariness for relocation that led to 
the decision to apply for asylum outside the home country is a subjective and personal 
judgement made by each asylum seeker at the individual level (Carling, 2017; Erdal and 
Oeppen, 2018). Nevertheless, there may be a difference in the degree of voluntariness in 
relocation between the two groups that applied for asylum to other countries depending on 
whether the group was generated in the democratization or in the autocratization process. Also, 
there may be differences between the two groups in the degree of perceived political insecurity 
that led them to pursue asylum abroad. What can be inferred from this paper is that in the 
process of democratization of an autocratic country, the accumulated fear and dissatisfaction 
of the people due to the state repression that was previously exercised can be expressed as an 
exit from that home country. On the other hand, asylum seekers generated by autocratization 
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may have a qualitative difference from those who are induced by democratization in terms of 
detecting immediate and direct threats while experiencing a coercive and repressive exercise 
of power from the regime in a transition toward autocracy. For example, if a new autocratic 
regime which seized the existing democratic government exerts unprecedentedly strong 
political repression against its citizens, people will sense direct political and security threats, 
and they might choose to apply for asylum abroad to protect their personal safety. On the other 
hand, if a strong autocratic government's censorship over its citizens becomes loosened in the 
process of democratization, people might choose to seek asylum abroad to escape the existing 
insecure life they’ve known under authoritarian rule. The political and security threat felt by 
the first group of asylum seekers is likely to be immediate and direct. In contrast, the threat 
perceived by the second group of asylum seekers may be indirect and accumulated, not 
immediate.  
 
However, these two groups still have a similarity in that they are asylum seekers, which are 
distinct from ordinary migrants. The fundamental element that sets them apart from ordinary 
migrants is that they apply for asylum in other countries with the personal judgement that they 
cannot receive full political and security protection from their home country; hence, they are 
seeking international protection. Both groups of asylum seekers discussed earlier applied for 
asylum abroad under the belief that they could no longer lead the secure life they had enjoyed 
in the past in their home country. Although there may be differences in the degree of their 
voluntariness to relocate and the degree of the immediacy of the perceived threat, both groups 
of asylum seekers can be regarded as forced migrants in a broader sense. It is hoped that a more 
systemic discussion about the qualitative differences between out-migration groups caused by 





Although this study reaffirmed that the occurrence of violence could be a very important 
determinant in the movement of refugees, this does not mean that the migration of refugees 
across countries can be attributed exclusively to outbreaks of violence. As the empirical 
findings of this study show, non-violent determinants are also found to be closely related to 
the phenomenon of refugee outflows. Consequently, this study contributes to the existing 
research on forced migration by bringing the dynamics of the politics back to the center of the 
debate on refugee outflows. It does so by highlighting the relevance of regime transition and 
explaining how these changes in government capacity to create or limit opportunities for 
asylum seekers to flee. In particular, the study explains how two phenomena, democratization 
and autocratization, affect people’s motivation to migrate and how both these processes 
structurally limit people’s ability to move to other countries.  
 
My findings show that a shift in regime either toward democracy or autocracy can play a 
role in increasing the volume of asylum seekers. The focus of previous studies has been on 
autocratic transitions, probably because large-scale forced migrations mostly tend to occur in 
non-democratic regions. Our findings support the existing belief that the political, security, 
and economic threats caused by autocratization can lead to increased forced migration. It is 
surprising, however, that democratization can also increase forced migration, especially in 
non-democratic countries. These findings suggest several important things.  
 
First, the empirical results suggest that autocratic countries that are undergoing rapid 
democratic transitions can create an environment vulnerable to population outflows, despite 
the lack of violent events. This structural change in the political system can be seen as an 
opportunity to escape for the people who have been oppressed by the more autocratic regime. 
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In this regard, the international community needs to consider that population outflows can 
occur when rapid democratization in autocratic countries proceeds. In addition, institutional 
measures should be sought to minimize the political and security risks that can result from 
rapid population outflows. 
 
Second, as can be seen from our analysis, the influence of regime shifts toward democracy 
on outflows of asylum seekers tends to be greater in more autocratic countries than in more 
democratic countries. On the other hand, the effect of regime shifts to autocracy on the volume 
of forced migration tends to be greater in more democratic than in more autocratic countries. 
This trend reflects the fact that the condition identified as anocracy can be vulnerable to the 
outflow of forced migration, regardless of the direction of the regime transition. Either a 
democratic or autocratic regime shift can increase the volume of forced migration under this 
condition.   
 
Finally, our analysis suggests that even if there are sufficient conditions for people to leave 
their home countries, individuals may experience an involuntary stay if they are not given the 
opportunity to escape. There may be areas of the globe whose inhabitants are experiencing 
involuntary stays, even as, on the surface, political and security stability is being maintained. 
A refugee crisis can become a reality at any time once there is a change in the political 
circumstances in these areas. In this regard, in future studies, we need to pay attention to 
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This paper examines different paths of regime development that the North Korean regime can 
follow, including 1) regime collapse, 2) status quo, and 3) democratic transition, and analyzes 
the possible impacts of each path of regime development on forced migrations from North 
Korea. A statistical model is developed to examine the effects of the three regime variants on 
population outflow across autocratic milieus. The study employs a panel dataset covering 138 
countries from 2000 to 2016. Our findings show that the collapse of the regime and democratic 
transition in autocratic countries can increase the magnitude of the outflow of forced migrants 
while the status quo of the regime has no significant impact thereon. In other words, the 
findings imply that if North Korea follows a path of regime collapse or democratic transition, 
the volume of forced migration generated is likely to increase. However, if the current regime 
continues to hold power in a manner resembling its current state, population outflow from 
North Korea will be deterred. The key conceptual framework of this study explains the 
relationship between a regime transition and population outflows, as well as distinguishing the 
motivation and opportunities for people to flee by controlling for the presence in a country of 
an autocratic military regime. In particularly, the motivation and opportunities for North 






Sudden changes or transitions in the ruling regime of an autocratic state inevitably exert a 
profound impact on the country’s society and its people in the areas of politics, economy, and 
security. These transformations are also deeply associated with population outflow in that they 
cause a structural change in the vertical relationship between the people and the regime (Esty 
et al., 1998; Geddes et al., 2014; Martin-Shields, 2017; Newland, 1993; Rotberg, 2003). 
Accordingly, much of the existing literature has focused on how the type of political regime 
(democracy/autocracy) is linked to population outflow (Breunig et al., 2012; Otunnu, 2002; 
Ozaltin et al., 2019). Other studies analyze the role of regime transition and the stability of the 
regime on outmigration (Kang, 2020; Martin, 2002; Moore and Shellman, 2007; Rubin and 
Moore, 2007). Also, research has been carried out on the impact of the failure of the autocratic 
regime on outmigration (Howard, 2010; Mazrui, 1995).  
 
Although existing research recognizes the role played by changes in the political regime in 
the country of origin of asylum seekers on outmigration, a systematic and comprehensive 
understanding of how such regime transition contributes to the outflow of asylum seekers and 
why different paths of transition can have different consequences on population outflows is 
still lacking. To present an explanation of the mechanism of how different types of regime 
transition affect population outflow differently in autocratic countries, this paper sets up three 
regime development paths, namely 1) failure of state authority, 2) democratic transition, and 3) 
status quo, that the ruling regime in an autocratic country can take and tests the impact of each 
development path on refugee outflow. Based on the empirical findings, this paper narrows 
down the research focus to the North Korean case. The situation in North Korea is well worth 
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visiting in that the country is vulnerable to future political changes but has not yet experienced 
mass population outflow. This study analyzes in depth the possible impacts of each path of 
regime development on the increase in asylum seekers from North Korea. 
 
Historically, empirical evidence of instances in which the collapse of the central authority 
led to an increased number of refugees can be found in many countries. Systemic Peace 
provides a list of adverse regime changes in the PITF — State Failure Problem Set dataset. 
This dataset measures state authority failure on a scale of 1 to 4, where 4 represents a status of 
complete collapse of the state authority, or a corresponding condition (Marshall et al. 2019). 
According to the dataset, between 1975 and 2017, 27 countries have experienced a complete 
collapse of state authority. Notably, 88% of these countries experienced an increase in the 
number of refugees during the period of regime collapse. According to PITF, the failure of 
state authority refers to a "situation in which the institutions of the central state are so weakened 
that they can no longer maintain authority or political order in significant parts of the country." 
In other words, the failure of state authority means that the government has lost the functions 
of security, welfare, legitimacy, and state of law. Scholars point out that the collapse of state 
power inevitably creates a security risk. Gökçe (2017), for example, argues that the collapse of 
the regime normalizes internal conflict and chaos, due to the loss of the regime's monopoly 
authority over the use of force and the lack of systemic operations. He then points out that 
internal violence such as arms smuggling, human trafficking, robbery, and sexual abuse 
becomes prevalent, and political and security instability inevitably causes economic collapse. 
Also, such a situation reflects the fact that the dominance of the governing power does not 
reach into every corner of the territory across the country. (Karacuka and Celik, 2017) argue 
that the loss of state control over the nation’s entire territory can create a structural environment 
favorable to the outbreak of terrorists and gang activities. The collapse of the regime raises the 
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level of physical and economic threats to people, making it impossible for them to meet the 
basic needs of life. Hence, it pushes people to leave the state (Gökçe 2017). A recent case in 
which a country’s authority being in a state of collapse has led to a mass refugee outflow can 
be found in Syria, resulting in 5.6 million refugees since 2011 (UNHCR, 2019). The case of 
Afghanistan, which has significantly lost stateness, is a case in which the failure of state 
authority, along with widespread war, is closely linked to the outbreak of 2.5 million refugees 
(UNHCR, 2019). In particular, many African countries experienced massive refugee outflows 
when they underwent both regime collapse and civil war simultaneously. In Burundi, there 
were in total 184,135 refugees in 1992, but with the collapse of the regime in 1993, the number 
increased to 871,382. In Central Africa, President Bozize was toppled by Islamic armed forces 
called Seleka, and the central state authority collapsed in 2013 (Arieff, 2014; Herbert et al., 
2013; Lombard, 2016). The number of refugees, counted as 164,568 in the previous year, 
soared to 252,867 (UNHCR 2019). Similarly, in the case of Mali, the central authority was 
paralyzed in the course of a coup by government troops to regain control of the government, 
which was overthrown by Islamic militants (Arieff and Johnson, 2012; Bleck and Michelitch, 
2015; Lendorfer et al., 2016; Thurston and Lebovich, 2013). The total number of refugees in 
Mali, which stood at 2,495 in 2011, rose significantly to 1,499,943 in 2012 (UNHCR 2019). 
South Sudan also experienced a collapse of the regime due to the civil war that broke out in 
2013, resulting in massive refugee outflows (Johnson, 2014; O’Grady, 2018). The 
consequences of the loss of state control over outmigration in a situation where political turmoil 
is intensifying can be found in Ethiopia's case. From the mid-1970s to the late 1980s, large 
numbers of refugees fled from Ethiopia to neighboring countries, including Sudan and Kenya. 
Although the prolonged civil war and guerrilla warfare are considered to have caused those 
mass outflows of refugees, Dowty (1987) argues that the Ethiopian regime in this period had 
lost the physical control necessary to stop the outflow of refugees and that the breakdown of 
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government thus resulted in increased refugee flows. Bariagaber (1997) also points out that a 
new massive refugee flow began when communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe lost 
the ability to exercise strong control over emigration in the way they had in the past. 
 
The close links between democratization in autocratic states and population outflows can 
also be found in our history. Over the past half-century, we have witnessed several distinct 
democratization processes. The collapse of communism and the resultant democratic 
transitions in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989, and the democratization movement in 
countries in the Middle East since 2010, called the Arab Spring, can be seen as representative 
democratization processes. Figures 1 and 2 below show how the two events affected the 
outflows of refugees in countries experiencing democratization. Figure 1 shows the change in 
the refugee stock from five specific countries to other European nations for a period of ten 
years, starting in 1985. Although it varies to different degrees across countries, the number of 
refugees tended to increase in the late 1980s and early 1990s, a period during which 
communism collapsed and democratization proceeded. Figure 2 shows the change in the 
number of asylum applicants in the Middle Eastern countries that experienced the Arab Spring 
from 2000 to 2016. Since 2010, when the democratization movement began, in most countries, 
















Figure 1. Fall of Communism and refugee flows   Figure 2. Arab Spring and asylum seekers 
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Figure 3. Emigration Freedom and Democracy    Figure 4. Emigration Freedom by Polity Score  
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The attitude toward emigration held by different regime types is clearly shown in Figures 3 
and 4, which are presented by Miller and Peters (2014). The first graph shows the average level 
of emigration freedom according to the type of regime from 1980 to 2010. As shown in the 
graph, in the last 30 years, autocratic countries have more strongly controlled freedom of 
international movement compared to democratic countries. The second figure shows the 
correlation between the polity score on the x-axis and the average emigration freedom on the 




























some fluctuations, suggesting that the countries with a higher polity score tend to provide better 
protections of the freedom of international movement. The historical indicator that the freedom 
of emigration increases as the democratization process progresses is important in explaining 
the impacts of regime change in an autocratic country on its population outflows. This is 
because regime transition in an autocratic country can be interpreted as a change in the level of 
structural control exercised by the regime on its people. Given that refugee status applies to 
those who are under physical, political, and economic threats in their home countries,1 it can 
be inferred that the sudden democratization of an autocratic country provides the oppressed 
people, who are in a status of involuntary stay, with opportunities to leave that country (Weiner, 
1996). 
 
From the empirical evidence, we can infer that the transition or failure of the state authority 
can boost the outflow of population. However, what we should not overlook is that some 
autocratic governments can maintain the regime in an existing way without significant changes. 
Therefore, it is also necessary to analyze the possibility of refugee outflows when the autocratic 
regime is strongly maintained.  
 
In general, it is widely accepted that autocratic countries tend to tightly limit outmigration, 
while democratic states allow it (Breunig et al. 2012; Miller and Peters 2018). Control over 
emigration in democratic countries is not common, although the entry of foreigners tends to be 
restricted in order to protect the welfare of those nations' citizens (Messina and Lahav, 2005). 
Democracies are expected to abide by international laws protecting individual human rights, 
including the freedom of movement.2 However, the exit from a nation tends to be limited in 





autocratic countries (Miller and Peters 2018). From a political point of view, there are several 
key reasons why autocratic countries regulate their citizens' ability to leave. First, an autocratic 
regime tries to keep its population flows under state control in order to prevent the grievances 
of the people against the regime from becoming visible through the phenomenon of massive 
outmigration (Bearce and Laks Hutnick, 2011; Betts and Jones, 2016). It is believed that in 
autocratic countries where freedom of political expression is limited, citizens can alternatively 
express their dissatisfaction with the government by leaving the country. This can impair the 
legitimacy of the autocratic regime (Hirschman, 1970, 1978). Another reason is to prevent the 
public from being exposed to democratic ideas. Alemán and Woods (2014) argue that 
relaxation of emigration is likely to improve civil rights. It is now well established from a 
variety of studies that active economic, cultural, and human exchanges between autocratic and 
democratic countries can contribute to the democratization of the autocratic side (Bearce and 
Laks Hutnick, 2011). More importantly, population movement across countries can play a role 
in spreading the norm of democracy (Levitsky and Way, 2005; Rapoport et al., 2017). 
 
Tsourapas (2019) analyzes that the autocratic regime tends to conserve tight control over the 
population outflows because emigration abroad impedes maintaining order and makes it 
difficult to eliminate any dissent. Therefore, in most autocratic countries, securitizing 
emigration at the border is implemented to systematically control those who attempt to leave 
the country without permission. In the past, such policies have existed in the Soviet Union, 
China, and Mozambique (Ibid.). Besides, many autocratic countries exercise robust control 
over diaspora communities residing abroad to prevent them from becoming politically 
mobilized and threatening the regime. That is, the coercive and violent repression exerted on 
diaspora communities for the purpose of silencing the voice of those citizens has existed in 
many autocratic countries. Thus, the outflow of mass refugees can be unlikely in a situation 
203 
 
where a strong autocratic regime is stably exercising tight border control without significant 
changes. Cuba, Uzbekistan, and North Korea, for example, are all governed by powerful 
autocratic regimes which have exercised firm border control and repression against illegal 
defectors. In these countries, exist visas have been required for overseas trips, and if illegal 
travel is detected, criminal penalties have been applied (Human Rights Watch, 2019; Tsourapas, 
2019). A common trend in these countries is that there has been a relatively low level of 
population outflow. Since 2000, the number of asylum applications per year, originating in 
Cuba, Uzbekistan, and North Korea has been, on average, 2500, 2000, and 360, respectively. 
 
Based on the discussion, three hypotheses are established as bellow. 
1. There is significantly positive relationship between the failure of state authority and the 
outflow of population outflow from autocratic countries.  
2. The democratization of the autocratic regime significantly positively increase the population 
outflow. 
3. The durability of the autocratic regime significantly negatively affects population outflows.  
 
2 Statistical analysis 
2.1 Data and statistical model 
 
A statistical model is established examining the effect of regime variation on population 
outflow across autocratic milieus. The study employs a panel data covering 138 countries for 
the full sample, and 71 countries for the sample for autocracy from 2000 to 2016. Our 
dependent variable (i.e., population outflow) is proxied by the number of asylum applications 
submitted, which is available from UNHCR (2019). Since the variance is observed to be much 
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higher than its mean, there is over-dispersion in our dependent variables. Therefore, the study 
employs a negative binomial regression model, which allows disagreed mean-variance as well 
as inclusion of an error term (Hilbe, 2011; Liu et al., 2005).  
 
The study's main estimation model can be specified as follows:  
The number of asylum applicationsi,t = αi,t+ ß1Authority_Failurei,t + ß2Regime_Transitioni,t 
ß3Regime_Durabilityi,t + ß4-11Controllingi,t + i.year + ε 
 
The subscript (i,t) denotes the variables values for each country i at a given year t. The model 
controls for country and year fixed effects to capture the time-invariance differences across 
countries and unobserved factors influencing trends in asylum applications across countries. ß1 
captures the overall impacts of the failure of state authority on the outflow of asylum seekers. 
According to Hypothesis 1, the value of ß1 should be positive, indicating that less stable 
regimes tend to be associated with higher population outflows. Regarding Hypothesis 2, the 
coefficient ß2 is expected to be positive, indicating that countries experiencing a democratic 
regime transition are associated with higher population outflows due to the higher chances of 
escape. ß3 is expected to be negative, indicating that regimes that are durable tend to reduce 
population outflow. This indicates that in countries with an autocratic regime, population 




Our first hypothesis states that the failure of the autocratic regime increases the population 
outflow (H1). This hypothesis is built on the belief that the failure of the regime, signaling the 
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country's political instability, can pose a threat to people and force them to flee. Moreover, the 
failure of a strong autocratic regime can cause a power vacuum and weaken the control that 
that government has exercised over its people. On the other hand, our third hypothesis predicts 
that if there is no significant transition in the current regime, the volume of population outflows 
from autocratic countries will not increase (H3). In other words, if the current autocratic regime 
remains stable and unchanged, the population outflows from those countries are likely to be 
curbed. There is a high possibility that the current policy stance of the autocratic regime, which 
firmly controls the outflow of population abroad, will continue. 
 
To test for the first and third hypotheses, two measures are employed to proxy regime 
collapse and status quo regime. Regarding the former, the failure of state authority 
(Authority_Failure) is measured using a part of the Political Instability Task Force (PITF) State 
Failure Problem Set, developed by Marshall et al. (2018). This Authority_Failure is measured 
on a scale of 1 to 4. The lowest score represents a continuing regime collapse with trivial 
damage to state authority, while the highest score represents a complete state collapse. 
Observations that have not experienced state failure are coded 0. Overall, the lower the value 
of this indicator, the more stable the current state authority is without suffering from internal 
and external challenges. We expect this variable to determine whether the magnitude of 
population outflow is proportional to the degree of collapse of state authority. Strict 
government control over the people in an autocratic country is possible when the ruling regime 
is durable. To measure the status quo in the regime, we employ the interaction term between 
the regime durability variable (Regime_Durability). The higher the durability of the autocratic 
regime, the less the population outflow. The durability of a regime captures the length (in years) 
of a regime's existence. The variable is log-transformed for a normal distribution data. The 
autocratic military regime variable comes from Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: 
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A New Data Set by Geddes et al. (2014). This binary variable is coded as 1 for autocratic 
military regimes and 0 otherwise. 
 
The second hypothesis states that the democratic transition is likely to increase population 
outflows from autocratic countries (H2). This hypothesis will be validated by using the regime 
transition variable, which measures the change in Polity2 index against the previous year's 
value. A positive value for this indicator indicates that the regime is more democratic than in 
the previous year. A negative value indicates that the regime becomes more autocratic 
compared to the previous year. Original data on this variable is taken from Political Regime 




State-sponsored repression has been identified as one of the major causes of forced migration 
(Schmeidl, 1997). To determine whether government repression increases forced migration 
abroad, the physical integrity rights index, one of the indicators of the Human Rights Dataset 
from Cingranelli-Rishards (Cingranelli et al., 2014), is utilized. This item is measured on a 
scale of 0 to 8. The higher the values, the better the protection of an individual's physical 
integrity rights by the government. Thus, it is expected that it is inversely related to the 
population outflow, based on the expectation that a high level of individual physical integrity 
rights should lower the motivation to leave the country. Another controlling factor that should 
be accounted for is the presence of genocide and politicide, which are binarily coded, i.e. unity 




The presence of intrastate and interstate conflicts has often been included in previous studies' 
analysis of forced migration. In the event of a sudden change or transition in an autocratic 
regime, armed conflict between competing power groups can be possible and can create a 
significant threat to the people. We include dummy variables for civil war and international 
war to capture the impact of violent conflict on the volume of forced migration. Their presence 
is coded 1, and their absence is coded 0. These indicators are available in Major Episodes of 
Political Violence (MEPV) and Conflicts Regions, 1946–2016 by Marshall (2017). 
 
In addition, many control variables that were frequently included in previous studies are 
included in the analysis. First, to control the impacts of economic security on the population 
outflow, GDP per capita (logged) is employed. This variable is expected to capture whether 
the individual's economic capacity and economic security play a role in the decision to move 
abroad. Population (logged) is used to see if population pressure plays a role in population 
outflow. In addition, land size (logged) is included in the analysis as a geographic indicator. 
All these indicators come from the World Bank (2019). Finally, the democracy in the region 
variable is included to see if the proportion of democracy in the region where the country of 
origin of forced migration is located induces population outflow. I account for this possibility 
by controlling for the proportion of democratic regimes in a region. Previous studies predicted 
that democratic neighbors can induce the population outflow from autocratic countries (Moore 
and Shellman, 2007; Uzonyi, 2014). Given the large number of asylum application is applied 
to democratic countries, it is an important indicator to identify the pulling impact of democracy 






2.2 Findings  
 
The results of the negative binomial regression are shown in Table 1, comprising four models:  
Models 1-2 present negative binomial estimates of asylum applications in non-democracies 
between 2000 and 2016, and Models 3-4 show the results of a full sample including democratic 
and non-democratic regimes. Model 1 is a baseline model. Model 2 accounts for some 
influential observations with civil war, international wars, and genocide & politicide. In many 
studies of forced migration, the presence of generalized violence has been identified as the 
most influential driver of human displacement (Davenport et al., 2003; Deal, 2013; Schmeidl, 
1997; Weiner, 1996; Zolberg, 1989). Therefore, it may be argued that the results obtained in 
the main analysis could be indeed the effects of samples with generalized violence instead. The 
analyses in Model 1 (non-democracies only) and Model 3 (both democracies and non-
democracies) are performed by excluding country-year observations with civil wars, 
international wars, and genocide & politicide.  
 
In all models in Table 1, the failure of state authority variable (Authority_Failure) is 
proportional to the number of asylum seekers and is statistically significant. As we expected, 
the failure of state authority is positively associated with the volume of asylum seekers, i.e., 
the number of asylum seekers increases as the degree of regime failure increases. The findings 
can be explained by the political uncertainty caused by the collapse of the state, which 
motivates more people to leave the country. However, what can be inferred from the results 
table is that the paralysis of government functions caused by the collapse of the state leads to 
a weakening of government control over the people, which can lead to population outflows 
across borders. The results also suggest that if the regime has a strong resistance to the 
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challenges of rebels and is immune from the collapse, that is, it can maintain its power, 
population outflow can be curbed. The regime transition variable is also positive and has a 
strong statistical significance. This result suggests that the democratic transition of the regime 
can lead to population outflow. Therefore, our third hypothesis is supported (H2) such that 
durable autocracies tend to have lower population outflows. In accordance with the present 
results, previous studies have explained that a democratic regime shift can ease border control 
and increase the outflow of population (Davenport et al., 2003; Zolberg, 1989). Our third 
hypothesis states that maintaining the status quo of the autocratic regime will curb population 
outflow. This hypothesis is tested once again by using the regime durability variable 
(Regime_Durability). In models 1 and 2 of Table 1, the regime durability parameter (ß3 < 0) 
shows statistical significance. This indicates that the durability of an autocratic regime has a 
significant influence on population outflows. However, in Model 3 and Model 4, which take 
account of both autocratic and democratic regimes, the results lost its significance. The results 
indicate that the durability of an autocratic regime, which exerts robust control over emigration, 
plays a role in suppressing the outflow of asylum seekers, but the effect of regime durability in 
suppressing population outflows may not be significant in democratic countries. 
 
Most of our control variables also reveal the expected signs. In particular, the finding shows 
that the outbreak of civil war increases forced migration. This result seems to be consistent 
with other research which found a significant positive relationship between civil war and 
increases in forced migration (Davenport et al., 2003; Moore and Shellman, 2004). On the other 
hand, the involvement of international wars does not have a significant impact on forced 
migration in our analysis. In the case of genocide and politicide, it is found to be strongly 
positively associated with the number of asylum seekers in all models (Lischer, 2007). The 
physical integrity rights variable has negative statistical significance at the .001 level. These 
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suggest that better government protection of physical integrity rights can reduce population 
outflows. This result mirrors those of the previous studies that have examined the association 
between state repression and forced migration (Weiner, 1996). The population variable is also 
statistically significant, indicating that countries that are densely populated tend to produce 
more asylum seekers. The GDP per capita variable is found to have a marginally positive 
relationship with the dependent variable, but a strong statistical significance is shown in the 
baseline model. This also accords with the earlier study, which showed that the economic 
capacity of an individual is an essential factor in deciding to leave the country (Schon, 2019; 
Van Hear, 2006). The higher the proportion of democracy in the region where the country is 
located, the higher the amount of forced migration. The size of the nation's territory is 
negatively correlated with the dependent variable in all models, but only marginally statistically 
















Table 1. Negative binomial estimates of asylum applications 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Dependent variable Number of asylum applications  
Authority_Failure 0.138*** 0.126** 0.145** 0.128** 
 (3.32) (3.23) (3.27) (2.97) 
Regime_Transition 0.0455*** 0.0445*** 0.0440*** 0.0428*** 
 (3.77) (3.68) (3.98) (3.94) 
Regime_Durability+ -0.0603* -0.0488+ -0.0122 -0.00596 
 (-2.23) (-1.78) (-0.53) (-0.25) 
Physical integrity rights -0.0700*** -0.0472* -0.112*** -0.103*** 
 (-3.58) (-2.34) (-8.12) (-7.27) 
Population+ 0.222** 0.192* 0.243*** 0.242*** 
 (2.83) (2.46) (6.12) (6.07) 
GDP per capita+ 0.277*** 0.286*** 0.123*** 0.121*** 
 (5.86) (5.94) (4.10) (4.00) 
Land size+ -0.0768 -0.0484 -0.0676* -0.0621+ 
 (-1.35) (-0.84) (-2.02) (-1.84) 
Democratic neighbors in the region  0.0107*** 0.0111*** 0.00752*** 0.00744*** 
 (3.91) (4.01) (5.04) (4.97) 
Civil war*  0.403***  0.282** 
  (4.05)  (2.85) 
International war*  -0.143  0.0709 
  (-0.43)  (0.22) 
Genocide & politicide*  0.633**  0.584** 
  (3.22)  (2.64) 
_cons -3.444** -3.525** -3.008*** -3.113*** 
 (-3.09) (-3.14) (-5.57) (-5.73) 
Number of observations 707 695 1635 1623 
t statistics in parentheses + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Note: 1) * Dummy variable 2) +log transformed variable for a normal distribution  
 
The expected duration of the impact of a change in regime on the outflow of 
population 
 
To identify whether the effect of the transition and collapse of the regime on the outflow of the 
population lasts only in the short term or persists over a longer period of time, I include the 
lagged (t-1 and t-2) variables of Authority_Failure and Regime_Transition in the analysis. In 
the model taking account of the full sample, when variables are lagged for one year, the 
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Authority_Failure and Regime_Transition variables are positively significant at 1% and 5% 
levels, respectively. However, when 2-year lagged variables are included, the statistical 
significance of both variables is lost. These results indicate that regime transition and collapse 
may have a short- to medium-term effect on population outflow. 
 
Table 2. Negative binomial estimates of asylum applications 
 
 Model 1  Model 2  
Dependent variable Number of asylum applications 
Authority_Failure(t-1) 0.131**  
 (2.96)  
Authority_Failure(t-2)  0.0411 
  (0.78) 
Regime_Transition(t-1) 0.0242*  
 (2.13)  
Regime_Transition(t-2)  -0.000939 
  (-0.09) 
Regime_Durability -0.0212 -0.0336 
 (-0.90) (-1.36) 
Physical integrity rights -0.0968*** -0.0862*** 
 (-6.46) (-5.50) 
Population+ 0.213*** 0.227*** 
 (4.89) (5.01) 
GDP per capita+ 0.0854** 0.0791* 
 (2.64) (2.30) 
Land size+ -0.0507 -0.0409 
 (-1.39) (-1.07) 
Democratic neighbors in the region  0.00882*** 0.00799*** 
 (5.51) (4.59) 
Civil war* 0.328** 0.309** 
 (3.15) (2.81) 
Internationa lwar* 0.292 0.198 
 (0.87) (0.60) 
Genocide & politicide* 0.580* 0.474+ 
 (2.53) (1.86) 
_cons -2.309*** -2.304*** 
 (-3.87) (-3.72) 
Number of observations 1487 1349 
t statistics in parentheses + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 





3. Case study - North Korea 
 
The statistical analysis supports the impact of changes in an autocratic regime on population 
outflow. Based on these findings, this paper now examines different paths of regime 
development that the North Korean regime can follow, including 1) regime collapse, 2) status 
quo, and 3) democratic transition, and analyzes the possible impacts of each path of regime 
development on forced migrations from North Korea. 
 
It has been about ten years since Kim Jong-un became the supreme leader of North Korea 
after the death of North Korea's second leader, Kim Jong-il, in 2011. Over the past decade, 
evaluations of the stability of the Kim Jong-un regime have been conducted continuously from 
outside, and plans and proposals have been presented to prepare for a sudden change in the 
North Korean regime. In particular, a lot of weight has been put on the scenario of the collapse 
of the North Korean regime under the pressure of sanctions. Unlike the predictions that were 
rampant from the outside, since 2018, North Korea has been sending some signals of change 
to the international society by expressing its commitment to moving toward normalizing its 
relations with the international community. On the flip side, however, their military 
provocations are still ongoing. The mixed messages from North Korea tell us that the future of 
the North Korean regime can unfold in various directions in the future. Hence, at this point, 
this paper revisits the possible paths of transition that the North Korean regime can follow, and 
poses a question about what the consequences of each regime transition might be.  
 
Since 2018, the North Korean regime has expressed its willingness to change by shifting to 
practical actions such as closing down the nuclear test site at Punggye-ri, resuming the inter-
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Korean summit, and engaging in various diplomatic dialogs with neighboring countries. North 
Korea's recent movements are significant. For example, the inter-Korean dialog in the political 
sphere, which has been held only six times in the last 10 years, was held 17 times in 2018 alone. 
There have been three inter-Korean summit talks to confirm the complete denuclearization of 
the Korean Peninsula and to establish a peaceful relationship between the two Koreas. 
 
 
Figure 5. Inter-Korean Dialog for Each Field (2002–2018) 
 
 
(Ministry of Unification ROK, 2018) 
  
We cannot make hasty judgments as to how the changes signaled by the North Korean 
regime will evolve. This is because there have been signs of change in the North Korean regime 
in the past. As shown in Figure 5, the North Korean regime showed a pattern similar to the 
present one during the period from 2002 to 2008, showing indicators of change in various 
fields, when South Korea was ruled by a progressive administration. This could suggest that 
the current movement could either be typical of a recurring North Korean pattern or a fresh 
signal of change created by the new regime leadership. It could be said that the unusual 
movements of the North Korean regime can result in the state taking various courses of action 
depending on the outcome of the nuclear negotiations with the international community and 
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is necessary to analyze the possible impacts of changes generated by the North Korean regime 
on the North Korean people, the Korean Peninsula, and the East Asian region.  
 
A massive outflow of North Korea's population is a potential problem that we cannot 
overlook, because it is a security issue that is closely related to regional stability. Although 
mass population outflows have not yet occurred in North Korea, this country is not fully free 
from the potential for this to happen. According to the Fragile States Index of 2018, the case 
of North Korea shows the shape of a broken circle, which represents overall high levels of the 
condition of fragility in a country, while the level of refugees and IDPs and the volume of 
human flight is visibly low compared to other indicators (The Fund for Peace, 2018). This 
figure could illustrate the fact that, despite various conditions for experiencing population 
outflows having been met in the area, the phenomenon has not yet been prominent due to the 
operation of heavy border controls which were imposed by the North Korean national security 
agency to thwart illegal defectors (Bennett, 2013). Hence, no one can guarantee that the future 
pattern of population outflow from North Korea will be same as that in the past, should 
structural changes in the North Korean regime take place.  
 
Figure 6. Fragile States Index 2018 — North Korea 
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Although research on the future of the North Korean regime and the resultant impact on 
population outflows, including forced migrants, has been accumulating rapidly over the past 
decades, most of the previous studies have tended to focus on a North Korean "regime collapse" 
scenario in explaining population outflows. However, what we should not overlook is that a 
regime transition in North Korea can take any course, and all of these can lead to a structural 
change in the vertical relationship between the North Korean regime and the people. In 
particular, more detailed analysis is needed of the potential impact of the democratization or 
liberalization of the North Korean regime on North Korean society and its people.  
 
In this study, I set out three major paths for the North Korean regime to move forward. The 
first scenario is "Regime collapse." It has been pointed out that the dictatorship of North Korea 
could face resistance by internal forces. The collapse of the regime may occur due to challenges 
from the prevailing elites or due to pressures from below. An externally induced regime 
collapse is also possible. If the diplomatic isolation and economic deterioration continue, the 
legitimacy of the Kim Jong-un regime could suffer considerable damage. The second scenario 
is "Status quo." The autocratic regime of North Korea has sowed some seeds of change over 
the past few decades, but none of them has bloomed. It could be the case that North Korea 
maintains the current status of autocracy without major changes. The last path is a "Democratic 
transition" in the North Korean regime. In order for the North Korean government to give up 
nuclear development and find a new means of survival, it is inevitable that a substantial 
transformation would be required. The reign of the Kim dynasty in North Korea has lasted for 
the last almost 70 years, which suggests that a sudden democratic transition in North Korea 




The key conceptual framework for this study, which explains the relationship between North 
Korean regime transition and population outflows, involves the motivation for North Koreans 
to flee and the availability of opportunities to move abroad. Regime transition in an autocratic 
country can be interpreted as a change in the level of structural control exercised by the regime 
on its people. The motivations and opportunities for North Koreans to flee may be increased 
or restricted depending on the path the regime transition goes down. 
 
3. 1 The future of the North Korean regime and its impact on population 
outflows 
3.1.1 Regime collapse    
 
One possible path that North Korea's regime may take is experiencing a weakening of the 
current autocratic government. This could appear in various forms. Regime change could take 
place through a coup or revolt by internal forces. In the most extreme form, it could be the 
collapse of the regime (Olson, 2016). Pessimism over the stability and durability of the North 
Korean regime has been steadily rising and attracted much attention after Kim Jong-il's death. 
The view was that the emergence of a new leader, Kim Jong-un, who lacked political 
experience could lead to a power vacuum among the elites and increase political instability in 
North Korea (Kim and Roland, 2012). Bruce Bennett is a leading scholar who asserts that there 
is a possibility of the collapse of the North Korean regime. In his book, Preparing for the 
Possibility of North Korean Collapse (2013), he argues that the North Korean regime is already 
in the process of failing or eroding and that collapse could take either of two forms: the collapse 
of the regime or the collapse of the government. The limitations caused by the continuous 
blocking of the inflow of external information, the loss of the engine of economic growth 
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caused by cuts in foreign currencies due to the economic sanctions, insufficient energy, and 
constant natural disasters are viewed as major factors weakening the legitimacy and durability 
of the regime (ibid.).  
 
The limitations of an anachronistic ideology that does not reflect the demands of the people 
have also been regarded as a factor causing instability of the regime. Park, using path dependent 
theory, analyzes that the monolithic system, backed up by the Juche Ideology which was 
established during the Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il regimes, has played an important role in 
consolidating and maintaining the stability of the current regime (2014, pp.8-11). However, 
researchers have also evaluated the legitimacy of Juche Ideology, which justifies absolute 
autocracy, and have found it to have been significantly weakened under the Kim Jong-un's 
regime (Kim et al., 2015). Choi (2017) points out that both the economic crisis and the influx 
of information from the outside have undermined the ideological foundation that sustains the 
North Korean regime. As a result, the Kim Jong-un regime has had to rely more on rule by 
force based on a stricter penal system. Gerschewski (2013) explains that the elements that make 
up the regime stability of an autocratic country are legitimation, repression, and co-optation. In 
his work, he points out that many autocratic countries failed to resolve the gap between 
ideological claims and social reality, thus losing regime legitimacy. In the case of Cuba and 
North Korea, which are classified as "ideocracies," the indoctrination mechanism, which serves 
as the backbone of the regime, is no longer sustainable. Again, no matter how strong the control 
measures that are used, it is impossible to completely prevent the inflow of information from 
the outside. The widening gap between the ideological claims made by the autocratic regime 
and actual reality make the North Korean regime more vulnerable to public assessment (ibid.). 
It is believed that it would be difficult for both the North Korean and Cuban regimes to maintain 
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long-term stability unless their economic levels rise to those of China or Vietnam (Saxonberg, 
2013).  
 
The diminishing solidarity among the ruling elites is also pointed out as a factor weakening 
the current regime. In the past, strong cohesion among the top-level power elites has been the 
foundation for sustaining the North Korean regime, guided by the Juche Ideology and the 
absolutism of the Suryong system (Kim, 2008). However, according to a systemic qualitative 
assessment of the North Korean political system conducted by Kim et al. (2015), partisan 
homogeneity and the once strong solidarity between the autocrat and the political elites has 
been significantly diminished in the Kim Jong-un regime. It is viewed that the coalition of 
power elites surrounding Kim Jong-un's regime is mainly based on economic interests and is 
maintained by the regime's strong surveillance and control. Hence, the division of these power 
elites responsible for sustaining the regime would accelerate if economic interests are damaged. 
Kim et al. argue that the fact that the ruling regime lacks ideological legitimacy has already led 
to the desertion of power elites by pointing out that the 46 high ranking individuals left the 
country between 2012-2015 (ibid. pp. 170-172). Furthermore, widespread public 
dissatisfaction with economic policies has significantly undermined the political loyalty felt 
toward the country's supreme leader, Kim Jong-un. Choi's (2017) analysis posits that the failure 
of the central economy in North Korea and the marketization generated by the public have 
changed the fundamental relationship between state and society. North Korean leaders have 
lost the ability to control the masses through ideology in the same way as they did in the past. 
In other words, the North Korean regime takes the form of "dominance without hegemony," 




The conflict between economic and political policies is also pointed out as a factor 
weakening the legitimacy of this regime. Cha (2013) argues that the marketization and 
ideological reification that the North Korean government has carried out has resulted in 
widening the gap between ideology and reality. While marketization, which was introduced 
after 2002, has lowered the people's economic dependence and political loyalty to the regime, 
the North Korean government is caught in the dilemma of reproducing a political ideology that 
seems far removed from reality in order to justify its economic failure and to control a society 
evolving toward democracy. According to a survey conducted by the Database Center for 
North Korean Human Rights on 414 North Korean defectors living in South Korea in 2018, 
61.8% of survey respondents replied that they had remitted to their families living in North 
Korea through unofficial routes. The total amount of these remittances delivered to North 
Korean families is reported to exceed $270,000 a year. Given that there are 34,000 North 
Korean defectors staying in South Korea, it suggests that a significant number of North Koreans 
now rely on remittances from overseas for their livelihood. According to statistical analysis 
carried out by Escribà-Folch et al. (2018), based on cross-national data on a latent measure of 
anti-government political protest and individual-level survey data from eight African non-
democracies, remittances are found to increase political protest in dictatorships by expanding 
the resources that government opponents can mobilize to protest against the regime. The 
weakening of the North Korean people's ideological and economic dependence on the ruling 
party and the formation of alternative financial sources through informal routes at the 
individual level, which allows North Koreans to protest against the regime, can be regarded as 
factors that can cause destabilization of the North Korean government. The common premise 
of previous studies holding skeptical views about the North Korean regime's stability is that 
North Korea's diplomatic isolation and economic deterioration will hamper the legitimacy and 
stability of this autocratic system. From this viewpoint, considering the weakened legitimacy 
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of the current establishment due to continued diplomatic and economic isolation, the possibility 
cannot be ruled out that both elite groups and the masses may express their grievances in the 
form of coups or revolts, further undermining the stability of the regime.  
 
The prevailing view is that any type of regime collapse in North Korea can change the 
balance of power, not only in the Korean Peninsula but also in the entire East Asian region, 
and it can have direct or indirect impacts on the population outflow from North Korea (Bennett, 
2013; Han, 2017). 
 
This collapse could take various forms. For example, Bennett (2013, pp. 5-7) defines 
collapse as a situation in which the Kim regime is overthrown by opposing elites. The collapse 
of government is defined as the absence of any individual or group to take control of the 
government after the existing ruling regime has been overthrown. A scenario of regime 
collapse stemming from the outbreak of violence by popular uprisings has also been discussed, 
although the possibility of this occurring is not high (Han, 2017). The consequences of regime 
collapse for North Korean society can vary depending on how the existing government breaks 
down and which group of forces takes control. Stares (2016) argues that the likelihood of the 
use of violence by the ruling regime to tackle the opposition tends to increase in the face of the 
weakening of the regime caused by either popular uprising or leadership challenges by elite 
groups. According to the possible regime collapse and absorption paths presented by Pollock 
(1999, p.65-66), a conflict between the party and the military after the collapse of the current 
regime, it could lead to prolonged political turmoil and instability. Furthermore, it is expected 




The assertion that the collapse of the regime will increase population outflows is the 
prevailing theory, based on the belief that it will result in violence caused by conflicts among 
various elite groups (Mastro 2018; Pollack and Lee, 1999). Based on the analysis of both 
American and Chinese contingency plans towards the collapse of the North Korean regime, 
Mastro (2018) predicts that in the event of a sudden collapse of said regime, the influx of 
conflict-induced North Korean refugees into China is highly likely; this will trigger China's 
military intervention, based on the fact that the Chinese government has already established a 
military plan against the influx of refugees from North Korea. According to the analysis of 
Geddes et al. (2014), only 61 percent of the 16 communist countries that existed before the 
collapse of communism were democratized, and most of these countries experienced civil wars. 
Geddes et al. (2014) claim that the collapse of an autocratic state, ruled by a personalist 
dictatorship, is unlikely to lead to democratization and tends to result in the country falling into 
political chaos or being taken over by other autocratic regimes. From this perspective, the 
possibility of the outbreak of civil war caused by regime collapse cannot be overlooked. Much 
of the literature on the North Korean government is concerned with the occurrence of civil war, 
which is a situation that could result from regime collapse (Bennett 2013; Pollack and Lee, 
1999). Rotberg (2003) argues that a highly regimented regime in North Korea or in Iraq could 
collapse when the autocrat is overthrown. He also points out that the collapse of the regime can 
bring society into lawlessness by causing a power vacuum in the central government, which 







In a situation where a power vacuum is created after the Kim regime is overthrown or he is 
incapacitated by poor health, there is a possibility of intervention from neighboring countries. 
It has been observed that in the context of the outbreak of war or the collapse of the North 
Korean regime, military intervention from China in the North Korean region is highly likely; 
such intervention can be attributed to geopolitical, political, and economic considerations 
(Scobell and Cozad, 2014). The main purpose of intervention will be preventing North Korea's 
political and military instability from spilling over into neighboring countries. It has also been 
observed that the presence of the US and ROK military in North Korea and the dominant 
influence of these two countries in the stabilization process could lead to a political and military 
threat to China, which would induce that nation to engage in more aggressive intervention 
(ibid.). In particular, the desire to neutralize nuclear threats that could affect their own interests 
and to minimize refugee outflows from North Korea stand out as major motivations for 
intervention (Mastro 2018). South Korea and the United States also have a military operation 
plan called "Oplan 5029" to prepare for a sudden change in the North Korean regime. It is 
likely that external intervention in North Korea by outside forces seeking their own national 
interests could heighten regional tension and increase the possibility of civil war (Saeed and 
Przystup, 2011). Tschirgi (2004) also points out that external intervention in failing states, 
under the guise of so-called stabilization, tends to reflect the national security interests of the 
participating countries. Geopolitically, North Korea is bordered by China, Russia, and South 
Korea and shares its maritime territory with Japan and China. Politically, it is a region where 
the democratic alliance formed between Korea, the United States, and Japan, and the 
communist bloc formed between North Korea, China, and Russia can encounter each other. 
Given this, when the North Korean regime collapses, it may be difficult to find a consensus to 
satisfy all the interests of these countries on the Korean Peninsula. If such an external 
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intervention were to take place with military force, it could also have an adverse effect on 
regional stability.  
 
Analysis has shown that external intervention can increase the probability of the onset of 
civil war not only in the country of origin but also in neighboring countries, based on a 
statistical analysis that derives risk score for all states from 1957 to 2007 (Regan and Meachum, 
2014). Moreover, it has been pointed out that external intervention can even increase the 
duration of civil wars (Sambanis and Elbadawi, 2000; Wood et al., 2012). A large number of 
previous studies on forced migration have focused on the impact of violence on outmigration 
caused by civil war (Melander and Ö berg, 2007; Moore and Shellman, 2004; Weiner, 1996). 
Despite the existence of coercive control and punishment by the North Korean government of 
its people, the country has been relatively immune from civil war. This is because the Kim 
regime has suppressed potential opponents to its power by forming and maintaining an absolute 
ruling system through the use of the purge tactic (Horak, 2011). In addition to a strong control 
system, the absence of immediate violence in the region has played a role in maintaining a low 
level of population outflows from North Korea. However, if the current North Korean regime 
loses its legitimacy and a power vacuum is created among elite groups, the possibility of civil 
war may increase. The outbreak of civil war caused by conflicts between various actors, both 
inside and outside the country, can increase the possibility of a mass population exodus from 
North Korea. 
 
The impact of the collapse of the North Korean regime on population outflows can also be 
explained in terms of the loss of national control over the people. As Thompson and Freeman 
(2009) point out, the collapse of the North Korean government has the potential to trigger a 
massive refugee outflow because it could paralyze the security forces. Rotberg (2003) explains 
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that the collapse of a regime can be measured in terms of the geographical range within which 
it can still exercise its control because failed regimes are unable to maintain control over their 
borders. Chatelard (2010) explains that an autocratic regime based on succession is able to limit 
the freedom of movement of a particular group of people and also to displace them arbitrarily. 
Considering that strong border control has been an important means of deterring outmigration 
from North Korea, it is likely that a sudden weakening or collapse of the North Korean regime 
could paralyze its physical ability to deter North Koreans from escaping. In other words, this 
failure, coupled with the political turmoil brought by the breakdown of central authority, could 
be the starting point of mass refugee outbreaks. 
 
3.1.2 Democratic transition     
 
Some are optimistic about democratic changes in the regime in North Korea. Although various 
definitions of democratization exist, for the purposes of this study the term is defined as a 
regime change that further weakens the level of state control over the people. Hence, the 
general meaning of democratization, which is the process of transitioning a political system 
starting from the collapse and replacement of an authoritarian regime, does not necessarily 
strictly apply to this study (Przeworski, 1997; Pye, 1990). From a broad perspective, 
liberalization, the stage at which state control over the people is weakening, can be seen as an 
early phase of democratization, prior to radical changes in political institutions (Haggard and 
Kaufman, 2016). Some scholars such as Fish and Choudhry (2007) find that economic 
liberalization can advance political democratization. Also, in Huntington's study (1991; 1993), 
it is viewed that liberalization can be perceived as a slow path of political transition to 
democracy in that liberalization can reduce the level of state repression, restore civil society, 
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and permit the existence of public debate. O'Donnell define such cases as instances of 
"liberalized authoritarianism" or "limited democracy" (1986, p. 9). Historically, there are 
liberalized autocratic nations that maintain existing structures of authority, such as China and 
Vietnam. Considering the fact that the North Korean regime has never experienced the process 
of democratization, it is difficult to expect North Korea to establish complete democracy in the 
near future. Hence, in this section, the possibility that the current North Korean regime can 
move toward either liberalized authoritarianism or a limited democracy is discussed.  
 
The viewpoints that conclude that democratization in North Korea is unlikely are largely 
based on several deterrent factors such as the government's strong control over its people and 
the inadequacy of any opposing forces to resist the regime in power. In terms of civil society, 
however, there are also counter arguments suggesting that North Korean culture is changing in 
various aspects. For example, the emergence of a new economic class that has been created by 
marketization (Lankov, 2008) and the rise of groups of young elites who can access external 
information can be interpreted as the potential basis for the formation of a civil society, one 
that along with social media and pressure on human rights violations from the international 
community could hamper the legitimacy and durability of the autocratic regime and hasten 
democratization (Cha, 2013; Choi, 2017). Lee (2017) claims that the transition process has 
already begun within the North Korean regime. According to his analysis, in North Korea, the 
party elites and the military elites are in competition, and the North Korean command will 
experience either a gradual transition or a radical transition, depending on which elite group 
takes the initiative. The scenario of gradual transition is based on alleviating political tensions 
and attracting foreign capital through economic cooperation and improving relations with 
neighboring countries. This is a path of liberalization that can develop if the party takes the 
political initiative. Lankov (2008) points out that market liberalization would undermine the 
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existing political isolation. This is because political and economic engagement with the 
international community can play an important role in initiating the process of democratization, 
once North Korean society begins to open up. Although economic liberalization and 
democratization cannot be considered to have a causal relationship or to be the same 
phenomenon, what they have in common is that they restrict governmental authority and state 
power over people (Huntington, 1993). Becoming a normal state presupposes that North Korea 
will adhere to international norms and tolerate some degree of international intervention. 
Geddes (2011) points out that foreign aid and investment have made a significant contribution 
to the political transition of autocratic countries that have experienced the third wave of 
democratization. Also, Gleditsch and Choung's argument (2004) that an autocratic country with 
democratic neighboring states is highly likely to be democratized is worthy of attention, given 
that information on the political and economic prosperity of South Korea is flowing into North 
Korea through the black market, creating great pressure on the North Korean regime. In a 
similar vein, Pevehouse (2002), based on a statistical analysis showing the causal mechanism 
between being a member of international organizations and political liberalization, claims that 
joining an international organization composed of democratic countries can accelerate the 
democratization of a totalitarian state, thus indirectly suggesting that North Korea's 
normalization of diplomacy with the international community can serve as a springboard for 
democratization. Given that the North Korean economy has lost its self-sufficiency and that 
the preservation of a regime which heavily depends on ideology and political fear is exposed 
to a number of limitations, the North Korean government will require a new instrument to 
reinforce its political legitimacy. The strengthening of economic power could be the most 
effective tool to maintain the legitimacy of a regime which must replace nuclear supremacy 
policy and ideology (Ikenberry et al., 2004; Schmidt, 2012). For an economic recovery, it is 
essential that foreign trade routes be resumed; diplomatic normalization must also be achieved. 
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In North Korea, however, all trade routes have been blocked due to economic sanctions, and 
the scale of international trade has continued to decline since Kim Jong-un took office, as 
shown in the following graph. In addition, North Korea's trade dependence on China has been 
significant, approaching 94.8%, which is an increase of 2.1 % from 2016 (Statistics Korea, 
2018). Economic isolation, overall, is likely to put great pressure on the political autonomy and 
legitimacy of the North Korean government, which makes changes in the regime inevitable.   
 
 
Figure 7. The total foreign trade of North Korea, growth of foreign trade (%) 
 
(Statistics Korea, 2018)  
 
 
Reflecting this in his 2019 New Year's address, Kim Jong-un repeatedly expressed his firm 
commitment to establish a permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula and to move toward 
complete denuclearization. He emphasized economic development based on technology, 
resources, and creativity, and demonstrated the will for inter-Korean economic cooperation 
through the resumption of the Kaesong Industrial Complex and the Mt. Kumgang tourist region 
(Rodong Sinmun, 2019). This represents a significant change compared to his New Year's 
address of the previous year, which was heavily weighted toward demonstrating North Korea's 
nuclear capability and delivering warning messages to neighboring countries, including the 
United States and South Korea (The National Committee on North Korea, 2018). In the New 
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it was used only once. Even though the term was used, it was included in the context that 
nuclear options will not be used unless the sovereignty of North Korea is threatened. On the 
other hand, the word economy was used 21 times in 2018 and 38 times in 2019. Kim Jong-un, 
the supreme leader of North Korea, is clearly demonstrating his will to denuclearize and to 
normalize diplomatic relations with the international community. If his intentions progress to 
the transparent implementation of the denuclearization process, it is expected that North Korea 
will be able to resume economic and diplomatic exchanges with the international community 
as a normal nation. The weakening of political legitimacy, the loss of economic independence, 
the deterioration of public support, and the pressure from the international community are 
driving democratic changes in the North Korean regime.  
 
This study expects that democratization in North Korea will increase the volume of 
outmigration, as it will ease the level of state control over emigration. Loosened state control, 
which will result in a reduction in the risk of being penalized for escaping, is likely to provide 
opportunities for oppressed North Koreans to leave the country. Hence, the democratization 
process is likely to end the phenomenon of involuntary stay. The political and economic 
dissatisfaction of the people with the government can be visibly expressed by leaving the 
country, once structural obstacles are diminished (Hirschman, 1970, 1978).  
 
According to Freedom House, the degree of freedom in North Korea in 2017 was rated at 3 
out of 100 (Freedom House 2017). Given that serious human rights abuses are still being 
committed, it is likely that the sudden increase in the level of freedom of movement caused by 
democratization will lead to a population exodus. The outflow of forced migration, caused by 
a temporary relaxation of state regulation over international movement, is a phenomenon that 




In sum, democratization in North Korea is likely to increase the volume of outmigration. 
First, it is expected that the volume of defectors will increase due to the loosened border 
controls. Second, it is also possible that the North Korean government will strategically allow 
emigration for political and economic purposes once democratization proceeds in North Korea.  
 
3.1.3 Status Quo 
 
In contrast to the prediction that the regime will collapse, there are views that North Korea's 
current regime will remain stable. Another possible path for North Korea's regime is for it to 
maintain the status quo, where the form of the current regime continues without major changes. 
A group of researchers believe that the Kim Jong-un regime has durability in various aspects. 
At least on the surface, the Kim Jong-un regime has dispelled some external concerns that had 
arisen in the early days of the administration by demonstrating its durability over the past six 
years. Ironically, McEachern (2018) explains that the country's economic and military 
capabilities were the factors that enabled the Kim Jong-un regime to conduct stable government 
operations. He points out that the succession of Kim Jong-un from his father was made under 
much better conditions than Kim Jong-il's succession in terms of the level of economic and 
nuclear capabilities (ibid.). 
 
The absence of potential political forces to oppose the current autocratic regime is also 
pointed out as a major reason for the long-term dominance of the Kim regime. Although 
historically most authoritarian regimes have been overthrown by political rivals, in North 
Korea, neither political rivalry nor a civil society that can lead mobilization to resist Kim's 
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regime exist. Dukalskis (2016) views the Kim Jong-un regime as being in a stable status 
because the potential opposing forces that could pose a threat to the current regime were 
eliminated at the early stage of his administration. In a similar vein, Saxonberg (2013) argues 
that revolutionary potential is low in North Korean society by pointing out that, unlike other 
former communist countries such as East Germany and Romania, there are no dissident groups 
with the aim of instigating a revolutionary movement. Along with the absence of a civil society, 
Fiori and Kim (2014), based on their comparative study on democratization in the Middle East 
and African regions compared with the North Korean region, point out that the elite split and 
the lack of experience with a democratization movement are factors that sustain the current 
autocratic regime and hamper democratic transition in North Korea. They also claims that 
favorable international pressures for democratic change in North Korea have not been 
effectively formed. By using an example of the attitude of the Chinese government towards the 
democratic transition in the North Korean regime, it is explained that surrounding North Korea 
tend to prefer the status quo of the North Korean regime so that North Korea can exist as a 
region to buffer political and security interest conflicts the surrounding countries may have 
(ibid. p.51). 
 
A strong ruling system, designed to support the Kim regime, is also regarded as a major 
factor allowing regime persistence. For example, the nation's militarization, the leader system, 
elite co-optation, and post-unification uncertainty are assumed to be governing tools that have 
played a role in protecting the autocratic regime from collapsing (Horak, 2011). Kightley (2016) 
argues that the North Korean government has been efficient in minimizing the potential for 
formation of hostile forces against the Kim regime. Because the North Korean government is 
equipped with strong coup-proofing institutions to prevent various forms of revolt, North 
Korean leaders can easily identify and prevent anti-regime movements. With their qualitative 
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assessment on the authoritarian regime's deterrence strategies against the outbreak of 
revolution as a foundation, Byman and Lind (2010) argue that the North Korean regime has 
long deterred the formation of opposing forces through various methods, such as education, a 
class system, co-optation, the monopoly of information, and the establishment of direct security 
institutions under the regime. Scholars who believe that the possibility of regime transition or 
regime collapse in North Korea is low commonly point out that the basis for forming opposing 
forces against the current autocratic regime is very weak in North Korea.  
 
It has been observed that a majority of the existing nation-states that have tight control over 
population flows are highly ideological one-party states (Dowty, 1987). This suggests that the 
nature of those governing systems is an important determinant influencing the degree of 
population outflows. This has also been the case in North Korea, where the type of governing 
system has played a significant role in minimizing the volume of outmigration. The North 
Korean regime defines "defection" as a penal offence (Lohman, 1996).  
 
The North Korean regime strictly restricts interactions with the outside world in almost all 
areas (Kwon and Chung, 2012). Lohman (1996) argues that the legal system in North Korea 
merely reflects the interests of the state. Consequently, individual rights and freedoms tend to 
be marginalized in order to satisfy the interests of the ruling regime. From a legal perspective, 
before the ninth amendment to the Constitution was made in 1998, the right to freedom of 
movement was not even specified in the Constitution of North Korea. Under chapter 5, article 
75 of the amended Constitution, freedom of movement and residence is legally guaranteed; 
however, North Koreans are still unable to enjoy those legal rights.3 For a North Korean citizen, 





long-term stays outside his or her residence are limited, and movement across cities is also 
strongly controlled (Lohman, 1996). Punishments for an illegal border crossing, including 
imprisonment, various forms of torture, and execution have continued to be reported (Noland 
and Haggard, 2009). The environment beyond the borders of this nation is not favorable to 
North Korean defectors. China, which is regarded as the most accessible destination for North 
Koreans, has maintained a policy of repatriation in agreement with the North Korean 
government. The Chinese government does not grant refugee status to North Koreans arrested 
in Chinese territory and treats them as illegal economic migrants (Human Rights Watch, 2017). 
It is believed that one possible reason the Chinese government maintains such a strict policy 
toward North Korean defectors is out of concern for the political and economic instability that 
could be caused by the large-scale influx of refugees from North Korea (Cohen, 2014). 
 
According to Dowty's analysis (1988), North Korea's emigration policy can be classified as 
following the Soviet model. In Soviet regimes, leaving one's own country was seen as a betrayal 
that signified disloyalty to the state. Interaction with the outside world, an ideological enemy, 
was perceived as a political threat to the regime. Collectivism, which prioritizes the state over 
the individual, became widespread after World War Ⅰ, when strong ethnic and ideological blocs 
were formed. After World War Ⅱ, in the early 1950s, the Soviet model of emigration policies 
permeated most of the Eastern European states, China, Mongolia, and North Korea (ibid.). 
Although most of these countries have experienced liberalization and have opened their borders, 
it seems that the North Korean regime can still be defined as following the Soviet model in that 
it remains hostile to the outside world, maintaining an ideological propaganda system and 




controlling internal society by blocking the border to prevent both human and material 
exchanges.  
 
It is difficult to count accurately how many people have fled from North Korea because these 
escapes take place in secret. According to a report submitted to the US Congress in 2007, 
estimates of the number of North Korean refugees living in China range from 30,000 to 50,000 
(Margesson et al., 2007). The Norwegian Refugee Council estimates that between 50,000 and 
200,000 North Korean defectors are currently hiding in China (Skretteberg, 2018). While a 
considerable number of people who have fled North Korea are staying illegally in China, there 
are others who try to ensure their political and economic security by applying for refugee status 
in a third country. South Korea has been regarded as a primary destination for North Korean 
refugees (Song, 2013). The figure below shows the number of North Korean defectors who 
settled in South Korea from 2001 to 2018 (Ministry of Unification ROK, 2018). The average 
number of North Koreans who have entered South Korea is slightly over 1,700 per year, 
reaching a peak of 2,914 in 2009, and has declined afterward. 
 
Figure 8. Annual number of North Korean defectors entering South Korea  
 
 
(Ministry of Unification ROK, 2018) 
 
 
On the other hand, the annual number of asylum applications submitted by North Koreans 
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North Korean refugees, these two countries are excluded from the refugee data provided by the 
UNHCR. China has not officially granted refugee status to North Koreans (Lankov, 2004). 
Also, the Constitution of the Republic of Korea recognizes people living on the Korean 
Peninsula as its citizens.4 For this reason, North Koreans who have entered South Korea are 
not recognized as refugees. The average number of asylum applications filed by North Korean 
defectors between 2000 and 2017 is only 350 per year. Given that the total population of North 
Korea was around 25 million in 2018, the ratio of asylum seekers to the total population has 
remained at a very low level. 
 






More importantly, it is remarkable that the number of people from North Korea attempting 
to seek asylum has tended to decrease since 2012 on both indicators. This illustrates that 
outmigration from North Korea has been decreasing since Kim Jong-un came into power. It 
can be surmised that the Kim Jong-un regime has raised the level of surveillance against 
population outflows, and this has made it harder for North Koreans to escape. The ruling system 
of North Korea established by Kim Il Sung has been maintained through three generations of 
hereditary succession for almost 70 years. The fundamental framework of government has not 
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changed much. In the sense that control over North Korean population flows is directly related 
to the stability of the regime, the existing policies on emigration, so important for maintaining 
that stability, are likely to be maintained if there are no remarkable changes in the current 
government in the near future.  
 
3.2 Statistical analysis controlling for an autocratic military regime 
 
This study aims to identify the effects of various transitional paths that the North Korean regime 
may face on the outflow of asylum seekers. Additional statistical models are established 
examining the effect of regime variation on population outflow across autocratic milieus, 
particularly under the rule of military regime, considering that the North Korean regime is a 
system that exerts strong control over its citizens through the military. In Table 3, the Models 
replicate Model 4 from Table 1 and further control for countries with an exclusively autocratic 
military regime. The autocratic military regime variable comes from Autocratic Breakdown 
and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set by Geddes et al. (2014). This binary variable is coded 
as 1 for autocratic military regimes and 0 otherwise. The study assumes that the population 
outflow from an autocratic state can occur when people are motivated to leave the country and 
given the opportunity to leave the country. The availability of chances to leave an autocratic 
state is closely related to the level of individual freedom of international movement. It is likely 
that the increase in the level of freedom of foreign movement in the autocratic military regime 
is expected to increase the volume of forced migration generated. This is because mitigated 
border control gives citizens more opportunities to leave the country. A measure of the freedom 
of foreign movement of the Human Rights Dataset from Cingranelli-Rishards (Cingranelli et 
al., 2014) is used to test this hypothesis. This indicator is measured on a 0–2 scale, where 2 
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indicates that the freedom of foreign movement is not restricted by the government, while 0 
indicates that this freedom is entirely restricted by the government. This variable is interacted 
with the autocratic military regime variable. Autocratic military regime is predicted to be 
inversely related to the density of forced migration generated. Nevertheless, if the high level of 
freedom of foreign movement exists in such a regime, the deterrent effect on population 
outflows due to the autocratic military regime may be reduced. In other words, higher freedom 
of foreign movement in an autocratic regime will increase the magnitude of population 
outflows. To measure the status quo in the autocratic military regime, we employ the 
interaction term between the regime durability variable (Regime_Durability) and the military 
regime (Auto_Military). The higher the durability of the autocratic military regime, the less the 
population outflow.  
   
In general, the results in Table 3 are consistent with the results of the models in Table 1. 
Therefore, here I discuss the results of the variables interacting with the autocratic military 
regime exclusively. In all models of Table 3, the regime durability parameter (ß2) shows no 
statistical significance. This indicates that the durability of a regime may not have a significant 
influence on population outflow. Despite the insignificant direct influence, the factor is shown 
to have moderating effects on the association between an autocratic military regime and forced 
migration. In particular, the coefficient revealed in Model 2 of Table 3 indicates the statistical 
significance at 5% of the interaction term Durability_Military. This implies that the durable 
length of a regime has a significant influence on the population outflow of an autocratic military 
country. Notably, in this model after the interaction of Durability_Military is accounted for, 
the single effect of Auto_Military is not statistically significant. Nevertheless, due to the 
significant moderating effect of Durability_Military, the negative values of Auto_Military may 
increase to a significant level of at least 5%. In other words, if the autocratic military regime is 
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durable, the population outflows tend to drop more compared to a less durable autocratic 
military regime. In our model, an increase in the durability of the autocratic regime appears to 
inhibit 21% of population outflow (IRR = 0.785). These results suggest that regime durability, 
as measured by the length of regime duration, generally does not have a significant impact on 
forced migration outflows. Importantly, however, the high degree of durability of the autocratic 
military regime reduces population outflow. This result implies that the outflow of asylum 
seekers will be likely curbed if North Korea's current regime continues without major 
transitions.  
 
In Model 1 and 2, the freedom of movement variable has a nonlinear relationship with the 
number of asylum seekers. In general, given that freedom of foreign movement tends to be less 
restricted in democratic countries, it can be understood that freedom of foreign movement is 
inversely related to the magnitude of the asylum seekers. The factor imposes direct effects on 
population outflow as well as significantly positively moderating the effect of an autocratic 
military regime (coefficient = 0.552 and 0.331, p-values < .1% and 5% respectively). This 
means that the decreased level of outflows of asylum seekers of military countries is smaller if 
the countries have higher freedom of movement across borders. For more specific effects as 
provided in Table 4, an increase in the level of freedom of foreign movement can decrease the 
number of asylum seekers by 15% (IRR= 0.849). However, a higher level of freedom of foreign 
movement in the country under an autocratic military regime offsets around 37.9% of the 
negative effect on the outflow of asylum seekers. This result indicates that while a military 
regime alone may restrict forced migration, yet as soon as the freedom of international 
movement is allowed, the forced migrants will seize the greater opportunities to leave and 
escape from these countries. More specifically, if the North Korean regime has not been 
transformed into a fully democratized state, that is, while maintaining the shape of an autocratic 
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state, if the North Korean regime loosens its restrictions on foreign movement, an increase in 
forced migration is expected.  
Table 3. Negative binomial regression results - controlling military regime 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Dependent variable 
Authority_Failure 0.146** 0.145** 
 (3.01) (2.97) 
Regime_Transition 0.0386*** 0.0352** 
 (3.47) (3.13) 
Regime_Durability+ 0.000850 0.0116 
 (0.03) (0.45) 
Physical integrity rights -0.0811*** -0.0820*** 
 (-5.37) (-5.46) 
Population+ 0.278*** 0.285*** 
 (6.37) (6.54) 
GDP per capita+ 0.103** 0.0936** 
 (3.06) (2.76) 
Landsize+ -0.0629+ -0.0649+ 
 (-1.75) (-1.81) 
Democracy neighbors in the region 0.00876*** 0.00887*** 
 (5.28) (5.36) 
Civil war* 0.219+ 0.218+ 
 (1.93) (1.93) 
International war* -0.0518 -0.0524 
 (-0.16) (-0.17) 
Genocide politicide* 1.105*** 1.113*** 
 (4.55) (4.59) 
Freeforeignmove -0.165*** -0.164*** 
 (-5.66) (-5.65) 
Interactions   
Auto_Military* -0.808** -0.210 
 (-3.17) (-0.71) 
Freeforeignmove_Military 0.552*** 0.321* 
 (3.30) (1.98) 
Durability_Military  -0.242* 
  (-2.44) 
_cons -3.392*** -3.424*** 
 (-5.55) (-5.62) 
Number of observations 1434 1434 
t statistics in parentheses + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 









Table 4. Negative binomial regression results in incidence rate ratio - controlling military 
regime 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Dependent variable 
Authority_Failure 1.158** 1.156** 
 (3.01) (2.97) 
Regime_Transition 1.039*** 1.036** 
 (3.47) (3.13) 
Regime_Durability+ 1.001 1.012 
 (0.03) (0.45) 
Physical integrity rights 0.922*** 0.921*** 
 (-5.37) (-5.46) 
Population+ 1.320*** 1.329*** 
 (6.37) (6.54) 
GDP per capita+ 1.109** 1.098** 
 (3.06) (2.76) 
Land size+ 0.939+ 0.937+ 
 (-1.75) (-1.81) 
Democratic neighbors in the region 1.009*** 1.009*** 
 (5.28) (5.36) 
Civil war* 1.245+ 1.244+ 
 (1.93) (1.93) 
International war* 0.950 0.949 
 (-0.16) (-0.17) 
Genocide & politicide* 3.019*** 3.042*** 
 (4.55) (4.59) 
Freeforeignmove 0.848*** 0.849*** 
 (-5.66) (-5.65) 
Interactions   
Auto_Military* 0.446** 0.810 
 (-3.17) (-0.71) 
Freeforeignmove_Military 1.737*** 1.379* 
 (3.30) (1.98) 
Durability_Military  0.785* 
  (-2.44) 
Number of observations 1434 1434 
Exponentiated coefficients; t statistics in parentheses + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 








3.2.1 Additional analysis  
Controlling adverse regime changes  
 
Our main analysis aims to analyze the impact of regime collapse on population outflow. The 
loss of control or the complete collapse of the existing regime can take place typically due to 
irregular adverse regime changes. Therefore, the study employed a variable capturing adverse 
regime changes as an alternative measure of regime collapse. As presented in the study, the 
probability of a regime change by popular uprising or a coup by an elite opposition group exists 
in North Korea, even if such a likelihood remains low. However, the possibility of an adverse 
regime change could increase if there was a power vacuum created by the sudden incapacitation 
of the supreme leader of the regime. Previous studies pointed out the impact of regime change 
on forced migration. Notably, Moore and Shellman (2007) find that the presence of a transition 
regime of country of origin increases refugee flow. More importantly, the violence involved in 
the course of adverse regime change increases the security threats and can lead to population 
outflows. A substantial prior literature commonly suggest that the presence of violent conflict 
induces human displacement (Davenport et al., 2003; Moore and Shellman, 2004; Neumayer, 
2005; Schmeidl, 1997; Weiner, 1996). Therefore, an indicator of Adverse_Regime_Change 
(violence associated with Adverse Regime Change, which is part of the PITF — State Failure 
Problem Set: Internal Wars and Failures of Governance, 1955–2017) is utilized (Marshall et 
al., 2018). This indicator is measured on a scale from 1 to 4, where 1 represents adverse regime 
change without armed violence, and 4 represents widespread violence affecting a wide range 
of areas including the capital. Observations that have not undergone an adverse regime change 
are coded 0. The model specifications in Table 5 replicate the models of the main analysis as 
presented in Table 3 with an alternative measure of dependent variable. Then, the 
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Authority_Failure variable is substituted with the Adverse_Regime_Change indicator. The 
results are consistent with those of the main analysis. The occurrence of adverse regime change 
is significantly and positively associated with population outflows. Besides, the intensity and 
geographic extent of armed violence associated with adverse regime change appear to be 
positively related to the amount of outflow. These results suggest that the occurrence of adverse 
regime change in North Korea is likely to increase the outflow of population. 
 
Table 5. Negative binomial regression results for the effects of Adverse Regime Change on 
asylum seekers 
 
 Model 2 Model 3 
Dependent variable 
Adverse_Regime_Change 0.520*** 0.510*** 
 (3.38) (3.31) 
Regime_Transition 0.0513*** 0.0480*** 
 (4.34) (4.00) 
Regime_Durability+ 0.0169 0.0270 
 (0.63) (1.00) 
Physical integrity rights -0.0802*** -0.0811*** 
 (-5.31) (-5.40) 
Population+ 0.281*** 0.287*** 
 (6.43) (6.59) 
GDP per capita+ 0.0987** 0.0892** 
 (2.91) (2.62) 
Land size+ -0.0635+ -0.0655+ 
 (-1.76) (-1.83) 
Democratic neighbors in the region 0.00858*** 0.00869*** 
 (5.17) (5.26) 
Civil war* 0.221+ 0.219+ 
 (1.96) (1.95) 
International war* -0.0528 -0.0537 
 (-0.17) (-0.17) 
Genocide & politicide* 1.123*** 1.130*** 
 (4.62) (4.65) 
Freeforeignmove -0.160*** -0.159*** 
 (-5.52) (-5.51) 
Auto_Military* -0.833** -0.250 
 (-3.27) (-0.83) 
Freeforeignmove_Military 0.572*** 0.346* 
 (3.41) (2.12) 
Durability_Military  -0.236* 
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  (-2.38) 
_cons -3.440*** -3.468*** 
 (-5.62) (-5.69) 
Number of observations 1434 1434 
t statistics in parentheses + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Note: 1) * Dummy variable 2) +log transformed variable for a normal distribution  
 
4 Discussion   
 
Globally, the increase in the outflow of refugees has become an undeniable phenomenon that 
can affect regional security and peace (Bariagaber, 1997; Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006). 
However, East Asia, including the Korean Peninsula, has been less influenced by flows of 
forced migrants compared to other parts of the world in the past decades. When Western 
European countries experienced a migration crisis which was initiated by conflicts in Middle 
Eastern countries, particularly Syria in 2013, the number of generated refugees from East Asia 
accounted for only 0.25% of the total number of refugees worldwide, while only 0.01% of the 
refugees from other regions flowed into East Asia (University of Zurich 2017). Nonetheless, 
the concerns of the international community about the possibility of a flood of refugees from 
North Korea have not been completely dispelled due to the persistent political and military 
uncertainty, economic deterioration, and human rights abuses in that nation. 
 
The North Korean regime may be moving toward a different future. It may maintain its 
current status without major changes, may be weakened or collapsed by internal or external 
forces, or may move toward reform and democratization, as other communist countries have 
experienced. This study attempted to analyze the possibility of population outflows from North 
Korea according to the various paths down which the North Korean regime could proceed. It 
began with the belief that regime change is the key to predicting outmigration from North 
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Korea in the future, considering that any form of outmigration has been strongly restricted and 
controlled by the ruling regime.  
 
In this study, I analyzed the probability of a large volume of outmigration from North Korea 
and concluded that the possibility of exodus will remain low if the current regime continues to 
maintain its power and operate in the same way as in the past. Hollyer et al. (2015) note that 
publicly observable information could enable the populace to organize a collective revolt 
against the regime. For an autocrat, the control of information can play a vital role in hiding 
the weaknesses of the regime and in preventing mass uprisings. Population migration can be a 
vehicle for the spread of information and can preclude the autocrat from monopolizing 
information. Given that the volume of outmigration from North Korea has been noticeably 
reduced since the Kim Jong-un regime took power, it is possible to predict that the freedom of 
movement of North Koreans will continue to be tightly controlled unless the regime changes 
its emigration policies. On the other hand, this study argues that the volume of outmigration 
can increase if the regime collapses or if the regime is rapidly liberalized. It may seem strange 
to conclude that the totally different phenomena of the collapse of the regime and the 
democratic transition of the regime can both increase the volume of outmigration. However, it 
is clear that both phenomena have in common that they can cause weakening or loss of 
government control over the people, which could lead to massive population outflows.   
 
This analysis reminds us of one important thing in analyzing population outflows from North 
Korea: the situation that can cause these outflows is not limited to the collapse of the regime. 
Most of the existing studies related to North Korean refugee outbreaks presuppose the collapse 
of the regime in North Korea or sudden changes that are the equivalent of a government 
breakdown. This study agrees with the existing view that the social instability and conflicts 
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that will result from the collapse of the regime in North Korea can directly affect refugee 
outflows. However, the regime has exercised unprecedented control over its citizens for the 
past half-century, and such strong state control has suppressed outmigration from North Korea. 
Thus, any form of regime change that could change the level of state control over the people, 
not just regime collapse, should be discussed to analyze outmigration from North Korea. 
 
This study is skeptical about the vague optimism that liberalization and democratization in 
an autocratic regime will contribute to the stability of regional security. Although the 
establishment of a mature democracy in a formerly autocratic country can help achieve peace 
locally, until that democracy is fully consolidated, the process of democratization can aggregate 
political crises and intensify social disorder (O'Donnell, 1973; Mansfield and Snyder, 1995). 
Many scholars point out that, historically, autocratic nations have experienced conflicts in the 
process of democratization, and that many nations have failed to actually establish a sound 
democracy (Ward and Gleditsch, 1998; Powell 1982). More importantly, we need to pay 
attention to the possibility that, should there be a sudden liberalization of the North Korean 
regime, the oppressed North Korean people might pour out instantly once the level of state 
control over them begins to decrease as a result.  
 
As we discussed earlier, historically, large-scale exoduses occurred not only when the state's 
regime collapsed, but also when it was rapidly liberalized or democratized. In particular, the 
collapse of communism can serve as an example of how democratization can affect the outflow 
of refugees following the collapse of an existing regime. In order to maintain sustainable peace 
and security in Northeast Asia, the possible future paths of the North Korean regime and their 
consequences should be discussed from various perspectives among scholars and policymakers. 
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In particular, it is expected that both security and humanitarian measures against population 
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Ⅷ  Summary of conclusions  
 
The summary of the overall contribution to the existing knowledge of this thesis is as follows. 
  
This thesis provides an alternative framework for discussion of the phenomenon of 
displacement flows, which was approached mainly based on a conflict-induced framework in 
previous studies. This thesis offers a systemic understanding of the influence of regime 
transition in the country of origin in connection with the flow of forced migration. It shows, 
empirically and theoretically, how each path of regime change or transition that can be 
developed in various directions affects displacement flow differently. Theoretically bridging 
between regime transition and forced migration is essential in several respects. First, in the 
field of forced migration studies, this attempt enriches the analysis of the causes of forced 
migration. In the past, most of the studies analyzing the causes of forced migration tended to 
pay attention exclusively to the factors that can increase the motivation of those who want to 
leave the country, especially displacement due to conflict. However, what we should not miss 
is that human displacement can occur outside of wartime, and it can still occur even in times 
of peace. A population outflow occurs when people are motivated to leave, and when those 
who want to leave are given the opportunities to do so. In explaining the structural conditions 
that initiate a population exodus, this study focused on the political regime in the country of 
origin. The transition in the regime is the key to understanding the phenomenon of population 
outflow in that people's motivations and opportunities for fleeing can be increased or limited 
by the process of regime transition. The empirical analyses provided strong evidence that 
transitions that develop in different directions in the regime each can play a crucial role in the 
level of population outflow. The theoretical framework provided by this paper thus enables a 
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broader and more in-depth discussion of the phenomenon of forced migration without 
impeding the findings of the cause of forced migration in existing studies. It provides a hint as 
to why human displacement can still occur even when people are not living in times of conflict. 
More importantly, this study raises an important message that the international community 
must not only make peacemaking efforts to predict, prevent, and prepare for human 
displacement, but also carefully observe whether there is an abrupt and sudden regime 
transition in the country of origin, regardless of the direction of the transition. Secondly, this 
attempt at theoretical bridging has important implications for discussions about the impact of 
a country’s regime transition on its society and its people. Studies on the consequences of 
regime transition in the political, economic, and security domains have accumulated 
considerably. However, studies that directly deal with the influence of regime transition on the 
inflow and outflow of the population are scare. In this regard, this thesis has meaningful 
academic contributions in that it complements the existing partial understanding of the effects 
of political dynamics in the country of origin on the population outflow by providing a 
comprehensive theory linking the regime transition and forced migration.  
  
The detailed academic implications and contributions of findings in each paper are as follows. 
  
The first paper looks at the impact of the occurrence of coups on refugee outflows. The 
important academic contribution of this paper is that it deals in-depth with coups d'état, a form 
of political instability not covered in previous studies in connection with refugee flows, and 
presents an explanation of how the outbreak of the coup increases refugees flows. By offering 
statistical findings, supplemented by evidence from the coups in Uruguay in 1973 and 1975 
and the coups in 2011 and 2013 in Egypt, this study shows that an argument that the outbreak 
of a coup can be considered a risk factor for anticipating an increase in refugees is not artificial, 
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in the aspect that the replacement of the existing regime by a coup would inevitably increase 
political, economic, and security insecurity, increasing people's aspirations to migrate. A more 
important academic novelty of this paper is not only to identify the effect of the coup per se on 
refugee outflows but also to show the reactive pattern of refugee flows according to regime 
dynamics that can unfold in various directions during and after the coup. Therefore, this study 
is expected to lay the groundwork for predicting and preparing for the outflow of the population 
according to the various regime dynamics that stem from a coup.  
  
The second paper identifies whether regime transition affects the increase in outflow of 
asylum seekers, and if so, whether its influence varies depending on the direction of the 
transition. The findings indicate that the increase in the volume of asylum seekers caused by 
democratization is more pronounced in autocratic countries, suggesting that the exodus of 
people is more likely when oppressed people are given greater opportunities to escape. On the 
other hand, the increase in population flight that is initiated by autocratization is more 
pronounced in non-autocratic countries but was found to be insignificant in autocratic countries. 
The results suggest that the increase in people's motivation to flee due to autocratization is 
difficult to realize in an environment where the opportunity to leave is not guaranteed. This 
study raised several important implications. First, vague positive expectations that the 
democratic regime transition in autocratic countries will bring about regional stability can be 
dangerous. Democracy is a good thing, but the journey to democracy can be tough. In 
promoting democratization in autocratic countries, the international community, local experts, 
and policymakers need to be prepared to deal with unexpected situations that may arise in the 
course of a democratic transition. It should be remembered that mass outflows of the population 
do not only occur during conflict but may also occur in the course of the democratic transition, 
which is expected as the measures to end the conflict and stabilize the region are carried out. 
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Second, although the majority of forced migration tends to be generated in conflict zones, we 
must remember that many people who are still under the threat of government oppression or 
conflict are unable to leave because they are not allowed to go. The international community 
should pay attention to those who cannot escape the dangers because there is no opportunity 
available for them. 
  
Since most of the forced migration is generated from autocratic milieus, it is important to 
see the effect of regime change in authoritarian regimes on outmigration. Regime transition in 
an autocratic country can be interpreted as a change in the level of structural control exercised 
by the regime on its people; hence, the motivations and opportunities for people to flee may be 
increased or restricted depending on the path the regime transition goes down. The importance 
and originality of the third paper is that it provides a systemic analysis of the impact of regime 
transition on the outflow of asylum seekers in autocratic countries and provides a 
comprehensive explanation of why different paths of transition can have different 
consequences on human displacement, supplemented by the empirical cases in which the 
regime transitions led an increase in outmigration. Furthermore, an in-depth case study analysis 
on North Korea which is presented in the paper fills a gap in the regional studies on forced 
migration. Surprisingly, relatively little research has been carried out on the possibility of mass 
forced migration from Northeast Asia and even less on North Korea, an area that is vulnerable 
to future political changes but has not yet experienced mass population outflows. The findings 
suggest that the collapse of the North Korean regime due to internal and external pressure could 
lead to the loss of state control over the population and create political and security threats to 
the people, leading to massive population outflows. Also, the volume of the exodus of people 
is expected to increase once sudden democratization takes place in North Korea, as it eases the 
level of state control over the citizenry and creates greater chances for people to escape. 
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However, if the current regime continues to maintain the existing way of governing, which 
firmly controls the people through coercive means, the likelihood of a massive population 
outflow from North Korea is expected to remain low. This paper makes an original contribution 
to the studies on North Korea by demonstrating a theoretical and practical understanding of a 
variety of possible paths for the North Korean regime to follow and the potential impacts of 
each of those trajectories on population outflows.  
 
It is hoped that the understanding of the link between regime transitions and the outflow of 
forced migration proposed in this study enables the prediction and analysis of regions that have 
the potential for regime transition but that have not yet experienced a mass population outflow. 
Also, it is hoped that this thesis contributes to the international community's efforts to predict, 
prevent, and prepare for the sudden outflow of forced migration that may occur in the future. 
 
 
